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Bulgaria: Khristov Assesses Bilateral Balkan Relations

AU1402174496 Sofia SEGA in Bulgarian 8-14 Feb 96 No 5, p 30

[Interview with Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Khristov by Ivo Stefanov; place and date not given: "Should We Pull Back From Greece Because of the Question of Balance?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Stefanov] Mr. Khristov, why is it necessary to hold a second Ioannina-type meeting in Varna?

[Khristov] The Dayton peace agreements have created a new situation. It is now necessary for us to undertake new initiatives, to obtain compensation for the great losses we suffered from the Yugoslav embargo, to ensure an overall stabilization of the region, and to create conditions for our region to join the process of European integration.

[Stefanov] Do you not think, however, that the absence of countries like Turkey, Albania, and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] implies a strengthening of the Athens-Belgrade-Sofia axis?

[Khristov] As you know, the government strongly opposes any axes whatsoever in the Balkans. The upcoming tripartite meeting will be held under the sign of European integration, which is why the foreign ministers of Greece—an EU member, and Bulgaria and Romania—both associated with the EU—are meeting. Neither Turkey nor Macedonia are EU members, so their absence is explicable.

[Stefanov] Does this mean that the regrouping in the Balkans is taking place under EU patronage?

[Khristov] Nothing of the kind. Since, at the meeting in Bulgaria, we will chiefly be discussing infrastructure projects that will be financed mainly by the EU, it is logical for the meeting to be held under the sign of European integration. We are preparing a six-sided meeting between the three countries and Austria, Hungary, and Slovakia. If you like, you can call this one Ioannina 3.

[Stefanov] What is your comment on the president's accusation that the government is creating an axis with Athens and Belgrade under Moscow's direction?

[Khristov] A balance does exist in our Balkan policy, but one should not make a fetish of this word. For example, Videnov cannot be in both Athens and Ankara at the same time nor can he be in Belgrade and Zagreb simultaneously. Let us take, for example, our relations with Turkey. We had an agreement in principle for Tansu Ciller to visit Sofia, but because of the government crisis there, it is clear that this visit will be delayed.

Apart from this, does this imply that if Greece shows a greater desire, a more constructive approach, and greater expeditiousness in considering bilateral issues, we should pull back to retain the balance?

[Stefanov] Why, then, has the dialogue with Macedonia become stalled?

[Khristov] Macedonia will not give up its formula for signing the bilateral agreements "in the Macedonian and Bulgarian languages." Naturally, such a position is unacceptable to us, but we have not refused to seek compromise alternatives. Last autumn, Foreign Minister Pirinski proposed "the official languages of the two countries" as a compromise formula. We are also prepared to sign the agreements in English.

Furthermore, we cannot close our eyes on the attitude of the Macedonian authorities toward the citizens who declare themselves to be Bulgarians. I believe that in certain aspects they have exceeded all limits.

[Stefanov] Are there any plans for summit visits in both directions in the near future?

[Khristov] At the moment we are working on a ministerial-level visit to Sofia. However, as long as the Macedonian side is not ready to unblock the signing of the agreements, what is the point of the ministers meeting? On the other hand, such a meeting might make an attempt to circumvent the problem.

[Stefanov] You deny the existence of Balkan axes, but is it not true that Prime Minister Videnov will go to Belgrade, but not to Zagreb?

[Khristov] If we look at this from a different angle, four agreements will certainly be signed in Zagreb, whereas it looks as if fewer agreements will be signed in the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. What is more, we have signed a friendship and cooperation treaty with Croatia, whereas a similar treaty with the FRY is still at the planning stage. Does this mean that a Sofia-Zagreb axis is being created?

[Stefanov] What will you say about the corridors?

[Khristov] The government will give its final support to the corridor for which the preparations are most advanced and which serves the communications links in the most integrated manner.

It would be better for us if both the North-South and East-West corridors pass through Bulgaria.

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[Stefanov] Do you expect any change in relations with Greece following the change of government in Athens?

[Khristov] No. We have quite a number of unresolved issues concerning the Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline, but Russia still has to have its say. If the Greek magnates continue to insist on reducing the Bulgarian participation to 5 percent, there is no reason why Russia should not act as arbiter on this issue.

We must also resolve certain less important problems, regarding the lamb and ice cream quotas, for example.

Bulgaria: Pirinski Answers Zhelev Policy Criticisms

AU1402182096 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 8 Feb 96 pp 7-8

[Article by Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski: "The Government's Foreign Policy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 31 January 1996 President Zhelev publicized his views on the government's performance during its first year in office. His statement contained extremely negative assertions concerning the government's foreign policy. These cannot be left without comment because, in the final analysis, they amount to the accusation that the government is conducting a policy that is irresponsible and runs counter to national interests. It is clear that such extremely grave words from the mouth of the president of the Republic must receive an adequate response.

The following account contains the main assertions put forward by the president together with findings and facts relating to them. These arguments and facts do not come from the government, but originate from representatives of Bulgaria's partner countries and international organizations.

Whether a deliberate policy of isolating the country is being conducted—the foreign minister, Zhelev claimed, had declared "the emphasis of economic aspects in foreign policy as a main priority," and an example provided of the alleged failure in this respect is the lack of foreign investments; other "examples" cited are the incomplete procedures for Bulgaria to join the World Trade Organization and neo-COCOM [successor to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls], the so-called EU black list, and the negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank.

Here is what UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali told BTA on 14 January 1996 regarding the government's foreign policy: "...I would like to stress that, thanks to the great efforts by your people, the reforms conducted by the government, and a new foreign policy, Bulgaria is assuming an important new role in the international community." Such a statement by the UN secretary general would hardly have been possible if there was any real basis to the assertion that a policy of isolating the country is being followed.

Regarding foreign policy priorities in general, in his statement at his meeting on 3 February with the members of the diplomatic corps accredited to Bulgaria, the prime minister declared: "The new cabinet commits itself to a foreign policy that guarantees the best possible conditions for Bulgaria's national security, its economic growth, and consolidation of the democratic processes. Our main aim will be to win Bulgaria a worthy place in international relations and to establish Bulgaria as a stable and reliable international partner. This implies continuity in defending national interests, realism and pragmatism, and equality of status and activity in the main directions of foreign policy."

These are precisely the real foreign policy priorities to which the government has consistently adhered. "The stressing of economic aspects" ["ekonomiziraneto"] in foreign policy, in the crude sense of this thesis (that is, as a Foreign Ministry department for trade and foreign investments), has never been advocated by the government. As early as 28 January 1995, in an interview I gave to Darik Radio, I attempted to explain that the economic priority in foreign policy involves not a direct commitment to the problems of foreign economic cooperation (for which other government bodies exist), but precisely that which the prime minister stressed in his foregoing statement—the establishment of Bulgaria as a stable and promising international partner, capable of assuming and fulfilling international commitments in a responsible way, which also serves as a general prerequisite for increasing foreign trade and for investment cooperation. I consider that, by and large, Bulgarian diplomacy is successfully implementing the economic priority precisely in this sense.

Regarding the specific "examples" concerning "deep international isolation," the truth is this:

—Negotiations for joining the World Trade Organization are in a particularly intensive phase, while we have the agreement and support of the EU, the United States, and other trading partners for the efforts to conclude the talks successfully during this year.

—Regarding the "black list," the EU has committed itself to objectively clarifying the criteria and indices for Bulgaria's removal from the list and to coordinating a joint plan for working to resolve this issue, also within the course of 1996.

—Regarding neo-COCOM, we have the support of almost all the countries for Bulgaria's early accession to the agreement.

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Alarm is allegedly aroused by "the lack of balance in the cabinet's Balkan policy"—the balanced policy toward all our neighbors appears "doubtful" and "very ambiguous" (the East-West corridor is cited as "most promising and important for Bulgaria,...for the entire Balkans, and for Europe"); the government is allegedly working for an "Orthodox axis," and so forth.

Here is the kind of assessment given to the agreement on Bulgaria's association with the EU by the supreme body—the EU Association Council, which includes the 15 foreign ministers of the EU member countries and the Bulgarian foreign minister. At the council's second session, held in Brussels only a few days ago, on 30 January 1996, it stated the following common position: "The Association Council highly praised Bulgaria's determination to develop regional cooperation and good-neighborly relations. The EU confirmed its support for Bulgaria's efforts to conclude agreements on free trade zones with the other associated countries and to join CEFTA [Central European Free Trade Agreement]. The Association Council noted Bulgaria's positive contribution to achieving the aims of the Pact for Stability in Europe and issued a reminder on the importance of the 'accompanying measures' for their implementation (i.e., measures in the economic field).

"In conclusion, the Association Council noted Bulgaria's constructive role throughout the period of the crisis in former Yugoslavia and welcomed Bulgaria's readiness to assist in implementing all the aspects of the Dayton agreement, including ensuring the success of the IFOR [Implementation Force] mission, and expressed its support for Bulgaria's active participation in the efforts to restore the country—both in immediate aid programs and in long-term programs."

It is evident that such an assessment would have been impossible if the claims concerning imbalances and ambiguities possessed any objective authenticity. As regards the transport corridors, it is absolutely groundless to make assertions about the government's "hostile attitude" to the East-West corridor. On 9 November 1995, the Council of Ministers established the government's position regarding the priorities of the regional infrastructure policy, in which Corridor No. 8 (that is, the East-West corridor) is treated on an equal basis with the other three corridors crossing Bulgaria's territory: "The priority of a balanced attitude in our foreign policy efforts to ensure a favorable climate for infrastructure development is directly related to the Bulgarian state's efforts to guarantee security through cooperation and integration.... The country's foreign policy interests do not permit the one-sided development of the national infrastructure in a single direction, regardless of the other corridors passing through the country's territory, let alone in conflict with them."

Furthermore, it should now be clear to everyone that Bulgaria, together with Greece and Romania, is developing forms of cooperation in conformance with these countries' association with and membership of the EU. In the joint statement issued after the meeting of the foreign ministers of Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece on 26 August 1995, it is declared: "The three ministers confirmed their firm intention to work for the development of the Balkan and Black Sea region as a zone in which stability and cooperation is established, and for the European orientation of this zone.... Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania emphasized the possibility of their cooperation in the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] and Interreg [community initiative concerning border] programs and stressed the particular importance of projects for transportation and energy infrastructure, telecommunications, and transport cooperation."

It ought to be crystal clear that this Eurocooperation is not directed against anyone; quite the contrary, it is open, and is aimed at applying EU practice and means for regional cooperation in the region of southeastern Europe as a whole.

The BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] government, by "its self-seeking aspirations in foreign policy (attempted) tacitly to change Bulgaria's foreign policy orientation and policies..."—it allegedly set the EU and WEU [West European Union] in opposition to NATO; our diplomacy allegedly elaborated absurd ideas about transforming NATO; and this created problems in our joining the EU and WEU.

As early as the beginning of May 1995, the government established three parallel and commensurate directions of action to obtain national security guarantees in conformance with the formula "security through integration and cooperation—association and membership in the EU; associated partnership with the WEU and active participation in Partnership for Peace," and dialogue and cooperation with NATO. This position was repeatedly stated officially on a bilateral and multilateral basis and invariably met with understanding on the part of our European and euro-atlantic partners. The "opposition" thesis can only be the fruit of a prejudiced approach.

Regarding joining the EU, here is the position adopted by the EU itself, as formulated in the joint final document of the above-mentioned session of the Association Council on 30 January 1996: "...The EU delegation informed the Bulgarian side that the EU Council decided on 29 January 1996 to apply the procedures prescribed

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in Article 'O' of the EU Treaty (that is, opening a procedure leading to talks on membership). The council confirmed its determination to assist Bulgaria in achieving the conditions for joining, as defined by the European Council in Copenhagen, with a view to preparing for its membership. The Bulgarian side welcomed the conclusions of the European Council in Madrid relating to expanding the EU, including the provision that candidate countries will continue to be treated on an equal basis." In her letter of 29 January 1996, Ms. Susanna Agnelli, Italy's foreign minister and chairman of the EU Council of Foreign Ministers, officially notified Bulgarian Prime Minister Zhan Videnov that the EU Council had decided to apply the procedures connected with our country's application to join the EU.

As regards the absurd ideas of "transforming" NATO, it is probably sufficient to quote French President Jacques Chirac's statement made in Washington on 1 February this year, in which he proposes that the organization should be reformed "to adapt to the world, which is much different from the one that existed when NATO was formed." After this statement, I wonder whether the ideas about transforming NATO will again be described as absurd, aside from the fact that reforming NATO in the new conditions following the end of the Cold War has been the subject of discussions since 1990.

Changes of direction should exist in politics, but certain specific politicians imagine that they play such a role, when in fact it is as if they sit on two stools (opinions expressed in response to a question on the East-West corridor and Russia's attitude to it).

It is unclear just which politicians the president had in mind, but in any event there are no grounds for referring to members of the cabinet in this manner. The government consistently strives to base its actions on the country's national interests and to apply uniform, common, and absolutely clear principles of mutual relations to all its foreign partners—a striving toward well-intentioned cooperation and balanced development of relations in different fields (political, economic, and humanitarian), mutual respect for interests, and nonencroachment by our country on the priority interests of anyone, while posing any controversial issues and problems openly, in a spirit of seeking mutually acceptable solution. The intensity and scale of development of relations depends on the extent to which our partners are prepared to accept this basis for relations with us. At the start of the second year of the government's four-year term of office, we have sufficient grounds to believe that this approach meets with understanding and is accepted as a good basis for the intensive development of relations on a bilateral and multilateral basis. Apart from the findings of the EU Council that I quoted above, eloquent proof of this is also provided by at least two other viewpoints expressed by two of our priority partners.

One is that of U.S. President Bill Clinton. In his report to the Congress on 29 January 1996, in which he proposes giving Bulgaria permanent most-favored-nation status in the field of foreign trade, he sais the following: "Apart from its positive practice in the field of its emigration policy, Bulgaria has made very substantial progress in defending human rights and in forming a democratic, free-market society, and continues to develop relations of cooperation with the United States. On 18 December 1994, Bulgaria held its third free elections since the end of communist rule. As a result of these elections, the BSP in practice controls the government. The relations of cooperation with the United States have been continued, and we have not noticed any major problems in the field of human rights since the BSP came to power."

Here is the viewpoint that Andrey Kozyrev, foreign minister of the Russian Federation, expressed during his visit to Sofia on 5 September 1995: "Bulgarian-Russian relations, which have deep roots in history, are lately being actively restored and acquiring a stable and mutually beneficial character. Political dialogue is taking place more actively and regularly at various levels and intensive work is proceeding on renewing the contractual and treaty basis for our bilateral relations. Joint efforts are being made to set trading and economic cooperation on a stable foundation, one that corresponds to the contemporary realities and to both countries' national interests."

Finally, our citizens are said to be asking themselves: "Is the BSP renouncing the independent foreign policy that Bulgaria has been following since 1990? Whose national interests is the BSP serving, to whose tune is it dancing?" These "questions" were accompanied by extremely offensive references to the BSP and its ability to follow a responsible national policy and defend national security and state sovereignty.

From the arguments and positions of our foremost partners quoted so far, it should be crystal clear that such descriptions and assertions may be the fruit of extreme political prejudice, but not of an objective assessment. Any commentary on these "assertions" is superfluous, because this would imply the acceptance that they have some kind of validity.

Instead of a conclusion, I would like to say only this: The dialogue between the president and the government on foreign policy issues should not be of the kind that emanates from the president's assessments, and for one simple, indisputable reason, namely, that such grossly

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politicized attacks directly damage Bulgaria's foreign policy positions and national interests.

Bulgaria: Lilov, OSD Present No Threat to Videnov

AU1402140696 Sofia SEGA in Bulgarian 8-14 Feb 96 No 5, p 16

[Article by Teodora Encheva: "Velvet-Gloved Pressure on Zhan Videnov"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If we exclude Prodev's revolt, the rest of the internal opposition in the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] appears to have recently emerged from a boarding house for young ladies of noble birth.

"I do not accept the excessive ambition of any party or politician," Aleksandur Lilov warned as the Zhan Videnov government neared the end of its first year in office. This is the strongest statement that Lilov has permitted himself to make to date.

The Strategist's [Lilov's sobriquet] moves are as soft as a tender embrace. Two weeks ago, at a meeting of the BSP Supreme Council Political Commission, he developed the thesis of national consensus. "The BSP should open negotiations with the opposition inside and outside parliament on three nationally important issues: crime, privatization, and the national coat of arms," he recommended to the party elite.

Charmed by this, Rosen Karadimov, OSD [Alliance for Social Democracy] member, immediately guessed that the Strategist was dictating thoughts about party life to his own supporters and the OSD. Finding themselves in Lilov's embrace, Chavdar Kyuranov's people resolved to push rapidly ahead with the idea of a dialogue with the minority in the National Assembly. In the confusion that prevailed last week, Ahmed Dogan and Prof. Kyuranov, independently of one another, both took credit for the idea to hold such a meeting.

On the following morning, the OSD leader [Kyuranov] personally reassured Zhan Videnov that his organization had no intention either of splitting the party or of toppling it from power. The prime minister, it is said, listened in silence. The silence intensified when Prof. Kyuranov urged him to formulate the aims and tasks facing the BSP and the cabinet clearly and precisely and to alter the style and method of government.

Although silence implies consent, the OSD is likely to step on the brakes. Meetings have reportedly been penciled in with the People's Union and the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces], but no specific dates have been decided. In the meantime, another OSD member—Dimitur Yonchev—has publicized in the press the thesis of national consensus: "The present government has a debt to the thesis of national consensus. There are a few great issues for the nation, questions of importance for our future history, such as privatization, crime, and building a security system. They cannot be decided by one party, however strong it may be."

These are Videnov's opponents: well-wishing, constructive, and wet. True, in the prime minister's eyes they are plotters who are preparing his political demise. However, the OSD and Lilov are regarded merely as internal party correctives. For this reason, when the Strategist proposes talks with the opposition, he does not want to topple the government, but merely to apply a touch of pressure.

Accordingly, the battle "for" or "against" Zhan Videnov has yet to be joined, simply because there is no one to lead it. The search is on for a bolder, less scrupulous executioner.

Bulgaria: Ilinden OMO Holds Conference on Unity

AU1302140096 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 6 Feb 96 p 7

[Commentary by Ivan Ilkov: "Ilinden OMO Adopts Star of Vergina as Symbol"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Scarcely a month goes by for society in the Pirin District when the country hears through the media of another nationalistic action mounted by the Ilinden OMO [Ilinden United Macedonian Organization]. To demonstrate how many Macedonians live in Bulgaria, the hundred or so members of the illegal organization have started threatening to append new names to their organization's notorious acronym. This is why Ilinden's formations with names like OMO-New, Democratic Movement, the so-called Macedonian Democratic Party, and the Pirin People's Academy, as well as their "leaders" Yordan Kostadinov, Atanas Kiryakov, Slave Makedonski, Stoyan Georgiev, Ivan Singartiyski, Vasilka Patonova, and others are representing themselves as the strongest advocates for creating their dearly cherished so-called Great Macedonian State in the Balkans.

The Ilinden OMO's latest "action," held in the village of Musomishte and proclaimed as its second conference, which was foiled by the police in Gotse Delchev and the regional national security service, demonstrated that lately its activities have changed direction. Having failed to attract the thousands-strong support of the "Macedonians" of the Pirin District and following the cooling in the Skopje authorities' courtship of Ilinden as a result of disputes and squabbles about personality cults, some of the leaders decided to seek consolidation with the "Vino-Zhito" ["Wine and Grain"] organization in northern Greece and the "Association of Refugees

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from Aegean Macedonia" in Bitolya. In addition to portraits of Gotse Delchev, Dame Gruev, and Yane Sandanski, the official presidium in the "Ilinden" cafe in Musomishte was also decorated with what was until recently the flag of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], emblazoned with the disputed golden Star of Vergina. The attendance of representatives from the so-called three sections of Macedonia—Pirin, Vardar, and Aegean—was intended to demonstrate to the authorities and the public of our southwestern neighbor, Greece, and Bulgaria the unity in favor of creating a state from the time of Alexander of Macedon's rule in the Balkans, Europe, Asia, and even perhaps in Africa.

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Czech Republic: Academy Lacks Funds, Scientists Leaving

AU1502090396 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 12 Feb 96 p 4

[Article by Pavel Baroch: "Academy of Sciences: The Funds Provided by the State Are Not Sufficient, and Young Scholars Are Leaving; Young Scholars Are Particularly Dissatisfied With Salaries"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The Academy of Sciences staff is concerned that in the near future the standard of domestic research will decline because the state does not contribute enough money.

"The worst thing is that young experts are leaving the Academy, dissatisfied particularly with the size of the salaries," Vladimir Petrus, a member of the Academic Council in charge of economic and organizational affairs, said. "In a few years this will definitely show in the standard of science. The scholars now between the ages of 30 and 45 will be particularly missed."

An average gross monthly salary in the Academy was just under 9,500 korunas [Kc] last year. Petrus said that the salaries rise very slowly in the Academy. "The wage growth is among the lowest in the budget sphere," Petrus claims.

According to him, the Academy is not asking the government and the parliament to triple the salaries, but a certain increase would certainly help the Academy. "It is not reasonable, for instance, that a young scientist cannot get a mortgage for an apartment," Petrus stated.

Parliament deputies mostly understand the financial difficulties of the Academy, but many of them say that the state cannot provide any more funds.

Pavel Hirs (Civic Democratic Party), chairman of the deputies' Commission for Science, stated that the Academy will only get as much as the state can afford. "As soon as industry operates properly, we will be able to invest more in science," he said at the time the state budget for this year was discussed.

Nevertheless, the Academy does not agree with this point of view. "On the contrary, science should get more support than it is getting because its results would be reflected in industrial production," Petrus claims. "The fact that the link between science and production is not working very well is another question."

The Academy received some Kc1.7 billion from the state this year. Petrus still hopes to obtain another Kc160 million this year from last year's surplus. "This request was accepted by the deputies' Undercommittee for Science, and we discussed it also at a meeting with the Government Council for Research and Development," Petrus declared.

Minister Igor Nemec (Civic Democratic Party) is rather skeptical, however, about the use of the Kc160 million to raise the salaries at the Academy. "It contradicts the legislative regulations in effect regarding the remuneration of employees in the budget-funded sphere. I can be certain, however, that the Council would support the application of the fund for modernization of the instrument hardware," Nemec said.

Petrus is of the opinion that this would hardly stop the departure of the young employees. "The Academy is aging. Only 39 percent of scientists are under age 40," Petrus said.

[Another report by the same author on the same page adds: "'The state support corresponding to a stable economy should represent about 0.7 percent of the GDP,' the government resolution reads. Minister Igor Nemec admitted: 'This value is approached only very slowly.'"]

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Slovakia: Daily Advocates Friendlier Attitude Toward U.S.

AU1502092296 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 13 Feb 96 p 3

[Commentary by Ivan Horsky: "Let Us Not Be Afraid of America—Let Us Ward Off Anti-Americanism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The reason for penning the following lines was provided by last week's interview in THE WASHINGTON POST with, I guess, today's best known diplomat, Richard Holbrooke. In it the head of the State Department's European section and the main architect of the Dayton peace accords, who is leaving for Wall Street, raised, as no one before him has done for a long time, the question of the credibility of the European Union's common foreign and security policies.

In this context, he was especially critical of the EU's inability to resolve the conflict in Bosnia, but also of the constantly reappearing crisis in relations between Greece and Turkey, first and foremost in the Aegean. At the same time, Holbrooke pointed clearly to the reasons for the aforementioned fact. The EU has not yet managed to underpin the political solving of conflicts with a threat to use military force. It has long been clear to everyone, even to the less able strategist, that there is no other option because no verbal appeals have yet convinced an aggressor to reach a settlement.

But the most singular thing is his logical conclusion. Only after Washington's direct military involvement in resolving the conflicts in Bosnia or the Aegean did the warring sides wise up. Therefore, one cannot be at all surprised at Holbrooke when he says that, for this very reason, the United States has to insist on its leading position within NATO.

Even with a more superficial analysis of the situation in Europe, every cognizant observer has to recognize that, without the arbiter function of the United States, our old continent would obviously go through a far greater number of crises and conflicts. And this even after the official end of the Cold War.

Therefore, it is almost extraordinary how relations between the United States and the Slovak Republic have deteriorated. The start was lightning fast. Even before the official declaration of independence, our parliamentary chairman, at a meeting with Vice President Al Gore, appealed for protection from the nationalist policy of the then Antall government. Six months later, in Washington, the prime minister even spoke about the possibility of deploying U.S. troops on the Slovak-Hungarian border. He was so enthusiastic that he became inspired publicly with the example of the Democratic Party and offered it partnership with his Movement for a Democratic Slovakia.

But, since the start of his third term in office, especially in connection with the criticism of the coalition's policy, which has also been manifested verbally in the form of a demarche from the United States, a palpable cooling down on the part of Slovak institutions with regard to the transatlantic power has set in. The only sphere where contacts are continuing, or possibly becoming even more intense, is, fortunately, defense. Maybe this is because, as professionals, the soldiers know what the point actually is—as opposed to many unprofessional politicians and would-be politicians.

At the same time, it is necessary to realize that the Dayton Accords mean an important change on the political map of our region. The United States, since it has guaranteed strong participation [illegible]bania and Macedonia, has thousands of troops [illegible]hat part of Bosnia adjoining Croatia and, not irrelevant, support bases for them in Hungary. In view of the fact that, at the moment, it is not at all clear whether, when, and in what number they will stay there after a period of one year, Bratislava should not be indifferent to this. Budapest is obviously reckoning that its willingness to lease bases on its territory to the U.S. expedition forces will also have the desirable political effect—first and foremost, in support for its endeavor to become a member of NATO.

Therefore, it would be more fitting if the Slovak prime minister were to stop playing at being offended that the U.S. President does not want to receive him. As a similar case concerning Germany's official name has shown, nothing can be achieved by such childish sulking. Elevating oneself above state interests is not a good strategy.

However, a change in the method of government in general, which is a target of criticism on the part of both the EU and the United States, could also mean a change in the attitude toward a Slovakia represented by the current Meciar government. And maybe also toward him. In addition to this, an uncompromising and unambiguous declaration regarding our proclaimed foreign political and security priorities, without evasions and tricks, would quite certainly help to break down the mistrust and would also improve the overall image of Slovakia, over which our ruling team likes to lament so much.

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Slovakia: EU Source: Doubts Still Persist About Country

AU1402155096 Bratislava SME in Slovak 13 Feb 96 p 1

[TASR, CTK report: "EU Source: Even After the EU Commissioner's Visit, Concerns About Political Development in the Slovak Republic Persist"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Brussels—Certain concerns about political development in Slovakia persist on the part of the European Union even after the visit to Bratislava by Hans van den Broek, the EU commissioner for foreign relations. This statement was made to a group of journalists in Brussels yesterday by an EU source who does not wish to be named. "If the Slovak parliament does indeed ratify the Slovak-Hungarian treaty in March, this will be a very good sign," said the source. According to this source, the interests of the ethnic minorities are not taken sufficiently into consideration in the new language law in Slovakia. More flexibility, according to this source, would also be required from the Slovak Government in relation to nongovernment organizations and civic associations. A spokesman for the senior EU commissioner in Brussels said that, during his visit to Slovakia and Romania last week, H. van den Broek pointed out that these two countries do not automatically have to belong to the first group of East European states with which the EU, probably at the end of next year, will begin talks on admission. As far as Slovakia is concerned, van den Broek, according to his spokesman, is of the opinion that this country has to implement a "transparent and stable" policy and thus lend "credibility" to its reform endeavors.

Slovakia: MKDH's Csaky: EU Dubious About New SNS Laws

AU1402155496 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 13 Feb 96 p 2

[Article by Zita Sujova: "According to P. Csaky, Hans van den Broek Was Skeptical About the Laws the SNS Is Proposing"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Within the framework of his 24-hour visit to Bratislava on 9 February, senior European Union Commissioner Hans van den Broek also met with representatives of the parliamentary parties' Deputies' Clubs. Pal Csaky, Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement [MKDH] deputy, said in an interview for NARODNA OBRODA that all of those present tried to outline, from the appropriate point of view, the opinions of his political entity. Csaky criticized the fact that Prime Minister Meciar did not receive the senior commissioner and added that every statesman, however sick he was, would receive a distinguished guest at least for a five-minute courtesy visit. Against this background, he also saw the absence of the chairmen of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, Slovak National Party [SNS], and Association of Workers of Slovakia Deputies' Clubs from the parliamentary meeting with van den Broek as a sign of their offense at the EU demarche. Csaky briefed the senior commissioner on behalf of the Hungarian Coalition on the repercussions of the language law, the proposal for the Slovak Republic's territorial-administrative division, and the financing of minority culture. He then gave him the draft law on minority languages and a copy of the joint application by the MKDH and the Christian Democratic Movement to the European People's Party, by means of which the two Slovak entities have demonstrated their "Europeanness." In reply to a question on whether any of the deputies raised the issue of the undemocratic nature of the draft laws unveiled by the SNS, Csaky said that Mr. van den Broek began to talk about this subject of his own accord. According to Csaky, he said that, if the law on the protection of the Republic, the state of emergency law, the new education law, and the lack of supervision over the activity of the Slovak Information Service [SIS] are placed side by side, they provoke some uncertainty about what the image of Slovakia in fact is. Hans van den Broek apparently indicated that one of the aims of his visit was to see for himself what has changed following the EU demarche, but Csaky has the feeling that, in this regard, he left with certain doubts. We have managed to ascertain from well-informed sources that the contents of Hans van den Broek's conversation with Parliament Chairman Ivan Gasparovic were almost identical to the contents of the visit by U.S. Ambassador Theodore Russell to I. Gasparovic in mid-January 1996. According to these reports, Russell expressed misgivings about the democratic nature and purpose of the adoption of the aforementioned laws, to which he also appended the draft law on foundations.

Slovakia: Russian Envoy's Interview Was in Two Parts

AU1402154896 Bratislava SME in Slovak 13 Feb 96 p 1

[Article by "(rk)": "According to the Recording, S. Yastrzhembskiy Said: Thank God, There Are No Such Phenomena in Slovakia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"I have not apologized to the Russian Embassy; I merely told the embassy's first counselor, N. Trutsuk, who said to me in a telephone conversation that they are displeased that the whole interview was not published, that it both-

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ers me if this inconveniences them, and I described the changes to the text as normal editorial practice in condensing an interview without altering its meaning, which is quite commonplace in such procedures," Karol Wolf, a MLADA FRONTA DNES editor, told us yesterday. He was reacting to a statement issued by the Russian Embassy on the publication of an interview in MLADA FRONTA DNES on 8 February. The statement says, among other things, "the MLADA FRONTA DNES journalist, K. Wolf, who conducted the interview with the Russian ambassador, has apologized for the distortions in the aforementioned text and has said that all of the changes and additions to the interview were carried out by the editorial office." According to Wolf, the Russian Embassy probably also incorrectly interpreted his statement about the editorial changes to the text and viewed them as changes made by the daily's Prague editorial office. We also found out from Wolf that the interview with Russian Ambassador S. Yastrzhembskiy consisted of two parts—an authorized text of replies to written questions submitted in advance, which the Russian Embassy has made available to TASR, and a tape recording of an interview given during a personal meeting (the MLADA FRONTA DNES editor has it at his disposal, and we have also listened to it), in which the Russian ambassador said, among other things, to the MLADA FRONTA DNES editor: "We also encounter such an attitude—realistic and pragmatic—in many of the West European capitals, in Paris, Bonn, and Rome, but in far from all of the capital cities of the Central European states. Na Slovakii etich yavleniy, slavabogu, nyet." [Sentence in Russian, without Slovak translation: Thank God, there are no such phenomena in Slovakia] (We are publishing the last sentence in a transliterated form according to the tape recording—editorial note).

Slovakia: Meciar Seen as Incompetent in Foreign Policy

AU1402124896 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 6, 7 Feb 96

[Article in two installments by Igor Uhrik: Evidence of Incompetence"] [6 Feb p 3]

[FBIS Translated Text] The events of the past few months confirm that Slovak foreign policy is in crisis. The ruling coalition's domestic policy is in such contradiction to the criteria of Western democracies that Slovak ambassadors attempting to defend the indefensible are losing credibility. Our foreign policy lacks a consistent concept. One of the pillars of policy could be the Slovak Republic's efforts to become integrated into the EU and NATO. Our domestic policy and many foreign policy steps and statements, however, create justified doubts about the load-bearing nature of this pillar. It seems rather that the load-bearing pillar is the prime minister's efforts to be received by the leading officials of the Western states, and through them to gain personal recognition. A recent example of the irrationality that rocks our foreign policy was the unnecessary conflict with Germany over its official name. If the prime minister was attempting to punish Chancellor Helmut Kohl for refusing to receive him, he was admitting defeat by his retreat. Vladimir Meciar has been demonstrating for some time now that his talent for antagonizing potential friends and allies does not stop at the state borders. This state, which has to deal with the potential danger of losing some of its territory, is dependent, if I can borrow a metaphor from Tennessee Williams, on the mercy of others. Tense relations with the West then and, above all, with Germany and the United States affect the security of the Slovak Republic.

The irresponsible attitude shown by the Slovak prime minister is revealed in full strength in connection with two international treaties—the Czechoslovak-German and the Slovak-Hungarian.

The Czechoslovak-German Treaty and Slovak Claims

Although this treaty historically belongs to the past, it still is in effect. It is necessary to pause and reflect on this treaty because it provides important facts that are topical now. It points out, for instance, that the roots of the conflict between the Slovak prime minister and the German federal officials go back to 1992. First, however, here are several important points for orientation:

In the fall of 1991, Vladimir Meciar invited me to a session of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] political board to take a stand on the treaty under preparations. I asked the HZDS to oppose its ratification in the Federal Assembly, if it did not want to deprive Slovakia of the compensation for damages that could be claimed from Germany (possibly from the Czech Republic)—namely, Czechoslovakia was the only country of the victorious coalition to which Germany has never paid war reparations. The reason for this was the property damages and lost lives resulting from the expulsion of almost 3 million Sudeten Germans. This expulsion, for which Slovakia was not responsible, resulted in Slovakia's never having received its share of reparations. In addition, there was one more-or-less theoretical possibility. If Germany recognized that the former Slovak State was an entity according to international law, Slovakia could claim the debt accumulated on the clearing account during the war. True, in this instance, Slovakia could not claim the compensation for war damages.

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On the whole, it was a complex legal and political problem, which the Slovak political representation in 1991 and 1992 was unable to diagnose and solve.

The ratification of the treaty guaranteed that Slovakia does not get compensated for either of two possible claims: the clearing surplus because a statement was included in the treaty on the uninterrupted continuity of the Czechoslovak state; the compensation for war damages then because the Czechs and the Germans basically agreed that the German claims for the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans and the Czechoslovak claims for war damages cancel out. This also canceled out the share of reparation Slovakia could have claimed. The Czechs used it to settle some of its debt to Germany. In other words, the Slovaks paid for the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans.

Meciar's False Card

Despite warnings, Vladimir Meciar has not raised any objection to this treaty. Moreover, in February 1992, two months before ratification, he stated that he considers it "unreasonable" to try to reopen the issue of possible claims.

Nevertheless, in September 1992—that is, after the ratification—he suddenly changed his mind, and, during the visit to Nuremberg, he called for a separate treaty with Germany. Unfortunately, he did it in such an uncouth manner that it came across as a discreditation of some members of the German Federal Government, and it was at the time when Vaclav Klaus was rejecting the idea of a Czecho-Slovak union. It was supposed to be a lever keeping Klaus from pushing Slovakia into independence. Meciar's lead with the "German card" looked like blackmail that turned against Slovakia. As recently as July, German Chancellor Kohl admitted the possibility of a separate Slovak-German treaty. After Meciar's faux pas, however, he rejected it firmly. This then also eliminated the possibility of agreement regarding compensation for Slovak claims. It is worth mentioning that, last November, the Slovak Government Commission for the Division of Federal Property assessed the amount of the German debt, which the Czech Republic should repay us, at $12.7 billion. One could say that, in doing so, it also expressed the amount of damage caused to the Slovak Republic by Meciar because he refused to raise this claim before the Czech-German Treaty went into effect in 1992.

[FBIS Translated Text]

The Slovak-Hungarian Treaty

Here again, his own government issued Vladimir Meciar a bill of incompetence when it found it necessary to adopt a resolution on presenting its interpretation of the agreed text just two days before signature. It thereby confirmed that the treaty is badly formulated and leaves room for various interpretations. The treaty directly appeals to the hotheads in the Hungarian ranks on both sides of the Danube to exploit its weak points. Slovakia needs a treaty that would contribute to the settlement of the Slovak-Hungarian settlement and, at the same time, provide the necessary guarantees for the protection of the Slovak Republic's sovereignty and territorial integrity. In my view, however, it does not fulfill these tasks. It is obvious already that it will only lead to increased tension between the two states and heighten the risk of autonomy and arbitration.

The Interpretation Can Develop

On the one hand, it must be observed that there is no imminent danger of territorial autonomy or arbitration. The mechanism for settling disputes, which requires that the members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) subject themselves to a reconciliatory process or a third-party decision, has numerous exceptions. So far, arbitration cannot be forced on a state that does not agree with it. The same applies to autonomy, which the OSCE recommends under certain circumstances but cannot prescribe. Nevertheless, these rules already make it possible for a state that—referring to the text of the treaty—is dissatisfied with the way the treaty obligations are observed to make it into an international affair. On the other hand, one must realize that dynamic changes are taking place in international relations. In the sphere of the protection of minority rights, for instance, several significant shifts have occurred over the past few years. Minorities are no longer an "internal affair of the individual states but, rather, a subject of the legitimate interest of the international community." This obligation is also covered in the Slovak-Hungarian treaty. The philosophy and rules of the processes that are to be applied in settling international disputes are developing in a similar way.

The course of the discussion on the possible pitfalls of the Slovak-Hungarian treaty indicates that the participants are not taking into consideration these dynamics but, rather, rely on the status quo and on the Cabinet interpretation of legal text. The Slovak Government is also guilty of this error when it claims that the treaty is rooted in standards "that are based exclusively on individual rights" and therefore, allegedly, "any other interpretation is out of the question." In fact, opinions exist, according to which the OSCE documents are based on collective rights. The reason this interpretation cannot succeed is that the U.S. Department of State has rejected it and that it recognizes only individual rights in principle. Where

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is the guarantee, however, that a change—of government, criteria, or interests—will not transpire tomorrow? The interpretation, then, which seemed favorable for Slovakia, can change. The rules for arbitration can harden up. A treaty of the type of the Slovak-Hungarian one cannot be judged only from the legal point of view; it must be considered within its political context, and that keeps developing. The example of Bosnia, where some "unshakable" principles failed—like the inviolability of borders and the unacceptability of demarcation of the border on the basis of the ethnic principle—should serve as sufficient warning. Therefore, this treaty must be formulated as precisely as possible so as to be able to stand on its own, under any circumstances. It is therefore irresponsible if risky formulations are included in it.

Achilles' Heel of the Slovak-Hungarian Treaty

One Achilles' heel is the renowned Council of Europe Recommendation No. 1201, which is a serious problem. It is an integral and therefore binding component of the treaty, which in Article 12 recognizes collective rights. This recognition, together with Article 11 on territorial autonomy, and possibly a special status for the minority, could be interpreted as an agreement to autonomy. The so-called Meciar safety valve is of doubtful value because it does not explicitly reject collective rights; the expression of respect for individual rights does not necessarily mean a rejection of collective rights.

Another great threat is a problem that has hardly ever been discussed. It is a promise that the ratio of the population in the mixed regions will not change (Article 15, Paragraph 2, Section d). This was requested by the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement and Egyutteles three years ago in the draft constitutional law on ethnic minorities. True, there is a difference because this ratio was not to be changed "by force." Recommendation No. 1201 does not permit an "intentional" change. Meciar went even further than the Hungarian political parties and agreed to Recommendation No. 1201 so that neither of these qualification appear in the treaty. This would indicate that the ratio between nationalities cannot be changed by any means.

This obligation represents another potential source of disputes regarding its interpretation and implementation. It is not quite clear whether the treaty permits tax and economic stimulation measures that could, even unintentionally, result in migration of the population into districts with a Hungarian minority. Let us assume that the state decides to place a certain institution in Dunajska Streda or that an enterprise is built here because of some tax advantages, which requires staff with qualifications that are not locally available, and 1,000 people of Slovak ethnic background move into the district. If the treaty is strictly interpreted, the state must move 1,000 original inhabitants of the Slovak ethnic background out of the district, so the ration between the two nationalities does not change.

The biggest problem lies, however, in the possibility that Meciar's promise to ethnically preserve almost one-fifth of Slovak territory could be considered recognition of a partial sovereignty of the Hungarian minority over the mixed territory, despite its being a minority there, and therefore could serve as a legal basis for future territorial autonomy.

Questions for the Prime Minister

True, at this time it is necessary to raise several unpleasant questions. They are unpleasant for the prime minister of the Slovak Republic. What made him agree to the incorporation of Recommendation No. 1201, which is not acceptable even to the Council of Europe? Is it only an "obvious political mistake," as Peter Weiss believes? One does not make such mistakes, and, if so, he pays for it with his political career. Why did he go beyond Recommendation No. 1201, which does not prohibit unintentional changes in the ratio of the population? Is that also a political mistake? Why did he sign the treaty as his partisan action, in a hurry, and, as it were, under cover of night, without its being approved even by his own movement and coalition? His conduct cannot be explained by lack of experience or insufficient legal training. Politician Vladimir Meciar, lawyer by education and profession, must have been aware of what he was signing. So, he should not be surprised if people ask him what Mr. Hron had on him.

Nevertheless, Meciar's faithful followers will go to any extreme to divert attention from his irresponsible conduct. Apparently the political career of a single person and their own advantages are more important to them than the interest of the state. They want to start talks with the Hungarian side on the interpretation of the treaty. They demand, in fact, that the two parties sign a treaty on the interpretation of the treaty. The interpretation should have been clarified, however, before the signing. They accuse the Hungarian Government and the Hungarian minority of taking the liberty of interpreting the treaty in their own way. One cannot blame the Hungarians, however, for this but, rather, the Slovak prime minister, who agreed to a text that lends itself to various interpretations.

So, what can one do with Meciar and the unfortunate treaty now? Regarding the treaty, one must judge it by its merits regardless of whether Meciar joins together the vote on the treaty with the vote of confidence in the

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government. If the deputies of the National Council of the Slovak Republic come to the considered conclusion that the treaty is in harmony with Slovak interests, it must be approved. If that be the case, they will assume responsibility for the risks embodied in the treaty, vindicate the prime minister regarding his conduct in the preparation of the treaty, and indirectly express agreement with the changes in criminal legislation that are to pay for foreign policy loopholes by domestic repression. If they conclude, however, that the treaty represents an unqualified risk, it must be rejected and, with it, the political blackmail. If the deputies of the National Council of the Slovak Republic were to ratify it only to protect Slovakia from an international scandal, they would, in fact, be giving preference to a long-term risk over a short-term scandal.

Regarding Meciar, he, too, should be judged on merit. If the parliament finds that by his policy he harms the interests of the Slovak Republic, they should recall him. Regardless of whether he links the fate of the Slovak-Hungarian treaty to the fate of his government.

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Hungary: UDMR's Frunda Meets With Holbrooke

LD1302224596 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Richard Holbrooke, U.S. assistant secretary of state for European affairs, who is currently staying in Bucharest, has drawn attention to the importance of the conclusion of the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty. He said it would be a good score for the two countries preparing for NATO and EU membership.

[Correspondent] [Passage omitted] Richard Holbrooke also met Romanian party and government representatives. He held talks with Gyorgy Frunda, senator of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR, RMDSZ in Hungarian]. At their talks, Frunda stressed that the UDMR supported the conclusion of the basic treaty and Romania's integration into euro-atlantic organizations, if for no other reason, because, according to the UDMR, minority rights can only be guaranteed in this framework.

Hungary: Tasks of Integration Strategy Group Explained

AU1302163796 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 10 Feb 96 p 12

[Interview with Andras Inotai, director of the World Economic Research Institute, head of the Integration Strategy Working Group, by Zsuzsa Varga; place and date not given: "A Stagnating Country Cannot Be an Attractive Partner"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] An Integration Strategy Working Group was set up adjacent to the Prime Minister's Office on 1 February. Its task is to prepare, coordinate, and work out everything that is necessary for Hungary to be able to start the EU membership negotiations. Its task is to examine what kind of Hungary will get into what kind of Europe.

[Varga] What is this working group actually?

[Inotai] I would better say what it is not: It is not a ministerial body; nor is it some kind of a cabinet or state administration organization. We are dealing with the strategic issues of integration facing us. This means that we do not want to interfere in the activity of any ministry. We will ask experts to carry out research and analyses and to make proposals. A tiny operative group at the Prime Minister's Office will complement their activity. [passage omitted]

[Varga] What is the Strategy Working Group "authorized" to do?

[Inotai] It is authorized to examine all the areas that have not yet been covered in the course of negotiations and preparation for membership. This is a coordination body that will work out Hungary's negotiating positions. Alternatives must be worked out for this, and long-term strategic work must be carried out. We must examine the advantages and disadvantages incurred in EU membership, and before that, we must find out with what kind of EU we will negotiate (whether there will be a common currency, institutional reform, etc. by then). But there are also changing elements in the Hungarian economy, society, and security policy. Therefore, our task is to think in comprehensive alternatives, namely, what kind of Hungary will join what kind of Europe. We would like to assert this way of thinking in the course of our activity.

[Varga] This is the dilemma of the working group. But the dilemma of the society is much bigger than this. What are the advantages and disadvantages of Hungary's EU membership?

[Inotai] So far, every country's EU membership has led to considerable structural changes in the respective country's economy and society. The extent of these changes depends on several factors. For example: the extent to which the country in question is ready to conform to EU requirements, and I mean here the issue of money, multinational firms, travel possibilities, scholarships, training methods, and so on; the difference in the level of development of the new member and the other members (for example, this difference was considerably high in the case of Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland.) As for the strength and direction of changes, a lot depends on how deliberately the country is preparing for membership and how it can assert this membership's comparative advantages and minimize its losses. [passage omitted]

[Varga] Please, tell us a few concrete examples of the expected advantages and disadvantages of EU membership.

[Inotai] It must be clear to us that there will be no demand for our classic mass products in industry or agriculture; however, there will probably be considerable demand for our special goods. This requires considerable restructuring. Industry will primarily need to manufacture spare parts and special products, while agriculture will primarily need to produce processed specialities.

[Varga] Who will be the losers of Hungary's EU membership?

[Inotai] Those who do not have previous training. We must face the fact that the times are gone when eco-

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nomic growth in Europe used every available manpower without selection. As a result, skilled manpower can be the winners of integration. This is a new challenge for the entire Hungarian educational system, a system that must be thoroughly revised as soon as possible, from language instruction up to the level of skills and their readiness to be used in integration.

[Varga] How can Hungary benefit from this integration?

[Inotai] Hungary's biggest benefit is that we can develop close institutional contacts with a developed Europe, something that we have hardly had the opportunity to do in the course of our history. All this also brings considerable security contacts and guarantees, something quite important in a region neighboring the uncertain and volatile Russia and southeast Europe. It is also a stabilizing factor for democracy. This EU membership could also bring us financial security, because our debts will appear in a different light once we are EU members. For example, Portugal has a bigger debt than Hungary, but this is hardly mentioned. And one more factor that we must definitely take into consideration: We will only be an attractive partner for the other EU members if we show economic growth. A stagnating country does not have a dynamic market, and such a situation leads to social tensions, and this is a risk factor. In addition, a country with a suppressed economy is also unable to make use of the mutual advantages inherent in cooperation. [passage omitted]

Hungary: Workers' Party Chairman on Milosevic Meeting

AU1502113796 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 14 Feb 96 p 9

[Interview with Workers' Party Chairman Gyula Thurmer by Ferenc Kepecs; place and date not given: "The Workers' Party Will Establish Computer Link With Belgrade"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the second half of last week, Workers' Party Chairman Gyula Thurmer visited Belgrade and held talks with Yugoslav leaders, including President Milosevic. We interviewed Thurmer on the goals of his visit.

[Thrumer] I visited Belgrade so we could find some concrete formulas in the new situation after the Bosnian peace agreement with which we can help the development of Hungarian-Yugoslav relations. We will hold a meeting of Hungarian and Yugoslav businessmen in Budapest in April, and this may be an important step toward reviving the former economic links. We would like to organize a Hungarian-Yugoslav meeting of intellectuals in the summer. We feel that cooperation is primarily our issue, not just Mr. Soros's.

[Kepecs] What kind of political agreements did you make?

[Thurmer] In talks with the United Yugoslav Left [JUL], Mira Markovic's party, we agreed to set up a direct computer link between the Workers' Party and the JUL in the two capital cities. This could be the basis of a future international information center. We also agreed that our Belgrade and Budapest organizations would consult with each other, for example, on the issues of town development, local government policy, and the fight against crime.

[Kepecs] What are your impressions of Milosevic?

[Thurmer] Milosevic is a politician of great foresight, and his intentions with Hungary are reasonable. He clearly stated that the improvement of Hungarian-Yugoslav relations does not depend on him. If recently Mr. Horn had talked to him about something other than what he had heard from Chancellor Kohl in Bonn, then the talks could have been very useful. As far as I can see, the Hungarian prime minister did not use his visit for what he should have.

[Kepecs] Did the issue of the Serbian Hungarians come up in the talks?

[Thurmer] It did. We have similar views on this issue. Both of us believe that the Hungarians will also live better if economic development is begun in the whole of Yugoslavia. If someone earns very little, then his living conditions are bad, regardless of whether he is Hungarian, Serbian, or of another nationality. When there is more money, then more can be spent on culture and everything else. On the other hand, the Yugoslav leadership is firmly resolved to resettle the Serbs who have found accommodation with their relatives in Vojvodina to the Krajinas or Bosnia as soon as this is possible. Milosevic has no objections at all to finding some modern legal formulas that will ensure the preservation of self-identity for the local Hungarians. I also have to agree with him in that the Vojvodina Hungarians should first agree on all this. They also have to talk about this with their own neighbors because there are also other nationalities living in Vojvodina.

[Kepecs] Do you also agree with Milosevic on the issue of autonomy for national minorities?

[Thurmer] A legal formula has to be found that corresponds to the international and the Vojvodina situation. I believe that there are many unrealistic elements in the ideas of certain Vojvodina Hungarian politicians. They do not take into account the fact that Hungary would be an immediate neighbor of this kind of autonomous unit, although this could have consequences. Nevertheless I trust that the local Hungarians, as Yugoslav citizens,

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will be able to come to an agreement with the Yugoslav state bodies. Milosevic shows willingness toward this.

[Kepecs] In your view, who is responsible for starting the terrible south Slav war? Usually President Milosevic, your negotiating partner, is listed among the criminals.

[Thurmer] In my view, the Hungarian public is being misled. Milosevic could not have started the war even if he had wanted to. This is the work of those Western powers who were not interested in the existence of a medium-sized power having 24 million people, a strong army, and a relatively strong economy at NATO's southern wing. They have achieved their goal: Now there is a Yugoslavia of 10 million, a Croatia of 4 million, and some other bits. Unfortunately, the matter is as simple as this.

[Kepecs] But the ethnic cleansings and mass murders were not ordered by the Westerners after all!

[Thurmer] No one doubts that some carry major and others minor responsibility for the war. And let me defend the Serbs: Not all blame can be shifted to them.

Hungary: Horn Calls for MSZP Unity Before Congress

AU1402125096 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 13 Feb 96 p 3

[Report by "A.Zs.-Sz.Sz.:" "The MSZP Parliamentary Group's Five Points on the Agent Law—Horn Criticized Vitanyi's Group"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to our information, at the 12 February session of the Hungarian Socialist Party's [MSZP] parliamentary group, Gyula Horn, prime minister and party chairman, said: The MSZP is facing difficult tasks; therefore, the party's deputies should pull together.

According to Horn, statements by certain party politicians do no good for the MSZP, which is preparing for its congress. As an example, Horn mentioned the statements made at the MSZP Social Democratic Association's 10 February meeting. Among others, he objected to National Committee Chairman Ivan Vitanyi comment that the MSZP is in a difficult situation in a number of ways. Vitanyi did not react to what Horn said, and Executive Deputy Chairman Sandor Csintalan agreed with Horn.

At the MSZP parliamentary group's 12 February session, parliamentary group leader Imre Szekeres reported on the political debate over the agent law. After the meeting, deputy parliamentary group leader Monika Lamperth said that the Socialist deputies objected to a statement by Interior Minister Gabor Kuncze, Alliance of Free Democrats, according to which the MSZP parliamentary group's possible departure from the debate on the agent law would be a "meaningful silence."

The parliamentary group accepted parliamentary deputy Karoly Toth's five-point proposal on the attitude to be adhered to in the debate on the agent law. According to this, the MSZP is interested in passing the law, therefore, it supports the government's proposal. The Socialist parliamentary group does not wish to submit amendments which would change the concept of the bill. The parliamentary group hopes that, in defense of constitutionality, it will not be forced to pass the law on its own. According to our information, Horn also defended the government proposal at the meeting. He argued, among others, that the proposal that would make the documents of the former III/III group [civilian secret service monitoring internal opposition] accessible endangers the country's security.

According to our information, the meeting of a group of Hajos Socialists, which was postponed on 9 February, will be held today.

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B-H: Smith: Attack on IFOR Would Be 'Worst Mistake'

AU1402173196 Paris AFP in English 1627 GMT 14 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb 14 (AFP) — Admiral Leighton Smith, the commander of the NATO-led multinational peace force in Bosnia, warned the Bosnian Serbs Wednesday that an attack on NATO would be their "worst mistake."

The commander of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) was responding to a threat on Tuesday by the vice-president of the self-declared Bosnian Serb Republic, that the Dayton accord would be threatened if two Bosnian Serb officers held on war crimes charges were not released.

Nikola Koljevic branded their arrest by Bosnian government police "illegal" and pledged an "appropriate response."

Smith told reporters here: "If that is what he considers to be an appropriate response it would be the biggest mistake he could ever make."

The two Serb officers are being held in the Dutch city of The Hague awaiting questioning by the International War Crimes Tribunal based there.

Asked about the role of IFOR forces in arresting those suspected of war crimes in Bosnia, Smith said: "I don't think if we arrested war criminals the damage to the process will be terminal," although he acknowledged that there would be "probably some people who would want to take immediate" reprisals.

"I don't think we will be giving pictures to every single IFOR soldier because right now there are 52 war criminals and I don't see 60,000 soldiers walking around with 60 pictures in his pocket," the NATO commander added.

"It's awfully difficult for us to try to train a force to participate in this process of detaining and arresting war criminals," he added in an apparent attempt to distance IFOR from the task of hunting down the suspects.

B-H: Serb Army Clarifies Scaling Down of IFOR Contacts

LD1502102996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1630 GMT 14 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Doboj, 14 Feb (SRNA) — Officers of Operation Group Nine of the Army of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic [VRS] responsible for contacts with IFOR [Implementation Force] today clarified the reasons behind the decision to scale down contacts with IFOR and to break off relations with the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation.

The following were given as reasons for lowering the level of and breaking off contacts, which until recently had been held on a regular basis:

1. Failure to abide by the section of the Dayton agreement relating to the release of POW's;

2. The arrest of the Serb officers;

3. The delay in lifting sanctions against the Serb Republic.

IFOR representatives explained that their mission is exclusively of a military nature and is aimed at supervising the peace process, and that the "misunderstandings" are, according to them, "mainly of a political nature."

Asked about the release of the remaining POW's, Major (?Terje Mikkelvold), the Nordic battalion's press spokesman, said that the responsibility rests with the International Committee of the Red Cross, which took on the responsibility for implementing the relevant section of the Dayton Agreement.

The arrival this evening of the Finnish engineering battalion makes the IFOR Nordic brigade in Doboj complete.

B-H: Krajisnik: Officers' Arrest 'Could Increase Tensions'

LD1402175596 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1650 GMT 14 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Obrenovac, 14 Feb (TANJUG) — The arrest of the Serb officers and their forced removal to The Hague is an international scandal and a direct violation of the Dayton agreement, and this could increase tensions, Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic Assembly, told Radio Obrenovac today.

Krajisnik expressed his disappointment with the passive policy of foreign ministries throughout the world, and he recalled that, on the eve of the abduction of the two Serb officers to The Hague, Rajko Kasagic, prime minister of the Serb Republic, had obtained assurances from some Western politicians that the officers Djukic and Krsmanovic would be released because there is no proof that they are guilty.

Commenting on speculation that this kidnapping conceals the international community's realization that it is easier to release the above-mentioned officers from The Hague than from Sarajevo, Krajisnik said the international community should not save the face of those who

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have made a mistake and who are flagrantly violating the peace agreement.

The walkout by the Serb Republic delegation from the Vienna disarmament conference was assessed by Krajisnik as "a defense mechanism" designed to attract the attention of those who have obliged themselves to implement the peace agreement but who still treat the actors in the Bosnia drama unequally.

We are ready to cooperate but not to make concessions which might weaken our position, Krajisnik said.

B-H: Koljevic on Muslims, Extradition of Serb Officers

AU1402191896 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Deputy president of the Serb Republic, Dr. Nikola Koljevic, commented on the extradition of the Serb officers to the Hague Tribunal.

[Begin Koljevic recording] It seems to me that this is a consequence of the failure to get the consent of the Muslim part of the Federation — as the Croats evidently had nothing to do with it for them to be released in a normal way. This was therefore the only thing the international envoys could do. This is the way I see this, and I hope this is what this act means. We will find out very soon whether this is true; if this indeed is the meaning, then they should be released as soon as possible — today or tomorrow — and if they really want to take them as witnesses — and they were arrested illegally — illegally in several aspects — which the entire world is aware of, particularly the alliance members, then the tribunal will simply lose its credibility completely, while the (?possibility) of implementing the Dayton accord will be heavily jeopardized.

Naturally, there was a much better way — which is that they should have been released immediately, as they were illegally arrested — but it seems that the pressure on the Muslim part of the Federation authorities was not sufficient. If you take into account Mr. Izetbegovic's statement saying that he would never release them, even at the cost of the implementation of the Dayton accord, you will see what kind of resistance was present.

However, I think that there is also a good side to this — the international mediators, Europe, Bildt, and Mr. Holbrooke should now see, on the ground, without the propaganda, who it is they are dealing with — it is not possible to see this as well from a great distance as it is from a small distance — and who it is that is in favor of implementing the Dayton accord. [end recording]

B-H: Arrests Show Freedom of Movement 'Doubtful' for Serbs

LD1302211396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1911 GMT 13 Feb 96

[By Jovan Babic; "pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, Feb. 13 (TANJUG) — The two arrested Bosnian Serb officers, General Djordje Djukic and Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic, were taken to The Hague Monday night in a manner resembling a rarely witnessed spectacle.

They were taken out of the prison in the Muslim part of Sarajevo dressed as French Legionnaires, with hemlets pulled down over their eyes. Spotlights and TV cameras were ready and waiting. The two senior officers were pushed into an armoured personnel carrier with automatic weapons pointed at them.

Bosnian Muslim Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic has told Croatian TV that the two officers have been handed over into the hands of justice.

The officers were taken in the armoured personnel carrier to the Sarajevo stadium, where an IFOR [Implementation Force] helicopter was waiting to fly them to a destination in Croatia, from where they were taken to The Hague.

The two officers were arrested by the Muslim police on Jan. 30 on an IFOR-controlled 'blue route', on their way to an IFOR base for an earlier scheduled meeting.

The Muslim policemen need not necessarily have known that Djukic served throughout the war in the rear area as an officer in charge of procurement and that he is a man of very poor health, but those who gave the order for the arrests and IFOR were no doubt aware of these facts.

How can any Bosnian Serb officer or civilian, for that matter, believe in one of the basic provisions of the Dayton peace agreement, the provision on the freedom of movement after the arrests of the two officers on the 'blue route' in Sarajevo and their transfer to The Hague.

It appears that only one side, the Muslim, has the right to hand over individuals to the war crimes tribunal.

Nobody in his right mind can think that war crimes should be amnestied, but it is in the interest of the proclaimed universal justice and fairness to prove one's guilt.

As things are, the signed provision on the freedom of movement for all sides on all of Bosnia-Herzegovina territory seems to be very doubtful and very dangerous when Serbs are concerned.

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B-H: Plavsic: No Reason for Indictment of Serb Officers

AU1402193996 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Feb 96

[Report by Drasko Ignjatic on Biljana Plavsic statement on extradition of Serb officers]

[FBIS Translated Text] We will also hear the opinion of deputy president Biljana Plavsic. Drasko Ignjatic talked to her.

[Ignjatic] Pointing out that this is a precedent and that the international community is biased, Dr. Biljana Plavsic expressed her optimism about the final solution to the most serious crisis since the Dayton accord was signed, and explained the transfer of General Djukic and Colonel Krsmanovic to The Hague.

[Begin Plavsic recording] I believe that they were applying pressure, and, in view of that, I think it is good that they have been taken out of the Muslim prison, (?even) if it is The Hague they went to.

No one really knows if they have gone to The Hague or somewhere else, but there is more probability that (?they will be released immediately) and come to our territory than there would have been (?while they were in the Muslim prison).

This is my view, which is in a way optimistic, of all this.

If they have come to The Hague, I really do not know if it is possible to issue an indictment without a single reason [words indistinct]. In this case, [passage indistinct]. [end recording]

[Ignjatic] In the opinion of the deputy president of the Serb Republic, Dr. Biljana Plavsic, if the creators of the Dayton accord intensify the anti-Serb campaign in the meantime, it will be necessary for the state authorities to take a principled and clear position on it.

B-H: Daily Profiles Suspected Serb War Criminal Djukic

AU1402170996 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 14 Feb 96 p 2

[Report by A. Dj.: "Commander of the VRS's Rear Area"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade — General Djordje Djukic, who was handed over to The Hague War Crimes Tribunal on Monday evening [12 February] together with Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic, had been in charge of the rear area of the Serb Republic army from the beginning of the war.

At the time he was arrested in Sarajevo on 30 January, Djukic held the post of assistant commander of the Serb Republic army's general staff in charge of the rear area. Colonel Krsmanovic was his assistant.

When war broke out in Bosnia in April 1992, Djukic was a retired Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] colonel. He spent his working life in the technical services of the armed forces. Djukic volunteered to join the Serb Republic army after Gen. Ratko Mladic appealed to all JNA officers born in Bosnia to "place themselves in the service of defending the Serb people." From the beginning of the war he belonged to the rear area services of the Serb Republic army and did not have the position of an operational commander, which could have put him into direct contact with combat operations, from which he could emerge as a war criminal. Provided that some rumors are correct, Djukic, as a commander of the rear area, might have known something about the Srebrenica events and the fate of those missing, if the service of which he had been the head was in charge of providing buses and trucks used to transport the Muslim captives.

Regarding Djukic's political inclinations, in the quarrel between the Serb Republic's civilian and military leaders, he only came to prominence last autumn, when, together with 11 other generals who were members of the general staff (the so-called collegium of generals), he signed a letter of support for Mladic following Radovan Karadzic's decision to replace him [Mladic] as commander of the Serb Republic army's general staff.

Gen. Djordje Djukic was born in 1937 in Glamoc in southwestern Bosnia.

B-H: TANJUG: Mostar Crisis Jeopardizes Dayton Accord

LD1402181896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1629 GMT 14 Feb 96

["Pool" item by Davor Lukac]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 14 (TANJUG) — The latest crisis surrounding Mostar, a town in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina, shows that the Moslem-Croat Federation has been seriously shattered as well as that the Dayton peace accord has been jeopardised.

Frequent visits by international officials to Zagreb and Mostar are a proof that the alliance between Moslems and Croats survives through international pressure only.

Croatia is in full control of western Herzegovina and does not intend to give up Herzeg-Bosnia, the Bosnian Croat state proclaimed at the outbreak of war in Bosnia that should have been rescinded when the Moslem-Croat Federation was set up in March 1994.

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When the international community tackled the issue of Mostar in 1994, it disregarded the fact that Serbs had always represented a factor of balance between Croats and Moslems in the town and that it was impossible to solve the issue without taking Serbs into account, too.

E.U. administrator in Mostar Hans Koschnick made the same mistake when he decided that the town be divided into three Moslem and three Croat municipalities and a joint, Moslem-Croat district.

Koschnick disregarded the fact that, according to 1991 census, Serbs had accounted for 25.6 percent of the town population and that, until early 1980s, the Serb community had been more numerous than the Croat.

Koschnick treats Serbs as a minority and, if one is to judge by the international community's current policy, it is highly unlikely that they will be allowed to have representatives in town bodies or to return home.

Croats and Moslems expelled about 35,000 Serbs from the town and another 45,000 from localities in the river Neretva valley, before they began fighting each other for the control of the town as well as territories with mixed population.

The European Union has made the situation in Mostar even more complex by trying to defuse the crisis. Its attempt to use Mostar as an example of future political arrangements in the federation has proved to be a real fiasco from the very outset.

The international community's favouring of Croatia and its regime has also become evident during the Mostar crisis.

Despite the awareness that all moves made by Mostar's Croats, including the storming and stoning of the building housing the E.U. administration as well as shots fired at Koschnick's car had been ordered by Zagreb, the international community has taken no concrete measures.

E.U. officials continue to visit Zagreb in an attempt to resolve the issue in talks with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, but no results are visible yet.

B-H: Koschnick Views Croat Resistance to Mostar Plans

AU1502105196 Vienna NEWS in German 15 Feb 96 p 53

[Interview with EU Mostar Administrator Hans Koschnick by Oliver Lehmann in Mostar; date not given: "I Am Not Here To Finance Pyromaniacs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Lehmann] Why is it so important that the EU mission succeeds?

[Koschnick] What is happening here in Mostar has an immense effect on Sarajevo. If the Croats are allowed to call the Dayton agreement into question, the Serbs will have the same right in Sarajevo. Whether this is in the interest of all partners to the Dayton agreement is a question that you must ask these partners to the treaty. I did not conclude the agreements.

[Lehman] Did you underestimate the Croatian resistance to you plans?

[Koschnick] No. But I did not know in which way they would exercise it. Ever since I came here, I have tried to build bridges between the people — in addition to reconstruction, which is making rather good progress. In this respect, I have suffered many disappointments: The police were not united because there were considerable, sometimes also understandable, reservations on the Croat side. It was said: It is impossible that yesterday they fought against each other and tomorrow they are supposed to go on joint patrols. I always answered: If this does not work, you should not have signed it. The Croatian side wrote to me: Agreements are one thing, life is another. For Europeans, this is an unusual attitude.

[Lehmann] How did you experience the riots?

[Koschnick] I understand the psychological pain of victims of war. However, if one sees how teachers take along their classes to demolish everything here, this is a disappointment. After all, they sat in the ruins and got new schools from us. And it is a great disappointment that politically influential forces abuse the pain of invalids and of the relatives of those who died in the war.

[Lehmann] How great is President's Tudjman influence on the local rulers?

[Koschnick] The president of Croatia is not only president of the country but, in the feelings of the population, the president of all Croats. He was involved in all agreements from Washington to Dayton. And I assume that his influence is a bit impeded because local leaders try to tell the people that, even though the president signed this, he does not really mean it.

[Lehmann] Does the resistance to your plans come from political extremists or from those who benefited from the town's economic misery?

[Koschnick] No one knows this exactly. If you talk with someone privately, you get different answers than in public. I think that there are still to many links that come from the war. It is said quite openly: We will not return the loot. However, tracing these matters is the task of the partners to the agreement and not mine.

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[Lehmann] The sanctions against Serbia were imposed relatively quickly. Would an economic boycott against Croatia be useful?

[Koschnick] If you always impose sanctions as soon as something happens, you will not be able to make progress in politics. You must also be able to convey insights. For instance, the following: The Europeans and Americans have helped eliminate the damage of war all over the world. Can one expect that taxpayers in Europe will finance the reconstruction of houses and cities that are burned down after peace has been concluded? I say: No. And I am not popular because I say this. I have no intention of asking the taxpayers in Europe to finance postwar damage; we are not here to finance pyromaniacs.

[Lehmann] Is Mostar facing the fate of Berlin?

[Koschnick] Yes. Here we do not have a wall, but we have armed Croat policemen from western Mostar who restrict the freedom of movement. And this is a situation that no one who has fought against the division of Berlin for many decades can bear. In addition, eastern Mostar does not have access to the Adriatic Sea. You must go through an area that is administered by the Croats of Herzegovina. Thus, you live in a ghetto. I am carrying the burden of German history. And I will certainly not agree to cementing ghettos.

[Lehmann] How do you deal with the strain?

[Koschnick] I have noticed that I become particularly calm in times of crisis. One of the most important principles of constitutional developments is that the people who bear responsibility do not disappear at the first danger. If one leaves in such a situation, then what should the people who have lost everything think?

B-H: Bosnian Croat Official Rejects EU Plan for Mostar

LD1502114496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1131 GMT 15 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 15 (TANJUG) — A senior official of the Croatian state Herzeg-Bosnia, Ivan Bender, said on Thursday it was impossible to implement the decision of Mostar's E.U. administrator Hans Koschnick on the political and territorial division of this city in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Croatian radio quoted Bender as calling on Koschnick 'to come to his senses.' Bender rejected the possibility of the existence of any kind of central district in Mostar in which the Croats and Muslims would share authority. 'Unless another solution for Mostar is found, it will be necessary to hold a referendum on the structure of this city,' Bender said.

The Bosnian Croats, who at the start of the war in Bosnia in 1992 planned Mostar as their capital, on Feb. 7 rejected Koschnick's proposal for a joint central city district and staged protests which almost ended in the lynching of the administrator.

Several days after this incident, condemned by the international community, the Mostar Croats carried out another provocation by laying down the foundations for a Catholic cathdral in the part of Mostar planned by Koschnick to be jointly ruled by the Muslims and Croats.

Muslim Sarajevo Radio said on Wednesday that several Muslim officials, including Alija Izetbegovic, announced there would be no backing away from Koschnik's plan and that only different modes of its implementation could be discussed.

On Wednesday the European Union, via its current chairman Italy, expressed support to Koschnick and underscored it expects Zagreb, which it said was the most responsible for the conduct of the Mostar Croats, to concretely contribute to the functioning of the E.U. administration in Mostar.

B-H: Croat Mostar Mayor Sends Letter to EU's Agnelli

LD1402184396 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 14 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Mayor of Mostar Mijo Brajkovic has sent a letter to Susanna Agnelli, president of the EU Council of Ministers. Among other things, the letter says:

Since the start of negotiations until today, the Croat side has remained consistent and principled, not diverging from the agreed principles under the Dayton agreement, but not seeking nor agreeing to any exceptions or changes in the agreement. We have also been and remain open with regard to the search for the necessary offices and other ancillary premises for the needs of city officials, of cantonal government bodies, and of ministries of the Federation government which, according to the Dayton agreement, should be located in Mostar.

We consider that these requirements do not warrant the introduction of a central zone, in contravention of the Dayton agreement, as proposed by the European administration.

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Following the decision of the administrator and our justified rejection of it, we have been exposed to unscrupulous attacks and accusations, simply because we have our own position and it represents the consistent and authentic implementation of the entire Dayton peace agreement, including the part concerning the organization of the city of Mostar.

In the hope that you will show understanding for the explanation of our position, we send our respectful regards to your excellency and to all members of the Council of Ministers, the letter from Mayor Brajkovic to Susanna Agnelli concludes.

B-H: Mostar Croats Want Talks on Ethnic Partition

AU1402180396 Paris AFP in English 1736 GMT 14 Feb 96

[Report by Juliette Hollier-Larousse: "Militant Croats Call For Direct Talks With Moslems on Mostar"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Feb 14 (AFP) — Bosnian Croats have called for direct talks with rival Moslem leaders on carving up this divided Bosnian city despite intense international pressure to accept EU plans to reunite the two communities.

Local Croatian officials said that a meeting would take place soon between representatives from both sides, but that information could not be confirmed here Wednesday [14 February] with Moslem leaders.

The Croats have loudly denounced European Union plans to redraw the boundaries of the southern Bosnian town and mounting tension over the issue has threatened to scuttle the Bosnia peace accord.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant General William Carter, chief of staff of the Implementation Force (IFOR) deployed in Bosnia to enforce the landmark peace accord signed in December, said he plans to send more NATO troops to Mostar to try and ease tensions.

"What we will do is reinforce the presence we have in Mostar with the existing troops," Carter told a press conference in the Croatian capital of Zagreb.

"We want to be sure that we will have an eye on what is going on there and be sure that we will be where it will be needed," he said. There are currently some 500 Spanish NATO troops deployed about 20 kilometers (12 miles) east of Mostar and about 20 more southwest of the city.

He added that negotiations on Mostar would also take place on Friday between the top commander of the NATO-led IFOR troops, Admiral Leighton Smith, and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman.

"They will discuss the (Moslem-Croat) federation and particularly the situation in Mostar," he said.

Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic also discussed the situation with Tudjman on Tuesay over the phone and stressed that the EU plan must serve as a basis for further negotiations.

The local BH Press news agency quoted Izetbegovic as saying that the talks may be held "only at the initiative and chairmanship of Hans Koschnick and may pertain only to modalities of the implementaton of his plan", Izetbegovic said.

Under such conditions the talks should start "immediately", Izetbegovic said, and should include leaders of the federation as well as representatives of Croatian and Bosnian governments, one from each side.

Hans Koschnick, the European Union (EU) administrator of the town, announced last week his plan for three districts for each side plus an additional central one with some joint institutions.

The plan outraged the Croats, who favor a partition of Mostar. It prompted them to sever all contacts with the EU and to vow to resolve the issue through direct negotiations with the Moslems, who accepted the EU proposal and agreed to negotiate on condition that any talks focus on how to implement the EU carve up.

Mostar came under European Union administration in July 1994 following 11 months of fierce fighting between the Croat and Moslem communities. The Croats currently control the western part of the town and the Moslems the eastern parts.

Also Wednesday, the Italian government, which currently holds the rotating EU presidency, said it fully backed Koschnick's proposal and called on the Croats to agree to the new carve up.

It pointed out in a communique that the two communities in January agreed for Koschnick to act as an arbitrator and vowed to abide by his decisions.

"As a result, the decisions taken by the EU administrator on the new boundaries of the municipalities must be respected," the statement said.

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B-H: E. Mostar Mayor Urges More Pressure on Croatia

AU1502104096 Vienna NEWS in German 15 Feb 96 p 54

[Interview with Safet Orucevic, mayor of eastern Mostar, by an unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "More Pressure on Croatia!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [NEWS] Why did you agree to Koschnick's plan for a central district?

[Orucevic] It gives us four possibilities: peaceful coexistence, freedom of movement, return of apartments, and prosecution of war crimes. Obviously, the Croats do not want to discuss these issues.

[NEWS] Who was responsible for the demonstration?

[Orucevic] The demonstrators were certainly not the representatives of the Croat people; they were extremists. But the Croat politicians did not tell their people what they signed in Dayton and Washington.

[NEWS] What role does the mayor of western Mostar play?

[Orucevic] Brajkovic has pursued a process of peace so far. If he had opposed the demonstration, far worse things would have happened to him than to Koschnick.

[NEWS] What task do the EU and the United States have?

[Orucevic] The pressure on Croatia was not sufficient. It should be increased so that Zagreb will exert pressure on the local extremists.

B-H: Croat Mostar Mayor's Remarks Termed 'Scandalous'

AU1402205096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 14 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] At his meeting in Mostar with German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel on 14 January, Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic officially promised that the Republic of Croatia would accept unconditionally any plan of Koschnick's for the organization of that city.

It is confusing that Croatia has in the meantime given up that, President Izetbegovic's special envoy Sacirbegovic says in an interview in Zagreb GLOBUS. He also comments on the statement by Mijo Brajkovic [leader of the Mostar Croats] to CNN that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be partitioned into three parts. Nada al Issa reports from Zagreb:

[Begin al Issa recording] Why has Minister Granic abandoned his promise to Kinkel, Koschnick, and the entire EU that Croatia would support Koschnick's plan? What has happened in the meantime? I do not know, Sacirbegovic says. We expected Croatia to be a positive factor in the establishment of coexistence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but I am confused now. I no longer know what Croatia's policy is.

The reactions from Zagreb and Mostar are completely unexpected. He says that Zagreb was expected to bring the Mostar extremists under control, but now it appears that they have Zagreb under their control. Sacirbegovic appears disappointed when he says that some U.S. politicians warned him some time ago that Tudjman was now the most dangerous man for Bosnia. I wonder, the Bosnian diplomat says, if they knew even then what was in store for Mostar.

Sacirbegovic is unpleasantly surprised by the statement by the mayor of the so-called western Mostar, Mijo Brajkovic, to CNN that Bosnia should be partitioned into three parts. After two years of building the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, he is now talking about its partition, Sacirbegovic says. In Dayton, we could barely bring ourselves to accept two entities and he now wants three.

Zagreb VJESNIK today carries the same statement by Mijo Brajkovic, expressing the same desires, but with an additional scandalous claim that Islam is being imposed on the Croats in Mostar. According to him, the Bosniaks are doing it in this way: They are turning up the loudspeakers on the mosques. Just imagine how it would resound if most of the mosques had not been destroyed! Would every call to prayer then be proclaimed an imposition of Islam? And, after such scandalous statements, Brajkovic claims that Croatian President Franjo Tudjman supports his policies in Mostar unconditionally and absolutely. If that is the case after Washington, Dayton, and Paris, Muhamed Sacirbegovic is right to be disappointed, and wonder what Croatia's policy toward Bosnia is. [end recording]

B-H: Herzeg-Bosnia's Bender on New Role of Entity

LD1402222896 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 14 Feb 96

[Passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Monday, 12 February, the Presidential Council of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia adopted a decision on the transformation of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia into the Croat Community of Herzeg-Bosnia. Ankica Posavljak spoke to Ivan Bender, acting president of the Presidential Council, about what this decision means.

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[Posavljak] The Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia is not being disbanded but is being transformed into a community of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is briefly the explanation of the Presidential Council's decision on the transformation of Herzeg-Bosnia, or, as Ivan Bender explains:

[Bender] "In accordance with the agreement achieved in Dayton and all acts which we have adopted in the former bodies of the Federation and the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, we wish to preserve the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, or rather to carry out its adaptation, adjustment, transformation into a new institution which is the Croat Community of Herzeg-Bosnia. It will be the guarantee of the existence of the Croats in this region.

"We began the transformation with the decisions of the presidency of the Croat Democratic Union [HDZ] where we were given the political message, and now we are embarking on its concrete realization. After a wide-ranging debate in the Presidential Council, decisions, or rather drafts, were adopted which now have to be worked out in detail, submitted again to the party bodies and the Presidential Council, and finally to the Chamber of Deputies, to be reviewed, analyzed, and adopted in order to proceed with implementation."

[Posavljak] The same decision also states that Herzeg-Bosnia will transfer a large part of its functions to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bender explains which these are.

[Bender] "In the framework of preparations, we agreed at the outset that we will adopt a gradual transfer of legislative powers to the relevant institutions of executive power. We have to look at these two aspects of government in parallel, and we have said this and so far acted accordingly. Our representatives who take part in the sessions of the constituent assembly have already in effect transferred a part of the institutions, some of the powers, to the constituent assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and as you can see, we are working with it and taking part. Today, decisions were adopted that come within the competence of the constituent assembly.

"However, within the framework of the [word indistinct] commitments are also part of the competencies of the Chamber of Deputies, which remain under the authority of the grand county. We have not constituted the grand county, and it is debatable how this will proceed, because we see that there are certain problems. For this reason, we must create a body that will replace the Chamber of Deputies, and at the moment the view prevails that this should be an assembly. Whether it will be an assembly or something else has still to be discussed.

"The remaining legislative functions that are not transferred to the constituent assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be transferred to a body — let us say called the assembly — which will be the legal successor to the Chamber of Deputies.

"Similarly with the executive powers. With the establishment of the Federation government, we transferred a part of the competencies to the government of the Federation, but there is a part of the competencies which were carried out by the government of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, which it is still carrying out, and these should be transferred to the grand counties. The grand counties have not been constituted, so these should be transferred to a body that will unite the competencies of the Presidential Council and the government of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia. This body will probably be called the Council of the Croat Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, and will carry out executive functions until all these are transferred.

"There should not be any misunderstandings, any confusion here. The Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia is continuing, transformed, to function as we have said, and these decisions which we are adopting have yet to be endorsed in the Chamber of Deputies, and only then will we be proceeding with all this. Until then there is no change in the organization of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia. This is a gradual transfer. Our people should know that the clear message is that there will be no anarchy in this region. All the organs and institutions of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia are continuing to function until such time as a new institution, a new body is created which will take over these competencies."

[Posavljak] The deputies in the Chamber of Deputies of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia have to give their views on the said decision of the Presidential Council, but this will only be after the further consideration of the draft of this decision by the Presidential Council, which, in the meantime, has formed a working group with the task of studying and working out the details of the draft decision before it is looked at again by both the party bodies and Presidential Council. Only then will the final proposal be drawn up and the final word given to the deputies in the Chamber of Deputies of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia.

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B-H: MBO Assails Croats for Undermining Federation

LD1402223996 Tuzla Radio Tuzla in Serbo Croatian 1500 GMT 14 Feb 96

[Statement issued by the Main Committee of the Muslim Bosniak Organization, MBO; date not given — read by announcer]

[FBIS Translated Text] The cruel truth is that the gloomy clouds of uncertainty are still hovering over the future of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The question may be asked [words indistinct] and is there a way out of this situation? Are the forces of evil stronger than the forces of good and the prosperity of the people?

There have been numerous meetings, gatherings, and conferences, starting with local meetings and ending with a world meeting. Accords and agreements have been signed, resolutions have been passed, statements and promises have been issued, but everything has been torpedoed and distorted by certain groups and individuals.

Besides Sarajevo, Mostar is a crucial issue. It represents a crossroads at which one has the opportunity to take either the road to war or the road to peace. We must stop the forces of war and work toward the restoration of peace. The world has confirmed the guarantees of the survival of a unified Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Entities have been approved as a basis for the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The price paid in blood and in the lives of soldiers who have fought for a unified, single state is known. This is known to all who have taken part in these events.

Despite everything, some people who sit in Federation armchairs and in Mostar or Sarajevo consistently throw a wrench in the works as soon as the Federation tries to get up on its own two feet.

Messrs. Zubak, Brajkovic [mayor of Croat-held Mostar], and others are torpedoing the Federation. Only a blind person is unable to see the separatism at work and the readiness of narrow-minded extremist nationalists to push the people again toward a bloody settling of scores.

The MBO protests against this behavior by the above-mentioned persons and by those aiding and abetting them in neighboring Croatia, and gives its full -support to the citizens of Mostar who are defending their long-standing right to live in an undivided city as free citizens and good neighbors. Supporting Mr. Koschnick's just decision, we also thank the international community for its support.

At the same time, we warn all those who conduct negotiations on behalf of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina that impermissible leeway has been given to extremists from the Croatian Democratic Union, who have distorted every agreement. They have reached a dead end.

Safeguard the pride and reputation of the people in whose name you speak. You do not have the right to lead the Bosniak people into humiliation. We must persist in our just struggle for the preservation of a unified state. We send word to the people of Mostar: Persist in your struggle and do everything to preserve the city and good-neighborly relations, and stop the warmongers from again lighting the torch of terrorism, war, misery, and [word indistinct].

B-H: SDA Official Views Party's Prospects

AU1402200196 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 9, 10 Feb 96

[Interview in two installments with Omer Behmen, member of the SDA Executive Committee and Bosnia-Herzegovina ambassador to Iran, by Samra Tafro; place and date not given; introductory paragraphs by Tafro] [9 Feb p 5: "Embassies Are Not for Fiestas"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt]

Omer Behmen is one of the founders of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA]. For his national and religious beliefs and the struggle for the rights of the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the former Yugoslavia, he spent several years in communist prisons, but remained faithful to his ideas. Today, his words and discussions almost as a matter of course are received by the public with great attention.

Because of his sharp tongue and frankness in conveying his political views, from a journalistic point of view he rates among the more interesting interviewees.

The direct reason for this interview was Behmen's address at the last session of the SDA Main Committee, but naturally it was not the only one.

[Tafro] At the session of the SDA Main Committee you made remarks about the party personnel policy, and said that "wolves were made to guard sheep." Can you explain your stance, and tell us what exactly you had in mind?

[Behmen] In the desire to gather our people together, which was our duty, we succumbed to the false notion that we should also give in to peoples' shortcomings, not to look at and study history but to treat it uncritically. This cost us dearly, in that we gave priority to people who were assigned to some posts for personal interests,

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while we forgot about those people who had been loyal to this nation.

All this followed the reasoning that they were already faithful, and so we would have no problems with them, but others needed to be lured over to our side. In this way, winning over the latter proved counterproductive for us. These people were ill-qualified and incapable. Now, in the run-up to the elections, we will be encountering problems with ordinary people, knowing about some individual swindle or poor personnel appointment and losing trust in the party.

[Tafro] There was much debate at the last session of the Main Committee about the poor organization of the party. In your opinion, to what extent is the SDA among the people, and to what extent can it take the pulse of the people and anticipate possible electoral surprises?

Chance for the Younger Ones

[Behmen] The organization is there and it has not disappeared; however, it is not appropriate to deal with the moment and the task that we face. To a degree, there is some objective justification for this. Only a few months after its formation, the SDA ventured out into parliamentary elections and won, so we actually never became a real party with a real base, called the organization. There was no time, because our people suddenly had the chance to have something of their own.

However, as a result of the wrong orientation, by 1990 we had already practically run out of breath, lost stamina and time coping with the initial problems, such as the first blow that was dealt to us in the form of Adil Zulfikarpasic, which we did not need at the time.

My vision was that we should give a chance to younger, educated people aged from 25 to 40, and not to former, spent brains that all had professorial and magisterial titles, because, by flying too high they had lost touch with life, with the real problems of our people. We had and we still have young, capable people; however, we gave priority to old and incapable ones.

[Tafro] Is there a conflict between the religious and the secular intelligentsia in the SDA?

[Behmen] I believe not, because, in reality, the prevailing consensus and orientation of all people as a group is to acknowledge and respect the tradition, customs, and Islam that has also shaped us here. This is honored regardless of an individual behaving in this or that in his private life. In short, I advocate a strategy that we should have a political party that will gather, direct, and organize all those who belong to the Bosniak national corpus.

[Tafro] Did you demand the replacement of certain personnel in the SDA?

[Behmen] I proposed that SDA Secretary General Mirsad Ceman be replaced. I said politely that he is a good administrator, a lawyer, that he knows the rules, but he has neither the charisma nor the guts. Ceman is good at administration and procedure, but not innovations. I know that most of the party thinks the same. However, nobody wants to get on the wrong side of the man, and it is completely put aside that he is actually harming the party in this post. Many people told me after my address that I was right; however, when it came to the vote, they did not raise their hands for the proposal. [passage omitted]

[Box 1, p 5]

Tesanj Faction

[Tafro] It there any sort of lobbying within the SDA?

[Behmen] There is a type of lobbying that is backfiring on the lobbyists. It is logical that one brings in people whom one knows. However, one should be cautious and have certain criteria. It is precisely because of the uncritical treatment of, for example, the Tesanj faction that we are now suffering a countereffect. Personally, I have nothing against Ceman. He is always welcome here; however, not as the secretary general.

[10 Feb p 5: "Brka Likes Throwing Words Around"]

[Tafro] The SDA Executive Committee distanced itself from you at the session of the Main Committee.

[Behmen] The Executive Committee distanced itself from it because the people do not agree with me. I believe that this is unfair. Actually, the Executive Committee distanced itself from the debate not because what I said would be incorrect, but to prevent certain reactions, namely, "upsetting the public" and creating political problems that are awkward just before the elections. Regardless of numerous accusations, nobody even dreamed of initiating an investigation, because they know what would happen.

[Tafro] Whom specifically did you have in mind when you spoke about the hodzas [Islamic clerics]?

[Behmen] Yes, it particularly hurt them when I mentioned some hodzas. I will be apologizing to some of them, but I told our mufti that I would not be apologizing to him because he knows very well what I wanted to say and he only laughed. A certain number of hodzas or religious institutions would like to participate in the division of the cake. People should know this.

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Take the example of Salih Colakovic from Mostar. The year before last a certain man in Yemen received a check for over $1 million as aid for Bosnia-Herzegovina. But there is no check. He made it through the Chetnik lines and went over to Fikret Abdic; however, now he is forming some Islamic institutions. And nobody is doing a thing about it.

Method of Self-Promotion

[Tafro] One hears rumors that those from the rural faction in the Executive Committee have prevailed over those from the so-called urban faction. What is your comment?

[Behmen] Looking at things individually, one could also make such conclusions. However, I believe it is wrong to reason in this way. My assessment is that a perfectly normal thing has occured. The people were led by impressions and feelings.

However, there is also local patriotism present in the voting. This is normal, to a degree, but it should be restrained. Although it is rumored that people from the province are getting ahead, I believe that this is nothing to go by. For example, Husein Zivalj with his address and clear biography earned his place, as opposed to some others who got ahead with self-promotion.

[Tafro] Who specifically?

[Behmen] Specifically Osman Brka. He got ahead with an inappropriate speech, namely, in a critical review of the party's work he pointed at certain irregularities, won some applause, and on the basis of this got the votes. However, Brka's duty was to submit a report on his work because he is a professional at party headquarters, in charge of the personnel issue and communications and the party's links with its branches abroad. Had he submitted this report, he would have definitely scored some negative points.

His present and further work, too, will have a negative effect on the party and influence the voters adversely. Brka is a man who acts like a populist, who likes throwing words around. Such an approach is absolutely counterproductive today, especially in Sarajevo, where the situation is normalizing.

[Tafro] Do you have a solution for Brka?

[Behmen] The party, for the sake of its own identity, must make sure that he is appointed to a post that suits his qualifications and that he does not attend gatherings, especially not abroad. [passage omitted]

Benefit From Both Sides

[Tafro] The U.S. Administration is exerting certain pressures on the legal Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities not to emphasize its good relations with Iran. Do you have any information as to how the Iranian authorities react to this and how Bosnia-Hezegovina can keep both friends?

[Behmen] I believe that we would be truly stupid if we were to lose one at the expense of the other, because we have certain benefits from both sides. Iran is absolutely our friend. America and Iran are in a confrontation to some degree; however, diplomatically speaking, it would be best if we did not get involved here, pay attention, mind our own business, and not forget about the past.

Iran has truly helped us a great deal and is our sincere friend; there will be more problems ahead and we will need it. America is helping us now, but who knows for how much longer. Another thing is that Iran is our great chance to work and earn money. We must start earning. One dies for ideals but lives off one's work. Therefore, they represent a big chance for us to recover economically and we would truly be foolish if we did not pursue the already initiated contacts and deals that are under way between our firms and Iranian ones. [passage omitted]

B-H: Official Presents Data on Missing People

AU1202175196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1033 GMT 12 February 96

[Speech by Amor Masovic, head of the State Commission for the Exchange of Prisoners of War, in the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo — live]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ladies and gentlemen, although Srebrenica and Zepa are finally on the agenda, allow me — despite the fact that Srebrenica is probably the most [word indistinct] example of not only the violation of basic human rights and [words indistinct] but also of the negation of all civil achievements — to say something in the introductory part of my speech and clarify, through some basic statistics, the situation regarding the missing and captured persons from the whole of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. After that [words indistinct].

Immediately after the start of the aggression against our republic in the middle of April 1992, the state commission for the exchange of prisoners of war, the persons who have been deprived of freedom, and the bodies of the killed, and for keeping a list of missing persons recorded the first cases of the persons who went missing. These persons were arrested and taken away by the former Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] and the Serb rebel forces. Since then, we have registered 25,887

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missing persons. Of these, 22,049 civilians and 2,593 members of the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina went missing on the territory controlled by the former JNA and the Serb (?occupational force); and 1,096 civilians and 1,050 members of the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina went missing on the territory under the control of the Croat Defense Council [HVO].

More than 95 percent of the missing persons are of the Bosniak Muslim nationality, they are of all ages, and they are mainly males. The greatest number of disappearances took place between April and October 1992 and between July and September 1995, and, regarding the territory under HVO control, between May and December [words indistinct]. Among those missing are persons of all constituencies, as well as Albanians, Montenegrins, and other nationalities.

These figures are not absolutely correct, as it is certain that a number of persons have lost the status of missing persons in the meantime. A certain number of people who had been registered as missing have fled or escaped from the aggressors' camps and are not registered with the state commission. A certain number of the missing have been killed. Their bodies have been handed over to us, but in such a state that their identification was impossible. These persons are treated as still being missing.

On the other hand, these figures are not (?absolutely correct), as we believe that a certain number have actually never been registered with the state commission for at least two reasons: The first is the almost total communications blockade during 1992, and the second stems from the fact that, in some rural areas, entire families have disappeared, in some case even all the residents of some local communities, hamlets, and villages, and it is therefore assumed that there was no one to report these people as missing.

Regarding the number of missing persons, the Bosnian Podrinje and the Una-Sana regions can be singled out in particular. Regarding municipalities, these are: Bijeljina, Bratunac, Cajnice, Foca, Gorazde, Han Pijesak, Kalinovik, Rogatica, Rud , Topolica, Srebrenica, Visegrad, Vlasenica, Zvornik, Bihac, Bosanska Krupa, Bosanski Novi, Kljuc, Prijedor, Sanski Most, the greater Sarajevo area, Brcko, Odzak, Modrica, Derventa, Jajce, Donji Vakuf, Kotor Varos, Nevesinje, Gacko, and so forth.

Regarding the territory under HVO control, these are: Mostar, Prozor, Stolac, [words indistinct].

The fact that I have not mentioned all the municipalities and places does not mean that they have in any way been ignored in the process of drawing up the list.

The number of people released through exchange from the camps and prisons run by the Serb rebel forces and the HVO, and whose fates are therefore definitely known, is 6,069. Of these, 4,155 had been held by the Serb rebel forces and 1,914 had been held by the HVO.

In the same period, and in the same way, that is, through exchanges, we have taken over the bodies of 848 persons, 709 from the territory held by the Serb rebel forces and 139 from the territory held by the HVO. More than 90 percent of the released persons and the bodies had been registered as missing. Ninety-five percent of the released persons are civilians, while 98 percent of the dead bodies taken over were members of our armed forces.

Considering the number of missing persons, the case of Srebrenica is especially drastic, and I will speak about this problem (?in particular).

(?During) the occupation of Srebrenica, almost 3,000 men of ages ranging between 13 and 60 years of age were arrested in Potocari and then taken in an unknown direction. [Words indistinct] on the list of missing there were about 5,000 persons who tried to save themselves by (?hiding) and fleeing. So, today, a total of 8,000 persons from Srebrenica are considered missing. In addition to the residents of Srebrenica, who number about 5,000, the rest are refugees who found shelter. They originally came from Bratunac, Vlasenica, Zvornik, and other municipalities — that is, about 3,000 of them. It is quite certain that several thousand of them were killed immediately upon their arrest or [words indistinct] the so-called Serb [word indistinct].

A group of 800 to 1,000 residents of Zepa, including a fairly large number of persons who, after the fall of Srebrenica, tried to save themselves by going to Zepa, found temporary sanctuary in Serbia, where the were put in two camps, in Sljivovica and Mitrovo Polje near Uzice. About 300 of them have already been deported to third European countries and other continents, such as Australia and North America.

All the persons from Srebrenica about whom we received reliable information that they were in the camps of Batkovic, Stocarsko, [word indistinct] Rogatica, Rudo, Han Pijesak, Vlasovica, Visegrad, and Kula near Sarajevo, about 200 of them, have been released and reunited with their families on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The government is currently engaging in all the necessary activities so that all the deported persons can return to the country, if they want to do so. The first group of them, 14 residents of Zepa, Srebrenica, Visegrad, and

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Bratunac, arrived on 7 February this year from the Republic of Ireland. On 8 February this year, they were reunited with their families in Zenica, [word indistinct], and other places.

Although the Dayton agreement clearly defines the obligations of all the sides to enable the other sides not only to visit the locations listed as sites of mass or individual graves, but also to take the bodies of the killed, the Serb side is refusing even the possibility [word indistinct] and is not allowing access [words indistinct].

The international community, above the United States, has thus been [word indistinct], to speed up the process of finding these graves, so that the remains of the innocent victims can be buried in a dignified manner and their families relieved of the immense uncertainty they have been suffering for (?seven) months.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck has visited some sites of mass execution. This was then done by the experts from the United Nations, the Commission for the Protection of Human Rights, Manfred Nowak, and Elisabeth Rehn, special UN rapporteur for human rights in the former Yugoslavia. The latter has promised that she will obtain permission from the Serb authorities for a delegation of women from Srebrenica to visit Srebrenica.

Before I say something about the planned activities, I would like to say something about the role of the International Committee of Red Cross [ICRC] in the events that happened around Srebrenica. It is unacceptable that not a single ICRC member was present in that enclave that during its fall. The presence of this organization in Srebrenica would certainly have, if not prevented, then at least slowed down the negative course of the events regarding the arrested and captured persons.

Seven months after the fall of Srebrenica, the ICRC has managed to register only 1.5 percent of the total number of all the missing and captured persons. This represents an unprecedented failure. Even today, they do not have access to the actual and potential sites in which the residents of Srebrenica (?are held).

Let me say now something about the role of other members of the international community. These are some of my personal impressions, and I beg you to (?treat them as such).

The colossal tragedy of the people from the Bosnian Podrinje region, in which the golgotha of Srebrenica and Zepa represent only the last minutes of the tragic events, appears not to have been sufficient for a section of the international community to watch silently the slaughter of 10-year-old boys. These accomplices to this human and incomprehensible crime will ask us, without any shame and consideration, not only to forgive the executioners but [word indistinct] to forget the victims.

While the Netherlands members of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] [words indistinct] innocent civilian population, and persecuted by the sights of horror, walk half insane through the streets of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, their (?mini-) generals are frowning and turning their heads.

The executioners, who not only surprised the unarmed, hungry, and suffering residents of Srebrenica [words indistinct] a small point on the map of Bosnia-Herzegovina [words indistinct].

Until the international community had realized that the executioner was too zealous in accomplishing his task, it was too late. The accomplices were left the option of either admitting their own co-responsibility or hiding the crime. We all know what their decision is; the conspiracy of keeping quiet about the victims.

We alone cannot [words indistinct] searching persistently for the truth. The truth is also being sought by the Bosniak women, who have been visiting all the places where the exchange of captured and killed are taking place, with the hope, as well as fear, that they would see one of the 35 members of their family who went missing (?near Srebrenica). Bad consciences, despair, our consistent repetition, all this together, or perhaps something else, has finally forced the international community to understand and accept what we have been saying repeatedly: There will be no peace until the last inmate of the Serb concentration camps is freed. There will be no peace until all the fighters and killed are buried in their own graves.

I think that the moment is close when our painstaking struggle for the truth — the struggle that we, unfortunately, had to fight not against our enemy but against a section of the international community — will finally produce the long-awaited results. Knowing how long and exhausting this struggle has been, I appeal: Let us not allow the international community to forget the suffering of the innocent people from Bijeljina, Foca, Visegrad, [words indistinct] Derventa, Modrica, Odzak, Bosanski Samac, Prijedor, Kozarac, Ljubija, Sanski Most, [words indistinct] Ahatovici, Grbavica, Vrace, Hadzici, Semizovac, Svraka, Kasindol Street, Rogatica, [word indistinct] and many other places in order to achieve a temporary, but short-lived peace.

I propose that the assembly should pass a law asking the United Nations, in the interest of the victims and their families, in the interest of a lasting peace — to

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pass an act demanding that the Serb entity allow the international investigation team of experts instant, full, and free access to all the listed and potential sites of mass executions. We must bear in mind the fact that time is working against the victims and [word indistinct].

My message to all those in the Serb entity [words indistinct] is: Help us in the search for the truth, because you will help yourself. Do not let the (?shadows), [words indistinct], death, screams, and cries persecute you for the rest of your lives.

Finally, my message to the families of the captured and missing Bosniak Muslims, Croats, Serbs, and all others is: With or without the help of the ICRC, IFOR [Implementation Force], the United Nations, and others, we will continue to search and fight for the life and freedom of every captured person, we will try to find out what has happened to every missing persons and find the bodies of every killed persons. You can help us with your patience, understanding, and belief in us.

Just a few words about current activities and plans. We are currently undertaking activities on the formation of a multilateral commission for the search for missing persons, which will function under the auspices of the United Nations and be headed by Mr. Manfred Nowak, expert from the commission for human rights. Its task is to speed up the process of finding missing people in the former Yugoslavia, and our representative will be in it, together with representatives of other republics, from Serbia, Montenegro, and [words indistinct].

Finally, we have agreed in principle on our participation in the work of a working group, which will be formed by the ICRC, but on two conditions: that it is really effective, and that the principle of neutrality is not abused, as has been the case so far, that is, that the investigation of over 20,000 cases of missing citizens of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is not conditioned by possible demands by Karadzic's Serbs regarding a dozen or a hundred or so missing Serbs in the area of [word indistinct].

With the mediation of Carl Bildt and his office, we are trying to obtain permission for a visit by a government delegation to the camps in Serbia and Montenegro. Thank you.

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Croatia: Susak on Talks With U.S. Defense Officials

LD1502003196 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2150 GMT 14 Feb 96

[Interview with Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak by unidentified correspondent, in the United States, date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Susak] We had talks on three topics. First we discussed the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and eastern Slavonia. I think we found a common language in both, in support for both sides [as heard], and thanks were expressed for Croatia's contribution to this whole process. Second, we discussed Partnership for Peace and here the United States, at the next session of NATO, in May in Europe, will raise the issue of Croatian membership of the Partnership for Peace, and [word indistinct] requested that some other member countries would support us, as this support has to be unanimous. Third, we discussed long-term cooperation between the two [defense] ministries.

[Correspondent] What is the Croatian view of what the United States can do to speed up the resolution of the eastern Slavonia issue?

[Susak] I discussed this with the Secretary [of State for Defense Perry] and with the joint chiefs [last two words in English] and we discussed the possibility that General Klein could be more effective if he had more U.S. aides, when everything else is in place. They themselves realized that this is one of the things which was needed. And he [Klein] has already sought this. Something which I have not mentioned in terms of their assistance to us—and this will be relevant over the coming few months—is the construction of a bridge over the Sava to replace the pontoon bridge and the carrying out of repairs to the bridge that exists.

[Correspondent] Minister, we have a degree of institutionalization what with the constant exchanges of visits and the constant meetings of working parties. What does this mean?.

[Susak] Yes, working parties [meet] every six months. This means there is close military cooperation at all levels, [word indistinct] [?the exchange of information], including equipment and communications. Secretary Perry himself mentioned that on 15 March part of the embargo ends, which means that purchases can be made of some weapons. Then on 15 June the arms embargo is being lifted completely. And the meeting of the working parties which ends here on Friday [16 February] will resume in Zagreb and four U.S. Army officers will be in constant contact in Zagreb to promote cooperation between the two ministries and armies. And the minister [Perry] will visit Zagreb in March, while the working meeting [not further specified] will resume in August.

[Correspondent] What, minister, can Croatia offer the Americans?

[Susak] This is part of the talks which the working party will negotiate about until Friday. One issue which I will raise this evening will be, perhaps, that a U.S. aircraft carrier might pay a visit to Dubrovnik. I hope we will get the green light for this.

Croatia: U.S. 'Determination' on E. Slavonia Viewed

AU1402143296 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 9 Feb 96 p 5

[Commentary by Aleksandar Milosevic: "General Klein Knows What He Wants"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Recently events in Bosnia-Herzegovina that threaten the Dayton agreements have drawn the attention of our general public away from the other even more important question for Croatia—the peaceful reintegration of Croatian Podunavlje [Danube river basin]. In that field, however, important things have happened that show, first of all, the determination of the United States to implement that what was agreed and signed in Dayton and Paris.

General Jacques Paul Klein, who has been given a mandate by the United Nations to implement the agreement on the peaceful reintegration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem, obviously knows what he wants and what he can. The UN civilian administrator, who will also command the military forces, explained at a recent meeting with journalists in Brussels that 5,000 peace troops of the world organization will be deployed in eastern Slavonia by May this year, that a demilitarized area will be created that a month later, and the local armed Serb paramilitary units will be disarmed.

Those time limits are not as short as the Croatian public expected with good reason, but it is obvious that they are the only ones possible at the moment. Namely, one should have no illusions that the whole operation has not been stalled by the international players that have so far been trying to use events in Croatia for a more or less tacit support of the Belgrade regime and the rebel Serbs. However, the determination of the United States to stay at the head of the peace initiative and force its European partners to firmly bite into the hot and sour apple of eastern Slavonian reintegration is a sufficient guarantee that the letter of the Dayton agreement will be followed. For that, it is not unimportant that the representatives of the Belgrade regime, although unwillingly, accept the inevitability of the political processes that will bring

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about the establishment of Croatian sovereignty on the whole internationally recognized territory of the state. So far, as one could have expected, only individual representatives of the Serbs from that region verbally oppose it, and they are aware of the fact that peaceful reintegration also means the end of their political power and the end of the whole series by 19 March of material privileges that they have been enjoying. There is no doubt, Gen. Klein emphasized in Brussels that the Serbs in eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem will have only two possibilities. One is to accept the fact that in a year they will become Croatian citizens, and the second is to leave that region and go to Serbia or to Bosnia-Herzegovina—the territory of the so-called Serb Republic.

This bitter pill from Gen. Klein's resolute statement has to be swallowed in Belgrade, Vukovar, and Erdut because the Americans obviously have no intention of giving in. Washington has invested all its moral and political authority in the peace process in the territory of former Yugoslavia, and the credibility of the United States as the world leading political and military power is at stake. One thing is sure—were Gen. Klein in Carl Bildt's place in Sarajevo, the Bosnian Serbs would not be able to keep their militia in those parts of Sarajevo that belong to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina until 19 March. Simply, used to understanding that politics is, among other things, strict adherence to the agreements and obligations, the Americans cannot agree to the policy and diplomacy of footdragging, double standards, behind-the-scenes moves, and everything else that is so dear to certain European diplomats and politicians. U.S. pragmatism reaches its full expression regarding eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem.

For its part, Croatia must, to the greatest degree possible, use U.S. decisiveness and make such political moves that will bring Croatia maximum advantage. Apparently, the political interests of Zagreb and Washington overlap at the moment, and it would be unreasonable not to use that fact. After all, Croatia will be able to integrate into the West sooner by relying on the United States instead of a European Union that is divided by politics, economics, and interests.

It is certain that Zagreb will carefully, as so far, follow everything that is going on in eastern Slavonia and analyze the moves of the international community by sending signals about the possible attempts to play down the Dayton agreement. However, Croatia has got another solution, as a last resort. Croatia, of course, does not want to implement it, but it cannot and must not rule it out completely. It has to be made clear to all factors, but without euphoria, because the establishment of the state sovereignty on the whole internationally recognized erritory is an undeniable right of every member state of the United Nations. Croatia does not want to make war, Croatia wants peace. Obviously, this Croatian intention is well understood in Washington. However, it seems that they are aware of the Croatian determination to definitely solve the question of eastern Slavonia within a year. Therefore, the resoluteness of U.S. administrator Klein to implement the Dayton agreement without rest is quite understandable. The American knows what he wants, but he knows even better what Croatia wants and what it is capable of doing.

Croatia: Minister Views Trials Following 'Storm'

AU1402160896 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 2 Feb 96 pp 2-5

[Interview with Croatian Justice Minister Miroslav Separovic by Djurdjica Klancir; place and date not given: "In Croatia, 1,005 Legal Proceedings Have Been Started Against Perpetrators of Criminal Acts After 'Storm' Military Operation!"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

[Klancir] The statement of the Security Council chairman, accepted in early January, condemns violations of international human rights in the former Sectors North and South. Why has the Croatian Government still not released any official data on crimes in the newly liberated regions following the military operations and can you tell us whether your ministry possesses precise data?

[Separovic] We have data on all the cases that are being legally processed because the ministry has demanded that all magistrates issue a list of all legal proceedings being taken against people accused of crimes committed in the wake of Operation Storm. It has been established that, all together, 1,005 legal proceedings have been taken by magistrates, of which 352 are cases that are still under investigation, while 653 cases have reached the first trial phase.

[Klancir] How many prosecutions for the murder of civilians are in progress now?

[Separovic] At the Sisak county court three individuals have been charged with murder, at the Sibenik county court there is one person, at the Zadar county court 16, at the Zagreb Military Court two, and at the Split Military Court three. All together, there are prosecutions in progress against 25 individuals on murder charges.

[Klancir] Are you prosecuting any cases of looting or arson?

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[Separovic] The majority of prosecutions are indeed for looting—at the Karlovac county court, there are prosecutions in progress against 153 individuals, in Sisak against 183, in Split against 28, in Sibenik 34 people have been indicted for theft and looting, in Zadar 350 have been charged with looting, and at the Military Court in Zagreb 14, in that in Karlovac, for theft and looting, 110, and in Split 63. The remaining cases concern banditry, rape, and endangering general law and order. Arson also falls under this last category.

[Klancir] The chairman's statement says that the the number of criminals charged is disproportionate to the number of crimes reported. The fact is that international human rights organizations claim that there have been thousands of civilians murdered, while, according to your data, only 25 individuals have been arrested on such charges.

[Separovic] Unfortunately after the brilliantly executed Operation Storm, a series of incidents did indeed occur that have not contributed to Crotia's good international reputation. However, the responsible institutions, the police and the State Prosecutor's Office, have done everything in their power to identify those responsible as quickly as possible and to put them on trial. Everything that the police have found out has been reported to the state prosecutor and the State Prosecutor's Office has issued demands for investigations. The Justice Ministry has asked magistrates to expedite precisely these proceedings. The magistrates have done exactly this and, despite the many unsolved cases and a shortage of judges, these cases, together with those of business irregularities, are being given priority.

Crimes Against Serb Civilians

[Klancir] International human rights organizations believe, however, that the police and the judiciary have not acted with the necessary urgency in the newly liberated regions. For instance, the body of an old woman was discovered still intact in her own home two months after her murder, which implies that this had not been processed by the police or legal authorities. In the case of elderly Serbs murdered in Varivode, the police and magistrates reacted later than journalists!

[Separovic] I do not want to judge whether it was the journalists or the police who reacted more quickly, but the police claim to have investigated every case reported and every time that they found evidence that a crime had been committed, they reported it to the state prosecutor. In the beginning, there were many problems, because a huge, newly liberated area needed to be placed under Croatia's legal authority. But no state institution can be reproached for encouraging anarchy in those regions. On the contrary, they have really insisted on the establishment of law and order. In concrete terms, the Varivode case has already been processed. According to my information, on 28 September 1995 in Varivode nine people of Serb nationality were killed and investigations have been initiated against four individuals of whom there is reasonable suspicion that they committed the murders. The investigation is almost completed and we only need a report and assessment from our ballistic expert. Similarly, the second serious case is being dealt with—in the village of Gosici seven people of Serb nationality were killed and an investigation is going on against six suspects. In this case, too, we are just waiting for the findings of the ballistics expert.

[Klancir] So are you maintaining that the Croatian authorities have urgently followed up on all the crimes committed against Serb civilians after the military operation?

[Separovic] As a member of the government, I know that the government took immediate action over the situation in the liberated regions. The government's conclusion was that all the cases ought to be resolved promptly and all investigations speeded up. The police were required to prevent possible violence and crime and the judiciary was required to convict the accused as soon as possible. The aim was to show that the Croatian Government did not want to turn a blind eye to incidents because only in such a way could further problems be prevented. Nothing was kept secret. On the contrary, it was insisted upon that all the cases were resolved as soon as possible.

[Klancir] Is it possible that the disproportion between the number of indicted suspects and the number of crimes reported is a result of the police not having processed all the crimes committed?

[Separovic] I believe that the police have correctly carried out their duties. One cannot talk of any such disproportion. On the contrary, the Croatian Government has already reacted to the the UN Security Council chairman's statement. All the data on the prosecutions following Storm have been forwarded to the Foreign Ministry and, as far as I know, Minister Granic has already presented some ojf the data to the assembly of the Council of Europe. He has told me personally that the data were very well prepared. The entire report has been forwarded to the Security Council and I believe that Butrus Butrus-Ghali will be satisfied.

[Klancir] Immediately after Operation Storm it seemed as though the Croatian Government was ignoring and minimizing the problems arising in the newly liberated regions, while the state media were waging a campaign against those foreign journalists who were writing about houses being burnt down and crime. Should the

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government have taken a more serious approach and prevented such crimes through police measures?

[Separovic] The government resolutely demanded that order be established in the newly liberated regions. We were sending reports to the government fairly regularly as well as warnings that it was a huge area difficult to control fully. We were getting information on problems with unauthorized individuals who were in military or police uniforms and there were many attempts at revenge.

[Klancir] Do you now have any data on whether army or police members committed any crimes?

[Separovic] I do not have any precise data on police or army members, but I have data on the number of those who are being prosecuted at the Zagreb, Karlovac, and Split Military Courts. All together, legal action has been taken against 208 individuals. It is clear that military personnel are subject to court martial. [passage omitted]

[Klancir] The Croatian Government has been surprised at findings issued by the State Agency for Revision, which disclose a series of incompetent actions and abuses in several ministries and state agencies and services during 1994. Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Seks in an interview says openly that all those responsible for abuses will be seized by the throat. Can you, as justice minister, explain the possible consequences of these findings by the State Agency? Will those responsible for abuses be prosecuted?

[Separovic] I find it difficult to talk about the final findings of the State Agency for Revision because I have not seen them. All I know about it is what I have read in the newspapers. The matter will be probably discussed in the Assembly and concrete questions will probably be put to each of the ministries. Of course, if the State Prosecutor's Office establishes on the basis of the findings of the State Agency for Revision that certain abuses really occurred, legal proceedings will follow. [passage omitted]

Denationalization

[Klancir] You also happen to be at the center of public attention because of the new Bill on Compensation for Seized Property. Over the past five years, the Assembly has considered several bills on denationalization, but so far none has been passed. Will the issue of denationalization be finally settled?

[Separovic] I think that this time as well it will be very difficult to do this. In the Assembly I expect very fiery debates. This is a question on which the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] will not be insisting on party discipline during the bill's first reading. I find it difficult to say: Yes, it is precisely this variant of the law that will be passed. The fact is that a political decision has been made to embark upon denationalization. That means that by the end of the year the act will certainly be passed, but I cannot say that all the solutions in the bill will be incorporated in it.

[Klancir] Does that mean that we can expect changes in this proposal as well?

[Separovic] Of course, if the Assembly decides so. We are open to all suggestions. We have long been reproached for being hesitant over passing laws and now, as soon as we present it, an avalanche of criticism falls on us. What is important is that we have stuck to several basic principles.

First, we start from natural restitution, which is to say, direct restoration in every case where it is possible.

Second, we provide compensation to the former owner, when it is not possible to make direct restitution of his property.

Third, we provide compensation in the form of shares or securities, which do not represent financial obligations upon the state to an unnecessary degree.

Fourth, we guarantee the protection of rights acquired.

Of course, we shall pay due regard to all comments made during the assembly debate that might improve the text of the law. The government has no reason stubbornly to insist on all details, but it will certainly insist on these four basic principles.

[Klancir] You say that in the HDZ a consensus on the model of denationalization cannot be achieved, but do you expect attacks on this bill from the opposition as well?

[Separovic] In the HDZ a consensus will most probably be achieved. I expect objections and a debate rather than the rejection of the entire bill. A year ago Assembly deputies made it clear in a poll what model of denationalization of flats because flats are the most disputed issue, they consider the best.

Over 60 signatures were then collected from Assembly deputies of the former structure supporting the same model that has been proposed in our bill. The majority of Assembly deputies have also supported the possibility of tenants recovering their flats. However, if the current Assembly debate shows that the solution is not good, we already have a different model prepared. The ministry will fully observe any demand of the legislature.

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Croatia: Zagreb TV on Mostar, Ties to Germany

LD1402213196 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 14 Feb 96

["Commentary" by Nenad Ivankovic in Bonn]

[FBIS Translated Text] How can we assess Kinkel's visit to Zagreb? Did it represent an obvious cooling of Croatian-German relations or was it concerned with German disappointment at the alleged Croatian lack of gratitude—as has been suggested by some Western commentators—because, even after Kinkel's friendly assurances, Zagreb has not yielded and accepted Koschnick's decree?

It is certainly true that the Mostar crisis has burdened relations between Bonn and Zagreb. At the same time, it is clear, after everything which has happened in Mostar and the way in which it has happened, that Bonn, the EU, and the Americans have demonstratively supported Koschnick.

When all is said and done, Koschnick is our man, Kinkel said on his return from Zagreb. But at the same time it is quite understandable that Croatian political leaders could not and cannot stop supporting the justified demands and interests of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats simply in order to show that they are cooperative and benevolent toward their partners and friends.

After all, in Mostar it is truly not a matter of a few houses or streets but of a very difficult and complex political and psychological situation which, if things get worse for the Croats there, could also have serious consequences for the internal stability of Croatia itself.

I do not know how aware Kinkel is of these facts in the wake of the certainly difficult talks in Zagreb, but one thing seems to me to be fairly certain: things are slowly settling down again. To be sure, the German foreign minister still firmly supports Koschnick but, today for example, he said that he has nothing against the Croats and Muslims reaching a mutual accord and finding a different solution.

If one adds to this that the tone has become calmer, it seems that Bonn wants, above all, to let it be known that it is not interested in an exacerbation of relations with Zagreb. I would say that just as our country needs Germany, its friendship and support, so Germany in its own way needs Croatia, too. And this is not because of old sentiments, but primarily because Croatia is one of the key players in bringing about peace and stability in this area. After all, 4,000 German soldiers are stationed in our country and they are enjoying hospitality here such as is enjoyed only by friends and partners.

Croatia: MP Says Government Wants 3-Way Split of Bosnia

LD1502112796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1011 GMT 15 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 15 (TANJUG)—Ivan Jakovcic, Croatian MP and president of the Istrian Democratic Union, has accused the Croatian Government of planning a three-way split of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

FERAL TRIBUNE, an independent weekly of the Croatian sea port of Split, on Thursday quoted Jakovcic as saying that it was an indication of a new tragedy for the Croatian nation.

He said that it seemed that the Croatian leadership had definitely decided to dismantle the concept of a Bosnian federation by dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina three ways and annexing one part to Croatia, FERAL TRIBUNE said.

The Bosnian peace accord divided Bosnia-Herzegovina into two entities—the Muslim-Croat Federation, created under strong pressure from Washington in 1994, and the Republika Srpska, in the territory predominantly populated by Serbs.

However, the Muslim-Croat Federation has not yet been translated into practice because of various disagreements and disputes between Muslims and Croats.

Croatia: Russian Urges Guarantees for Serb Rights

LD1402235896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2242 GMT 14 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Erdut, Feb. 14 (TANJUG)—Russia's special envoy to the Srem-Baranja region Aleksandr Aganyenok said on Wednesday that the implementation of a Serb-Croatian agreement for the region would depend on the international community's equal and objective treatment of the signatories.

Ambassador Aganyenok, who came to Erdut instead of Russian ambassador in Zagreb Leonid Kerestedzhiyants, as previously announced, said that Russia was firm in its position that the signatories to the agreement should be treated objectively and urged other countries to take the same stand. Failing this, there may be complications in the implementation of the peace agreement, he added.

Aganyenok said that the placing of the Srem-Baranja region, formerly U.N.-protected sector east, under Croatian jurisdiction, as requested under relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, could be achieved only if all human and civil rights were guaranteed to the Serb population.

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The agreement on the Srem-Baranja region was signed by Croatian authorities and representatives of the local Serbs in November 1995. In mid-January, the U.N. Security Council decided to send 5,000 peacekeepers to the region within the UNTAES (U.N. Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia) mission.

U.S. official Jacques Klein was appointed U.N. administrator for the Srem-Baranja region, the only of the former four Serb-populated regions which Croatia has not seized.

Aganyenok said that the implementation of the agreement was slow because some of its provisions were vague and allowed for different interpretation. The precise formulation of these provisions is therefore of paramount importance, he added. The Russian diplomat said he was pleased with the Serb side's readiness to honour all obligations of the agreement.

Head of the Serb negotiating team Milan Milanovic said that talks with Aganyenok proved that the Russian Federation wanted to do everything in its power to find a just solution for the Srem-Baranja region. Milanovic also said that U.S. ambassador in Zagreb Peter Galbraith would arrive in Erdut on Thursday and that U.N. administrator Jacques Klein was due in Vukovar on Friday.

Croatia: E. Slavonia Serbs Satisfied With Settlement

AU1402193396 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Summary] In a 10-minute item, an unidentified correspondent reports on the 79th session of the "Executive Council of Beli Manastir municipal assembly", chaired by Vaso Zigic, which was held on 13 February in Beli Manastir. The only item on the agenda, implementation of the settlement and housing program for the refugees and displaced persons from "the occupied parts of the Republic of Serb Krajina," was considered.

He says that this program, whose "starting point lies in the national interest of the Serb people and other citizens living in Baranja," and whose "tasks are based on specific Erdut Agreement provisions," is being "successfully implemented." He adds that "good, prompt, and comprehensive implementation of the program is an important task not only of the municipal government, but also of all the bodies and organizations in charge, as well as economic and other agents, particularly the executive bodies of the local communities in Baranja and the Beli Manastir municipal assembly's Secretariat for Town Planning, Civil Engineering, Public Utility, and Legal and Property Relations."

Reporting that "the settlement of the refugees and displaced persons will be carried out taking into account the available housing facilities and other necessary living conditions," he adds that "the programs will be redefined, that is, supplemented by economic revitalization programs and programs for reconstruction and development of the education and health systems, as well as all other aspects of the life of the people who live in Baranja and the displaced persons from the Republic of Serb Krajina who wish to make Baranja their home." He also adds that "for all the tasks to be carried out properly, some of the bodies will have to do their part of the work in a much more determined way, which is why the municipal government has demanded that the housing resources be urgently reviewed, that those who illegally moved into the housing units be evicted, and that the judiciary bodies be efficient and prosecute the individuals who no longer deserve the hospitality of Baranja in view of their dishonorable acts."

He then introduces the statement by Dusan Jerinic, commissioner of the Beli Manastir municipality Commission of the Secretariat for Refugees and Displaced Persons, who informed the members of the municipal government of the tasks accomplished so far. Jerinic says that "in the period from 1 January to 9 February 1996, 479 families entered Baranja, 91 of them consisting of one person, 107 consisting of two, and 281 consisting of three and more members, totaling 1,531 persons. We have 350 children and adolescents up to the age of 19, 892 persons of working age, that is, from 20 to 60, and 289 persons over the age of 60. It is interesting to point out that there are 117 children up to the age of 6, 128 elementary school students, and 105 high school students, while there are 92 persons who are over 75 years of age. In this past period 107 elderly pensioners arrived in Baranja, which is a little under 7 percent." He adds that "all the refugees who arrive at the Commission of the Secretariat for Refugees are given refugee status on the basis of their identification documents; if they are refugees from the Republic of Serb Krajina or the Republic of Croatia they are given refugee status according to the Erdut Agreement." Once they are given refugee status, "the Secretariat for Housing and Public Utility Affairs assigns a housing facility to them."

The reporter then continues to report that "refugees and displaced persons have been arriving in Baranja since 1991," and adds that "following the registering of the housing facilities, which was carried out late last year, it was determined that 1,200 persons can be accommodated in housing facilities that need to be remodeled, 2,200 can be accommodated in housing facilities that have extra room, and 1,600 in housing facilities occupied by squatters."

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He then introduces the Jerinic statement on the activity of the refugee center in Batina, where refugees and displaced persons are accommodated before their housing problems are resolved. Jerinic says that "in the period between their being given refugee status and receiving housing documents, these persons are accommodated in the refugee center in Batina or with relatives or friends. The Batina refugee center was opened last month, that is, only one of its parts, in which it is possible to accommodate about 40 persons. The refugee center has been full all the time—as some leave, we bring in new people." Having reported on the details of the refugee center's officials' work, he adds that "once central heating is installed in the (?hall), it will be possible to accommodate between 100 and 150 more persons." Moreover, he says that "the Red Cross provides food, but only the food they have at the moment, while the rest must be bought, and we are going to try to find sponsors in the FRY."

The reporter rounds the report up by saying that "apart from the measures that were set earlier and the ones stated above, the Executive Council of the Beli Manastir municipal assembly set the tasks for the bodies in charge of providing agricultural machinery for the people who have arrived," and announces that at the next session "the implementation of all the elements of the settlement program will be considered, and at the same time the measures and activities aimed at combating all forms of crime in the area will be outlined. The agenda will also cover the consideration of the current political and security situation in Baranja, which is now satisfactory."

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FYROM: Gligorov Regrets Breakup of Ruling Coalition

LD1302223796 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2116 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Skopje, 13 February (TANJUG)—Commenting this evening on the breakup of the ruling coalition, Kiro Gligorov, president of FYROM [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], said on national television that he regretted that his recent appeal for dialogue and compromise between the partners in the Alliance for Macedonia had met with differing interpretations.

Gligorov stressed that, instead of a constructive outcome, which had been the only aim of his appeal, a further kindling of passions had ensued which led to the complete break up of the former partners.

"I have no intention of acting as arbitrator since I remain consistently of the view that everyone will bear responsibility for the actions and events which follow, but it is sad that matters have been brought to a fait accompli and that totally opposite and uncontrolled pronouncements and statements have been exchanged," Gligorov said.

Gligorov reiterated that he, as president of all citizens of Macedonia, irrespective of their party, religious, or any other affiliation, would continue to carry out his function on the basis of the program set out during the elections. [passage omitted]

FYROM: Gligorov Comments on Coalition Breakup

AU1402210096 Skopje MIC in English 14 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "I am sorry to say that my appeal to the hitherto partners in the Alliance for Macedonia for holding reasonable discussions and making compromises was interpreted in different ways, such as that I allegedly agree with everything that is being done, that I gave a delayed public statement that I actually do not consent, that the Alliance for Macedonia should be maintained, and so on.

Instead of reaching a constructive outcome, which was my only goal, the agitation was even further intensified, which led to a definite break up of the former partners.

I do not intend to arbitrate this evening, since I am firm in my stance that everyone will bear responsibility for the future activities and events. It is sad that the matters have hit the rock-bottom and that totally contradictory and extreme announcements and statements have been exchanged.

It is exactly for this reason that I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to repeat once again, as the president of all the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], regardless of their party, religious, or any other affiliation, that I will continue to carry out my function on the base of the program and goals that I stood for during the elections.

This is what I wanted to communicate to you this evening in order to avoid misunderstandings over the origin of these events and over the reason why this action was persistently being directed to an outcome that will finally have to be solved in the Macedonian Parliament."

FYROM: Bulgarian Attitude Toward State 'Insincere'

AU1402153096 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 12 Feb 96 p 2

[Article by Tomislav Ivanovski: "On Two Stools"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It seems that in the absence of other engagements, the Bulgarian parliament has recently decided to get involved in the "case" of Vladimir Paunkovski. Although a foreigner, he is of great interest to Bulgarian parliament members, at one time because they label him a "pro-Bulgarian politician" from Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], while at other times they refer to him as a "declared Bulgarian." The national feelings of the Bulgarian parliament members were stirred up because he [Vladimir Paunkovski] was called into the Macedonian Interior Ministry for questioning just after the assassination attempt against President Gligorov and because he was allegedly maltreated by our police merely because he declared himself a Bulgarian. This forced [Bulgarian] Foreign Minister Pirinski to threaten Macedonia "with other measures" if our state did not respond to Bulgaria and "explain" the case regarding this Macedonian citizen!

Only a few days later, the Bulgarian authorities took some measures that may have seemed counterproductive only at first sight. In a village near the town of Goce Delcev in the Pirin part of Bulgaria, they sent a strong police force to disperse the Macedonians who had gathered at the second annual meeting of the OMO [United Macedonian Organization] Ilinden—Democratic Movement. The meeting was banned. The police explained, "Bulgaria does not recognize any Macedonian minority on its territory," and the guests from Macedonia and Greece were expelled after a few hours' of questioning by the police. Moreover, Sofia again completely ignored the appeal of the oldest Macedonian organization

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in Bulgaria—OMO Ilinden, which was formed immediately after Zhivkov's fall in autumn 1989—to the [Bulgarian] authorities and public, although its only demand was to stop the incriminating campaign intended to denigrate the organizations of the Macedonians as terrorist and separatist. Instead of showing understanding and support for the appeal, the Bulgarian press welcomed the brutality of its police and particularly the "synchronized actions of the authorities."

Errors of the Past

These compliments to the authorities and the satisfaction with its coordinated actions are a good illustration of the situation and the spirit in Bulgarian society, which is incapable of freeing itself from the historic traumas and errors of the past, particularly regarding the unchanged relationship toward Macedonia, toward the Macedonian nation, and its particular national identity. That is why Sofia is looking for an excuse for its domestic situation and for its policy in relation to its neighborhood, and to the Balkans in general, "through synchronized actions." For these and such policies and situations, it is necessary to have a "case" and it was expressly and easily found in an "oppressed Bulgarian." However, what is the real purpose behind it?

The first purpose is to present the domestic public with a false image of the lively "Bulgarian feelings" in Macedonia. It has now been revived with the appearance of "pro-Bulgarian politicians" who allegedly belong to a bloc that is still represented as our own national and genuine Macedonian! The second purpose is to use these imputations to make Europe believe that there are more "Bulgarians" in Macedonia than the 1,547 people who declared themselves as Bulgarians during the last census in June 1994. The third purpose is to use "cases" of this kind, including the one from a couple of years ago when a nationalist theater was made out of granting Bulgarian citizenship to Ilija Ilievski, to intensify the pressure on and threats against the 10,800 citizens in Bulgaria who declared themselves as Macedonians in the December 1992 census. Finally, the fourth purpose is to make use of the "Macedonian-Bulgarian" case to cover up, at least for a time, the "language problem" into which Bulgarian policy was dragged two years ago when it refused to sign a document in Macedonian. Evidently it does not want to free itself of this problem, although it is clear that, if the problem in Macedonian-Bulgarian relations persists, a solution will finally have to be found. Sofia believes that the possibility of "damaging" the interests of the Bulgarian cause is much greater where the language is at stake than by inventing affairs like the one with the "maltreated Bulgarians," in which parliament and the Foreign Ministry had to be engaged to score valuable points on the Bulgarian political scene, where nationalism still has a very high rating.

Domestic Traumas

All this leads to the conclusion that the general domestic situation forces Bulgaria to remain a prisoner of the past instead of becoming a creator of the future. However, its domestic traumas and day-to-day needs have gone beyond all this, because Macedonia is being deeply involved, despite the fact that it is a sovereign state with which Sofia has established diplomatic relations. So the games that are occasionally but also persistently played show how insincere the references are to good neighborly relations that are constantly being made, and this can sometimes even be regarded as interference in internal affairs and as the wish to maintain insecurity in the region. Sitting on two stools has been the case practically since the moment Sofia decided to recognize and accept our independence with limitations—recognition of territory and state, denial of nation and language. At that moment it was clear that Bulgaria hastened to be the first country to accept the new Balkan reality with the aim of forging some "special links" between Skopje and Sofia, probably like the ones that existed before with Belgrade.

To serve this political need a partner was sought on the Macedonian political scene. It was found in the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] leadership, which was given special status in Sofia and then used to inform the Macedonian public about the Bulgarian state's positions regarding our state, its domestic and foreign policies, and economic situation. The nearly perfectly coordinated policy of equidistance was attacked, which is in itself absurd for a party that is constantly accusing the Macedonian leadership of "Yugo-nostalgia," although this policy contributed to the slow and patient construction of new relations and confidence toward Belgrade and Athens, but also toward Tirana, by which independence was bolstered.

Next, behind the facade that blank spots in history are being filled in, there was an attempt to rehabilitate those who had spent their lives liquidating the fighters for independent Macedonia with the aim of annexing Macedonia to Bulgaria. This campaign culminated last summer when some members of the VMRO-DPMNE and some Sofia historians and publishers promoted the hackneyed thesis that the Macedonians have Bulgarian roots, that their language is Bulgarian, and that the history of our national liberation is nothing but a part of Bulgarian history. The old thesis, dating from Zhivkov's time, that the "scientists must define what the Macedonians are and what kind of language is

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theirs" has now been given political verification. It is understandable that in such an atmosphere 80 Bulgarian parliament members asked for the "the border between Bulgaria and Macedonia to be lifted, because, according to them, it is an artificial border separating one and the same nation—Bulgaria," and about 30 officials, politicians, and intellectuals said that they "are ready to protect democracy and freedom in our country," as if it were their own pocket that they could reach into whenever they wish.

Without a Firm View

Finally, in the days after the attempt to assassinate the Macedonian president, in the period of total dismay in the Balkans as to who tried to liquidate the head of the youngest independent state in the region and why, Sofia's dishonesty toward its western neighbor was fully revealed. The first rumors were that the trail led to the east, then that there was not a "Bulgarian connection," and finally Bulgarian Interior Minister Nachev confirmed that his spies in Macedonia "had informed him" that there was no salvation for Gligorov. There was a whole series of meetings in the Bulgarian state leadership, the police, and the army, which were dedicated to the situation in Macedonia at that time. The reason for this was that the assassination attempt took place immediately after the Greek-Macedonian accord and after the announcement that Belgrade and Skopje were preparing to recognize each other. Apparently Bulgarian official policy did not and still does not have a firm view on these important events.

The announcement by the Bulgarian Socialists after they came to power that the new government in Sofia will conduct a "real policy" toward Macedonia can for now be taken within the framework of the messages that could be heard when they were in opposition—the need to bring Skopje to its senses and to get from Sofia just as much as it was ready to give, and the most frequent message was that "finally, the Bulgarians have two states!" In simple language this means that this "reality" smacks of something very old and rotten, reminding one of Greece's attitude toward Cyprus 20 years ago, when Athens was fully involved in "enosis," that is, "union." Some people in Sofia, and also in our country, know that Macedonia is not Cyprus, nor is Bulgaria Greece, regardless of the fact that some people here persist in representing a foreign state's symbols as Macedonian. Let us recall that the policy of "enosis" in 1974 led to war and to the partition of the Cypriot state, which has since remained divided. In the Balkans, in the case of Macedonia, the whole matter might acquire larger dimensions.

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Poland: Kwasniewski: Zhirinovskiy's Remarks Scandalous

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[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Potemkin]

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 14 Feb—"It is paying Mr. Zhirinovskiy too much honor for the Polish president to comment officially on his remarks," Polish President Alexander Kwasniewski said today. He did, however, "permit" journalists to tell their readers [as received] that the Polish president regarded the remarks by the leader of the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] as "scandalous and unworthy of the language we ought to be using to communicate in Europe at the end of the 20th century, particularly in relations between Poland and Russia."

Kwasniewski said this today in the lobbies of parliament after the lower house of the Polish Sejm placed on the agenda "information regarding the scandalous remarks, insulting to Poland, that are appearing in the Russian Duma." A representative of the right-wing nationalist party, the Confederation of Independent Poland, having proposed that this issue be raised, said that the Sejm could not "remain indifferent to the insults against the independent Polish state that Russian deputies are permitting themselves" and demanded that "criminal proceedings be instituted against people sowing the seeds of hatred between people."

Poland: Prime Minister Cimoszewicz's Address to Sejm

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[Address by Polish Prime Minister Wlodzimierz to the Polish Sejm in Warsaw—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, and the House: The Council of Ministers and its program, the composition of which I am presenting today to the House, is a government made up of a social democratic and peasant coalition created by two political groups that received the greatest public support in the latest parliamentary elections. It is thanks to the will of the electorate, expressed in a free and democratic vote, that this coalition has the right and duty to shoulder responsibility for the Polish state during the four years before the next Sejm and Senate elections are held as required by the constitution. Today, joint public support for both groups is not [as heard] greater than two years ago, and this constitutes additional political confirmation of the mandate enjoyed by the government I am creating. Respect for the law and for the principles of democracy should not make it possible for anyone to undermine this mandate. After all, politicians are there to serve the public, and it is only the public that can determine the elections and the makeup of the political authorities.

I want this to be a government that continues the reforms, that creates the conditions in which everyday human worries and problems can be resolved in a more satisfactory way, that builds the authority of the state, that extends the scope of government policy beyond the year 2000, and that is a government accessible to the public. This government is not being formed because the previous one lost public confidence. And neither are such factors as the government's program or a disintegration of the coalition the reason for the change. The aspiration to create conditions that make it possible to fully clear up, in accordance with the constitutional order, suspicions that are of a personal nature concerning my predecessor lies at the heart of this change.

During the governments of Waldemar Pawlak and Jozef Oleksy, the Polish economy was strengthened and attained some of the highest rate of development seen in Europe. I propose to repudiate today arguments about how much effort was put into this from the beginning of the 1990's, when the government was in the hands of those politicians who now form the opposition. What is important for Poland is that it should overcome the crisis and achieve visible changes for the better. It is important that predictions, which accompanied the takeover of power by the PSL-SLD [Polish Peasant Party-Democratic Left Alliance] coalition, that there would be an economic collapse and crisis did not come true. This creates a very strong foundation for reforming the economy in a consistent manner and for effectively resolving existing difficult social problems.

You see, the fact that there has been an improvement cannot lead the government to fail to see or worry about areas of human misery, danger, and fear that still exist. I am aware of how many Poles still live in difficult and downright dramatic conditions and of how many social injustices there still are. I will take this into consideration in the decisions of the government. My government will march consistently down the road of reforms, and, in this sense, it will be a government continuing the hitherto economic and social policies.

I can assure Poles and our foreign partners that this is one of the essential principles governing the work of the new government. I wish to thank at this juncture the government of Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy for its great and solid work it did to prepare and, to a large extent, to introduce strategic programs and to deal with

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numerous matters that had previously not been grasped effectively.

The elections to the Sejm and Senate next year define the period in which we will be implementing our program. This should not disturb the calm work on the reforms that are being implemented and that are in preparation. This Cabinet will attach much importance to the fulfillment of plans and projects that are in progress, bearing well in mind the numerous cases in the past, when the problems present in the announcements and declarations of new prime ministers had a longer life span than that of their governments. Citizens have the right to bring those in government to account for their results and not just for their intentions.

The government will soon present to parliament its opinion on the level of urgency and importance of draft laws that have already been submitted to the esteemed House. With much respect and recognition for the legislative activity of this parliament, one can say, however, that already now more bills have been submitted to the House than it will practically be able to examine before the end of the parliamentary term. It is necessary to focus legislative effort on the most important matters.

Already today I want to point out the government's interest in the completion of a legal basis for the reform of the central government, the establishment of a civil service, the reform of the health care and social security, and the implementation of the new penal codes.

In the past few days, President Aleksander Kwasniewski signed the budget for 1996 that had been passed by the esteemed House. This has established the limits and opportunities for financing important social needs this year. This arouses the hope for practical implementation of the four basic priorities of the government this year. They are: citizens' safety, the development of education and science, the reform of the health service, and the development of the countryside.

Next year we should start the implementation of a new, medium-term economic and social policy program. It will constitute an expansion of the coalition's strategy for Poland. It will draw new initiatives based on the results achieved so far until the year 2000.

The government will also regard as its task the preparation of a mature long-term strategy for socioeconomic development and town and country planning for Poland after the year 2000. So, we are not thinking only about the administration of the country. We understand that our responsibility is to create conditions to extend the perspective outside the current century.

We deeply believe that the balance of results achieved by the social-democratic and peasant coalition in its four-year period in power will make the voters decide to extend our mandate and make it possible to fulfill the program I have described.

However, irrespective of that, the feeling of responsibility for Poland puts us under the obligation to leave a ready-made concept for the country's development to our possible successors.

May it please the House: As a result of deep political divisions still existing in Poland, political confrontation often takes very sharp forms, which in some cases have very little in common with the principles of a law-abiding state. Everything has become a commodity on a political market. Some of the political class members, by carrying on their continuous arguments, have unconsciously brought about the lowering of the prestige of the most important state institutions and a gradual demise of any authority. Nobody is without fault here. I am fully aware that the weak threads of dialogue and understanding on the most important state matters have been broken.

At the same time, unfortunately, incidents involving state officials, who break the rules of public service, and the fact that the effectiveness of the fight against social pathology has been weakened have become a source for concern of many citizens. In unfavorable conditions this could increase the risk of weakening the democratic state. It is time to come to our senses. For this reason, my government has set itself a task to improve the credibility of public authorities.

I know that we will be able to perform this most difficult task if we show efficiency, responsibility, honesty, competence, and a very serious respect of the law. The government wants to be open to dialogue and to search for accord on issues that should not divide us because they are of the most vital interest to the state and citizens. First of all, it concerns basic assumptions of foreign policy and the security of state and its citizens. I am of the opinion that the logic of dividing people between those who govern and bear responsibility and those in opposition does not rule out the possibility for searching and finding agreements on specific issues on both the state and local scale.

There are numerous social problems that on the one hand are increasing alarmingly and, on the other, are beyond any political qualification. Cooperation in combating drug addiction, care for eliminating the reasons for and reducing the scale of social deprivation, and saving people's lives from the dangers on Polish roads and streets are the planes where there should not

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be political divisions. We will still have enough real reasons to differ in opinion.

The government declares its openness and readiness for dialogue regarding various social partners, including trade unions, employers organizations, associations, self-governments, and other structures of the civic society. The care for Poland should prompt us to search for agreements that prevent or resolve conflicts and are based on a rational and honest compromise. The government will consistently come out in favor of searching for solutions within the boundaries of the law and in accordance with the principle that no individual or group reasons can have priority over public reasons or an important interest of the state.

May it please the House: The assurance of permanent development, stability, and competitiveness of the economy is the condition for Poland's success. Recent economic results constitute unquestionable achievements for all of us. Proof for such an assessment can be found in almost every domain. We closed last year with the growth of the GDP of almost 7 percent. This gives Poland the best position in Europe. We have regained the 1989 level of output after the slump in Central and East Europe. Our production structure is better adapted to the requirements of the international market. The dynamics of Polish export—there the growth was over 30 percent in 1995—has been linked to an increase of export to the OECD markets—that is, to the most developed countries. Last year also brought 12 percent growth in investment. There was a clear drop in inflation to the level of 21.6 percent. The improvement in the image of Poland's economy in the world, measured by swift redemption of our bonds and an increased influx of foreign capital, has been a fact. The better financial situation of Polish enterprises, connected with a considerable increase in returns generated by the private sector, is proof of advancing ownership changes.

The government thinks that the aforementioned changes for the better in the economy neither came about on their own nor are necessarily going to stay forever. Proceeding from this assumption, I announce the maintenance of the state's financial discipline, consistency in the implementation of the industrial policy program and in the development of small and medium-sized enterprises, and the strengthening of the competitiveness of the Polish economy and its products. Efforts linked up to the restructuring of strategic spheres of the economy, including the coal industry, the iron and steel industries, the defense industry, and the fuel industry, will be intensified. The government will actively tackle problems pertaining to regional development, paying particular attention to those areas requiring deep restructuring. We wish to use the experience gained from the implementation of the regional contract for Katowice Province.

There is every reason to suppose there will be visible results in the sphere of housing construction in 1997. This is closely connected to the introduction of legal regulations that support housing construction, to the development of the real estate market, and to starting up the construction of rented accommodation. When I say effects, I mean not only the quantity of houses but also their quality and level of accessibility, especially for young people who more often than not do not have their own financial resources. Housing construction clearly must and will be supported financially by the state.

I am deeply convinced that there have to be more rapid changes in the infrastructure, particularly in Polish telecommunications and the country's transportation system. It is high time that the implementation of the program for the construction of motorways was speeded up. We also wish to intensify the modernization of the main railway lines. We will wish to take better advantage of the opportunity the considerable development of tourism creates for the budget and for the creation of new jobs.

The government is aware that favorable conditions for and security for conducting economic activity and the limitation of the extent of fiscal stringency are conditions for maintaining positive trends in the economy. This applies equally to large enterprises and to individuals working for themselves. I am announcing today solutions intended to strengthen the structures and stabilize the conditions under which the banking system operates. Bearing in mind these tasks, we willl voice our support for the necessary measures that guarantee the independence of the National Polish Bank, and we will conduct a process designed to consolidate the privatization of banks.

I am announcing that steps will be taken to further strengthen the guarantees for export insurance schemes, that the further liberalization of foreign currency law will be considered, and that the equality of the principles governing economic activity, including those governing foreign capital, will be ensured. I personally also attach great importance to our plans to guarantee more fully the security of economic activity, including changes in the bankruptcy law and the economic law register. I declare the durable nature of the approach that treats investment in people above all as an opportunity for, among other things, the economy and not as an expense weighing down the budget. Confirmation of this stance will be found in the state's educational strategy that is being prepared, in the conclusion of the work being done on the draft bill on the Polish Academy of Sciences,

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and in the introduction of a cultural education program spanning various ministries.

A special system for analyzing the effects of the transfer of schools onto the jurisdiction of local government will be launched. A program for additional physical education classes at primary schools will be implemented. The government will regard the principle of general access to free public education as fundamental.

Our national culture can expect help from the government, as well as the creation of a legal framework to enable it to develop. Personally, I attach much importance to the implementation of solutions concerning the organization and financing of cultural activity. It is culture that to a large degree determines national identity and constitutes the source of its continuity and development.

I regard a more open approach to the issues of ecological development and environmental protection as indispensable. On this issue we are prepared to cooperate with all social partners, including the ecological movements. Above all, we will endeavor to build systemic links between science and the economy as part of the implementation of the government state policy program on science and technology. Strict adherence to the principle of clear criteria, assessments and decisions connected with the use by academic research of budget resources, will serve this purpose.

It is the government will to be consistent in its treatment of measures aimed at reducing unemployment as a factor that determines economic development. The effects of this approach are already apparent. Several hundred thousand new jobs have already been created. The number of unemployed has been reduced. Mechanisms for systemic solutions for areas afflicted by structural unemployment have been worked out. The special economic zone in Mielec can serve as an example.

Further regulations will be prepared, aimed at lifting the stress in unemployment programs from paying out benefits onto financial incentives for those who create new jobs and graduates actively seeking employment.

The fate of Poland's economy is to a large extent determined by the countryside, by agriculture, and by family farms. I do not need to be convinced how much still remains to be done to prepare the Polish countryside to able to meet the challenges of the contemporary world. I know from my own experience how enormous the civilization gap is between living conditions in the countryside and in the cities. My government and I will treat the tasks connected with this area as our highest priority.

The government will create conditions to develop the profitability of agricultural production and create jobs as part of the implementation of the comprehensive program of management of the countryside. The work on creating legislation to facilitate transformations in the Polish countryside and agriculture in order to adapt them to EU standards will continue.

The regulations concerning labor relations are of great importance to social market policy. The negotiation mechanisms, which have been successfully implemented as part of the Tripartite Commission for Socioeconomic Affairs, and the new solutions contained in the Labor Code have proved to be of great value. I want these solutions to be supplemented by legislation on collective labor relations without unnecessary delay.

However, in this area much depends on social partners because it is easy to spoil these mechanisms by concentrating on individual demands and by attempts to exert pressure by way of the strike, in order to achieve what has not been possible to agree to with employers at the negotiating table. We have to demonstrate a particular sense of responsibility here because it is in this area where it will be determined whether the sacrifices and costs borne for many years are not wasted, where it will be determined whether pay increases turn out to be real and not just inflationary, solely in terms of paper money. Wages must not and should not be a subject of continuous bargaining and political struggle.

Privatization is one of the most important elements in the process of transforming the economy. In this area we have an unequivocal will to continue, and we have already had good results, but also much discussion and many concerns, as well as proposals for solutions, have arisen as a result of different political positions.

On the one hand, we have record high receipts from privatization, allowing the financing of necessary economic and social tasks from the budget. On the other, there are some doubts regarding decisions on this issue. On the one hand, we have the National Investment Fund program and the purchase of certificates by nearly 7 million people, but, on the other, question marks are being put on proposals to expand this program. On the one hand, we have the idea of enfranchisement by using privatized assets for setting up big programs of social services and social insurance and compensation funds for meeting outstanding pay and pension obligations that transpire from the rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal. And, on the other, we have the idea of enfranchisement providing for equal and direct public participation in the division of assets coming from privatization. I want to stress three things about these issues. First, the unquestionable determination of the government to con-

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tinue the speedy process of privatization. Second, the need to consider what additional control mechanisms are justified in order to avoid any doubts on privatization decisions. Third, the decision as to the method of enfranchisement is to be made by the public in a referendum. I would warn, however, against creating a new myth about the possibility of quickly becoming richer in this way.

Mr. Speaker, may it please the House: An efficient and fair introduction of big reforms in the social services sector in the coming years is a condition for Poland's development. Social insurance and health-care reforms are among the most difficult tasks. This sphere is going to show to a great extent whether we have been able to guarantee fair access to the effects of economic growth. The government is to carefully examine social proportions of costs and advantages. At present we are in an advanced stage of preparing legal bases for both reforms. A package of bills concerning general health insurance, state benefits from public funds, the principles of payment for medicines and sanitary products and for medical care establishments has already been submitted to the Sejm. The government will carry out necessary preparatory work to implement these solutions. Changes in the system of funding and organizing health care are already under way. The program of social insurance, which already was the subject of wide public consultation, is also waiting for a debate in the Sejm. The government is ready to prepare concrete drafts of legislative acts transpiring from this program. I want to clearly present my conviction that all reforms have to be carried out with respect for the rights of the weakest section of the population, with the guarantee that the old-age and disability pensioners will have their share of benefits arising from economic growth and with respect to the social guarantees of the citizens, including a package signed last 14 July with the participation of trade unions and employers' organizations and after thorough explanation of proposals concerning modifications and amendments.

This will also be the philosophy governing the activities of this government.

Esteemed deputies, the government's economic and social policies can be checked most accurately when applied to the situation of the Polish family. The years of transformation and success have also produced phenomena that have made the conditions of many Polish families worse. Personally speaking, I think this poses a fundamental threat for Polish reforms. All signs of disease and shortcomings in families sooner or later have an impact on social life. It is within the family that such words and values as patriotism, morality, and responsibility take on some meaning. It is within the family that the conditions are created for the first steps by the young generation and that matters determining the nation's demographic conditions are decided on. I want this government's profamily political course to be clearly visible. This year we will carry out yet again a wholesale review of legal and institutional measures regarding their importance for the requirement of strengthening the family. We will do this not just to describe the current situation, but to prepare the necessary changes and modifications.

May it please the House: The government will consider its supreme duty to serve the cause of creating in the Polish Republic a democratic state based on the rule of law, a state with authority and social confidence. The observance of laws, the efficiency and effectiveness of work, and responsibility and cohesion in behavior will be relentlessly executed as regards all echelons of the government administration and all of its employees. I know that impartiality and the credibility of all those involved in the work of government institutions is a fundamental condition for the government to fulfill its duties towards citizens. There cannot be and there will not be any unclear or ambiguous statements in these matters. No one should expect an easy ride. The government will support measures that help shape confidence in the public administration. There can be no doubts about whether public matters are conducted by competent and honest people, people with clean hands.

At the same time, I wish to confirm unambiguously the will of the government to implement the program for the reform of the public administration. The reconstruction of the administrative and economic center, the creation of a modern state civil service, the extension of the powers of provincial governors at the expense of a limitation being put on special administrations, the strengthening of the legal and financial position of territorial self-government bodies and extending the sphere of its activities are for me the basic policy plans. I am counting here on good cooperation with the Sejm on draft statutes that have already been submitted to the parliament. I declare that I will be firm about your remarks and proposals.

The closure of the office [urzad] of the Council of Ministers as a structure that has excessively widespread and differing powers and the creation of the Chancellery [kancelaria] of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and a separate ministry dealing with public administration matters will create conditions for improved work by the government. This will make it possible to improve the way that ministries, local government administrations, and territorial self-governing bodies cooperate. In consultation with the unions of towns and parishes, especially within the framework of the joint government

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and self-government commission, an analysis has been made of the recently introduced regulations concerning the financing of parishes, of the new powers given to the authorities of self-governing bodies and big towns, and also of the new tasks given to the parishes. Everywhere where we decide together that there is a need for this, we will propose the necessary legal amendments, and we will draw conclusions during the preparations for the 1997 draft budget.

Widening the scope of activities of local self-governments is linked to the need to approach the issues of territorial division of the country. There is still diversity of opinion on this issue. All decisions have to be preceded by thorough analysis and wide public debate. The government will initiate this discussion so that parliament will be able to make necessary decisions. I have also no doubt that we will have to create better mechanisms for real decentralization of the state authorities and for the development of self-governments. The reform of the state structures is obviously linked to the completion of work on a new constitution by the National Assembly and to the approval for the constitution in a referendum. Any delays in this process would hamper the work of putting the issues of government administration in order. Relations between the president, parliament, and government are also of utmost importance to the success of the public administration reform. The hope for normal relations, compatible with the character of the constitution, that are now taking shape is also a great chance for reform of the state.

May it please the House: Since 1990, the increase of crime in Poland has reached an alarming proportion. The growing number of crimes and the sinister trend of rapid growth of the most serious ones, including murders, the appearance of organized crime with international links, and the evidence that the criminal world is building a strong financial base for its activities are posing a challenge to the state. Without exaggeration, one has to recognize the present state of affairs as demanding far greater resolute actions for improvement of internal security of our country and for ensuring peace for its people. Unfortunately, the activities by the previous governments, including the last one, did not bring about satisfying results. There is the need for more efficient work of services responsible for combatting crime, based on higher discipline and higher qualifications. Taking advantage of the increasing awareness of international community that the fight against crime should be a joint one, the government will vigorously strive for clear expansion of cooperation in this sphere with other countries. While demanding more from its own services, the government expects necessary cooperation from other institutions. Among other things, it concerns banks and other financial institutions. Fighting crime means not only detecting and punishing perpetrators, but also efficient actions to prevent them from using financial resources coming from unlawful activities. Public concern about the state of their personal security should make us all aware that one will be able to talk about a real breakthrough in fighting crime only when the services of the state responsible for this task win wide public support. We should support various forms of civic activity for safety in local community, district, or town.

The experience of many democratic countries has confirmed the great value of such initiatives and has demonstrated the potential of local government. The state budget for this year envisages improved financial and human resources for the Interior Ministry sector. The government expects that the additional resources will produce better quality and effectiveness.

After years of discussion, the time has now come to complete the reform of the Ministry of Internal Affairs that started in 1990 but was later halted. Too much power is concentrated in this ministry without any rational reason. This power is still not subject to any effective democratic control. It has turned out that it was an easier task to build a democratic political system in Poland than to adapt the form, structure, and principles of the functions of the Interior Ministry to the rules of this system.

I want to announce that, as part of the course of parliamentary work on the reform of the central government administration, the government will submit appropriate proposals in the form of its own amendment. It will envisage, among other things, the exclusion from this ministry of the State Protection Office [UOP] and its subordination directly to the prime minister. I am in favor of introducing this change as soon as possible.

Parliamentary control over the special services has to be increased already today. However, the effectiveness of such control will depend on whether we can ensure a situation when the only point of reference will be the interest of the state and not entanglement in continuous arguments of political groupings. The special services must not be involved by anybody, including themselves, in current wrangles and political conflicts. These services belong to the state and not to political groupings and coteries. The situation when the special services determine their own tasks and report on their implementation themselves is unacceptable. It is the government's task to define these objectives. The prime minister and the minister of internal affairs are in charge of this area in accordance with the law.

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As prime minister, I will give the minister of internal affairs my full support and help in his work to prepare and effectively implement reform of the internal affairs sector and his work in defending the law and public order. Within a period of a few months, the government will submit to the Sejm a detailed report on the condition of the services of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW]. The report will include an assessment of the situation and the activity of these services.

We are considering the possibility that has already been suggested of further opening up the archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to historians. This might be useful for clearing up the truth about the conflicts and tensions during the PRL [Polish People's Republic] period. In the very near future, draft statutes regulating access to weapons, the principles governing the defense of persons and property, the protection of personal data, and traffic regulations will also be submitted to the Sejm.

May it please the House: Work being done to ensure the quality of the law is an essential task that the Council of Ministers, led by me, is setting for itself. In accordance with the proposals of the Legislative Council, I want government legislative activity to become more efficient. I wish to overcome manifestations, that can still be felt, of ministries or industries acting in isolation from other ministries, which often leads to a lack of cohesion in the whole system of the law. We plan to create a strong governmental legislative center, and we will consider the possibility of giving the Minister of Justice a fundamental role in the way it is run. Work will be speeded up on drawing up a modern statute on the way that laws are prepared and announced. We will attach the greatest importance to harmonizing Polish law with European Union law.

The efficient functioning of a system for the administration of justice, based on the principle of the independence of judges and the independence of the courts and prosecutor's office, and respect for the activities and decisions of the Constitutional Tribunal and the ombudsman, particularly when these institutions point to instances of the law being broken, are a condition for the construction of a democratic state based on adherence to the law. It is the duty of all state organs to observe the constitutional guarantees for these values. The National Judiciary Council has a special role to play in this. However, it is necessary to continue strengthening the position of the system for the administration of justice. The government will present to the Sejm a draft statute on having a separate budget for the judiciary. A significant streamlining of the judiciary, which is necessary for the correct functioning of the state and economy, means that it has to have conditions created for it that allow it to cope with the tasks that have been set.

Last year about 5 million cases reached the courts. The prosecutor's office has the same problem. In the next few years, it will also be necessary to create the conditions for the correct functioning of the prison services. Whether they can fulfill their resocialization tasks depends on, among other things, ensuring employment for people who have been sentenced.

May it please the House: I will consider the strengthening and extension of the rights and freedoms of citizens to be a fundamental precondition for the activity of the government. I wish to stress in particular the will of the government to guarantee equality in matters of freedom of conscience, religion, and nationality and its determination to implement the right that citizens have to information. Freedom of conscience and religion, freedom to practice any religion, and a ban on discrimination on the basis of one's philosophy, these constitute a fundamental right of human beings and citizens. Citizens exercise this right by joining churches and religious associations. Guided by respect for the inviolable rights of citizens and recognition for the great role played in the life of Poles and Poland, including the Catholic Church, which has a particular role in history and in the formation of the nation's consciousness, the government declares openness and goodwill in seeking cooperation for the benefit of people and our fatherland. The government, in carrying out its duties, will take the appropriate steps to guarantee equal rights for citizens irrespective of their philosophical convictions.

Approximately 1 million citizens of our country form national and ethnic minorities. A free and democratic state guarantees them full freedom to cultivate their traditions, identity, culture, and language, and to receive nondiscriminatory treatment. Of our own free will, and at the same time implementing legal and international obligations, the government will give appropriate support to initiatives by the minorities, especially in the domains of education, culture, and access to the media. In the immediate future, the Council of Ministers will appoint a special team to deal with these issues. Access to versatile, honest, and credible information on problems of the state and on activities of the authorities is a condition for the citizens to enjoy their full and real constitutional rights—political rights, in particular. Respecting this law, the government will provide the citizens, the free press, radio, and television with information about its work, decisions, and planned initiatives. I want to believe that the media will report on the government activities with objectivity and professional competence.

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May it please the House: Consistent implementation of the provisions of Polish policy of security, formulated in 1992, allows me to say that Poland today is a safe country. We have no conflicts with our neighbors. Our position in the region is stable. It does not, however, free us of the duty to maintain the capability of the Army for effective defense of the country. We are in the process of final work on the political and strategic plan for the defense of the Republic. In accordance with the recommendations of the Sejm, the Council of Ministers will focus its attention on building an integrated state's defense system. The government will support the modernization of the armed forces and the systematic increase of funds for research and obtaining technology and for the purchase of weapons and military equipment, especially from the Polish arms industry. The government will submit the bill on a program of armed forces development in 1998-2002, in which there will be stress on systematic modernization and on full implementation of restructuring and training processes in accordance with future defense needs and the social and economic capabilities of the country. The Council of Ministers will specify a clear, long-term forecast of defense spending, which will make technical modernization of th armed forces possible and will ensure an annual increase in spending. The government will guarantee stability of measures concerning social provisions for the Army. Effective and civil control over the Army is a fundamental condition for its right place in the structures of a democratic state. The approval of the law on the minister of national defense by the House has been a significant step in this direction. Organizational changes in the armed forces are to be a natural consequence of the implementation of this law. Their scale and scope will have an impact in making Poland a credible partner regarding the requirements we are expected to follow.

The way Poland's security policy is being implemented is manifested by military cooperation with both the West and the East. The Council of Ministers believes that in this area it is necessary to intensify bilateral and multilateral military contacts, which we intend to develop, while strictly preserving the hierarchy of priorities of Poland's foreign policy.

Full implementation of the signed agreements on arms control and disarmament is an important part of the sphere of international security, in which Poland takes and will take an active part. This concerns the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the Vienna document and, in the near future, the Open Skies Treaty.

The emergence of a national consensus on the fundamental objectives of Poland's fully sovereign foreign policy is an important achievement of recent years. Governments, prime ministers, and foreign affairs ministers keep changing, but the fundamental directions, priorities, and objectives of Polish policy remain the same. The government whose leadership has been entrusted to me will continue the foreign policy pursued so far. It results from both our historical experience and a thorough analysis of the current circumstances.

The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the polarized world order has removed the enforced links, has created an opportunity to build a new architecture of international relations and to put our country in a new position. First and above all, it is in Poland's interest to become part of the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance as soon as possible, and to develop friendly and constructive relations with all of our neighbors, including Russia.

We want to join the Western structures in order to create the optimum conditions for the peaceful development of the country. The Western democratic institutions guarantee such conditions. Poland was and is part of Europe. Our absence from the European structures is illogical. It can become a source of conflict of conscience for Poles and a source of doubt in the value of European solidarity. Poland needs some signals to strengthen our European aspirations and to base the national integration strategy, which requires considerable sacrifices, on solid foundations.

Such signals would be: Poland's acceptance in the OECD in 1996, which my government will try to achieve with full determination; the starting of negotiations with the states associated with the EU soon after the end of the intergovernmental conference; and intensified dialogue that is to prepare our membership in NATO.

We have taken steps to adapt Polish civilian and military structures to NATO membership, including measures aimed at preparing a national program for integration into NATO. We take an active part in the work of the North-Atlantic Cooperation Council and in the Partnership for Peace program.

We will attach much importance to the participation of Poland's military contingent in IFOR [Implementation Force] operations. NATO, when carrying out peacekeeping work—as, for example, currently in Bosnia—has been manifesting its new role by extending the area of stability on the European Continent and is becoming a key element in the construction of a new model of European security.

The international community has been helpless for a long time with regard to the conflict in Bosnia, the greatest conflict in Europe in the second half of the

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20th century. Only the formula applied at present that involves NATO states, Russia, and other countries—among which Poland plays an active role—acting in solidarity, has turned out to be effective. This has symbolic significance. We treat our NATO membership as a factor that would contribute to general European stability, the preservation of peace, the development of democracy and a market economy in entire Europe. It would not be aimed against any state or group of states.

The NATO workshops, organized in Warsaw for June, will provide an opportunity for high-ranking political and military representatives from the NATO states and their partners from the East and the West to meet one another. I believe that this will lead to a better understanding of our intentions and plans.

In our contacts so far with the EU, we have proved that Poland is a responsible and credible partner. The political and economic aims being implemented by our country coincide with the aims of the EU. But we are still faced with the difficult task of making the Polish economy and Polish institutions and Polish law match the requirements of EU membership. Poland's relations with France and Germany, also within the framework of the Weimar Triangle [France, Germany, and Poland], will occupy a special place in the new government's policies. This year we will be hosting another trilateral meeting of foreign ministers here in Poland. We consider it useful to organize such meetings at the highest level, too.

Overcoming in a consistent manner the liabilities of the past constitutes an important contribution by Poland and Germany toward the construction of a new Europe. Polish-German military cooperation is of special importance for both our nations. Developing this cooperation by giving it new forms will be an important element in the creation of better security conditions in this part of Europe.

We will attach great importance to bilateral relations with other member states of NATO and the EU. Europe's future depends to a large measure on the involvement of the United States in the process of the development of the security of our continent. Our relations with the United States have basically become like those between allies. We wish to maintain intensive political and military cooperation with the United States and the accompanying dialogue at the highest levels of power. We can see great possibilities regarding economic cooperation between Poland and both the United States and Canada.

The deepening and expansion of cooperation with our eastern neighbors—Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania—will remain a matter of fundamental importance for my government. Concerning these states, we wish to strengthen good-neighborly relations and develop comprehensive relations, to have a political dialogue based on partnership and equal rights, to get to know one another better, and to have the societies of these states understand one another better.

We can see big opportunities regarding the development of mutually advantageous economic cooperation. Eastern markets are one of the natural areas of economic activity for us. We are ready to share our experience gained from the difficult transformation period. The recently completed Polish-Russian roundtable is a good example of constructive dialogue. Differences over the expansion of NATO did not undermine the joint opinion that Poland and Russia ought to remain friends and develop mutual relations. We are ready to cooperate with Russia in strengthening European security.

Changes in our part of Europe create conditions that make it possible to avoid the mistakes of the past, particularly not treating various sides as equals, and provide an opportunity for building lasting, good-neighborly relations based on partnership and ensuring friendly cooperation with all eastern neighbors. The work that has been undertaken with Lithuania and Ukraine on the creation of joint military units for peace operations provides the best proof of the new nature of our relations with our neighbors.

We are also vitally interested in developing regional cooperation. There are various initiatives here such as the Central European Free Trade Association [CEFTA], the Central European Initiative, and the Baltic Sea States Council.

We attach particular importance to the development of CEFTA as a great opportunity for comprehensive and intensive economic cooperation between neighboring countries. I am deeply convinced that the strengthening of various links to the Central European countries constitutes an important joint argument in these countries' integration strategy with Western structures and allows them to play a new role in European politics, realizing the unique opportunity to transform this part of Europe into a region of intensive cooperation, mutual confidence, and partnership. This objective will be well served by the meeting between Central European presidents this spring at Lancut [in Poland].

We have deep respect for the efforts of Pope John Paul II and the Holy See for dialogue on the basis of universal values and a peaceful future for Europe and the world.

We are open to cooperation with Poles abroad and all Polish communities beyond the borders. Concern for respect for their rights and the protection of Polish

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cultural heritage will constantly remain within my government's field of vision.

May it please the House: Present-day Poland is facing the need to take a wider view of world problems and become involved in issues of other regions. We note opportunities for the development of comprehensive cooperation with the Republic of Korea, Japan, the PRC, India, and many other countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America, Australia, and Oceania, especially countries constituting new centers of economic development. One of my first foreign trips will be to countries of southeast Asia, a few weeks after the summit of the countries of the EU and ASEAN. I feel that this is not just a confirmation of the will to develop relations between Poland and the dynamically developing countries of Asia but also an important signal to the EU showing that the objectives of our foreign policy are also convergent with the European policies outside Europe.

We treat Poland's election to the UN Security Council as an expression of recognition by the international community of our efforts for international peace and security. At the same time, this is an obligation to continue carrying out these duties. I would like to assure you that our actions will consistently continue to support peace processes around the world, including in the Middle East and the Balkans. Poland favors a strengthening of the United Nations, but it also sees the necessity of its reform, a reform the directions of which are dictated by the profound changes in the modern world, as well as by new challenges and global threats. It will be particularly important to strengthen the UN effectiveness in the area of prevention of conflicts and rapid reaction to these, the countering of violations of human rights, the struggle against the smuggling of drugs and fissile substances, and assistance to less developed countries in transforming their economies and social services.

May it please the House: In presenting the action program of this government, I ask the House to pass a vote of confidence in the Council of Ministers led by me and having the following members:

Roman Jagielinski, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister of agriculture and the food economy;

Grzegorz Witold Kolodko, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister of finance;

Miroslaw Pietrewicz, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister-head of the Central Planning Office;

Andrzej Baczkowski, minister of labor and social policy;

Barbara Blida, minister of town and country planning and construction;

Jacek Buchacz, minister of foreign economic cooperation;

Stanislaw Dobrzanski, minister of national defense;

Wieslaw Kaczmarek, minister of ownership transformation;

Leszek Kubicki, minister of justice;

Boguslaw Liberadzki, minister of transport and maritime economy;

Leszek Miller, minister-head of the office of the Council of Ministers;

Zdzislaw Podkanski, minister of culture and arts;

Dariusz Rosati, minister of foreign affairs;

Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, minister of internal affairs;

Klemens Scierski, minister of industry and trade;

Jerzy Wiatr, minister of national education;

Andrzej Zielinski, minister of communications;

Stanislaw Zelichowski, minister of environmental protection, natural resources and forestry;

Ryszard Jacek Zochowski, minister of health and social welfare;

Aleksander Luczak, chairman of the Scientific Research Committee;

I am counting on the support of the parliamentary majority represented by you ladies and gentlemen from the coalition floor groups. I am counting on the support of deputies who are not connected to the parliamentary coalition. This support will represent a symbolic readiness for dialogue on the state's fundamental problems. I would like to hear that the parliamentary opposition is ready to seek agreement in matters that, by their very nature, ought not to be the object of political games. Irrespective of the times we are in, Poland is one country that is common to us all. Our responsibility for it is also common to us all in the same way. Thank you. [applause]

Poland: Gen Wilecki 'Disturbed' by U.S. Report

WS1402155796 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 14 Feb 96 p 3

[Article by Luiza Zalewska: "Army. U.S. Experts' Opinion; General Wilecki Disturbed by Report on Armed Forces"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *A shattering report on our Armed Forces prepared by U.S. experts officially*

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reached the General Staff yesterday. Chief of General Staff Wilecki has not issued any statement yet, but he has already discussed the report with the U.S. ambassador.

The report is to be translated into Polish today. As we learned at the General Staff, we will hear Wilecki's reaction to the document when he returns from a skiing holiday in a few days.

The report (we wrote about it last Friday—9 February) was published on 4 December 1995 by two experts from the U.S. Congress Research Center, John M. Collins and Jason D. Meyers. They claim that the experience of the Polish Armed Forces qualifies them for peace missions, not for war. They note that "high-ranking Polish officers never made major decisions" and that we are not autonomous because "the doctrine of satellite states of the Warsaw Pact, their tactics, training, and logistics are based on Soviet models."

The experts also remarked that, although the Polish constitution provides for civilian control over the Armed Forces, there are conflicts between the minister and top military commanders pertaining to the division of power. The report praises the Czech Army, where "more than 100 generals and many other high-ranking officers from communist times were either dismissed or retired."

Our unofficial sources claim that the chief of General Staff was very disturbed by the report. He discussed it with U.S. Ambassador Nicholas Rey on 9 February. Wilecki is alleged to have been surprised by the contradictory signals sent by the Americans: On the one hand, they are suggesting more joint military missions, and, on the other, they are harshly critical of our Armed Forces. Rey is said to have given assurances that the report is not the official stance of the United States.

The U.S. Embassy confirmed that the meeting took place, but, as is the general practice, refused to disclose its topic.

Poland: Deputy Defense Minister on MON Restructuring

WS1502092296 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 12 Feb 96 pp 1-2

[Interview with Andrzej Karkoszka, Polish deputy defense minister and chairman of the team for restructuring the Ministry of National Defense, by Jerzy Markowski; place and date not given: "We Are Not a Sabbat"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Markowski] Is the restructuring team you head a broom or a creator [miotla czy kreatorem]?

[Karkoszka] The minister and the chief authorities at the Ministry of National Defense [MON] established this team in order to finalize the very painful process of restructuring MON and the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces that has been going on for the past five to six years. In the third phase, which we have now entered, we want to structure the central administrative organs of our defense system and our ministry so as to meet the provisions of the Law on the Office of the Defense Minister, as well as prepare other laws, among them the so-called competence law, which is still being developed. We are thus contributing to the development of the new constitution by elaborating a model of democratic control over the Armed Forces and over state defense. I wish to stress the latter because we want the Armed Forces to be more closely connected with extramilitary factors and with the overall system of overseeing state defense. In this sense we are definitely a creator.

Another issue is that we do not want our activities to be reminiscent of a purge of sorts, of sweeping anyone out or destroying certain structures at the expense of others. We do not want that.

[Markowski] What is this commission, then?

[Karkoszka] Putting it briefly, this is a team developing a draft resolution of the Council of Ministers on the competences, the scope of responsibilities, and the structure of MON.

[Markowski] It will therefore merely provide materials on the basis of which decisions are to be made in the future.

[Karkoszka] Yes, exactly. The draft is to be consulted with other ministries. It is to be presented to the MON team and to the Defense Committee of the Council of Ministers. It will then be reviewed by the government and materialize as an instruction issued by the Council of Ministers.

[Markowski] Does that mean your commission does not have the power to make decisions?

[Karkoszka] It has no such powers. Our commission is made up of a large number of members representing every branch of MON. We particularly wanted the General Staff to have a strong representation. The large number of members, however, does not mean we are a sabbat. The deputy chairman of the commission is Major General Jaroslaw Bielecki, very experienced in this type of activity, whom I personally trust. The role he and the General Staff officers perform is very noticeable. As chairman I have the right to appoint new members, and I have already made use of that privilege. I have invited two other generals from the territorial defense branch

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to the commission starting Monday [date unspecified]. Both are experienced in the needs that arise in times of threat.

The initiative-giving role of the military experts is therefore visible because of the commission's composition. Neither the minister nor I nor the team has any ready solutions. We are only guided by the idea that specific solutions should endorse the conviction, domestically as well as abroad, that Poland already has firm democratic parliamentary civilian control over the Armed Forces and the defense system. Moreover, we are making an attempt at saving jobs and money by dissolving all of the redundant bureaucratic institutions that have been established in huge quantities recently.

[Markowski] The mention of dissolution gives grounds for gossip that the General Staff is to be dissolved. Will that rumor come true when civilian control is introduced?

[Karkoszka] I think that rumor is unfair to the team and the minister. All members of the commission enjoy equal rights as far as intellectual contribution to the solutions being developed is concerned. Thus, no possibility exists of dissolving the General Staff. Putting it directly, whoever uses such terms is spreading confusion.

Let us move on to more specific examples. It is a well-known fact that commanders are responsible for education. We have huge problems with discipline. I think no solutions have been formulated yet as to how commanders could educate and at the same time discipline their men. The basic principles of military education will be developed either by one center or several. We do not yet know who is to be responsible for this—the educational directorate of the General Staff or a MON department. I do not want to draw any premature conclusions. Control is another example. It is generally approved that it is to be exercised by the minister. Yet we also have the very specific inspection of military education that is to assess the commanders' ability in personal terms. This cannot be done by one and the same team. Perhaps both inspection teams could be administered by one center. Although I do not wish to draw any premature conclusions, I do not preclude that inspection could be an element of the control department. This is by no means destruction but retaining the same function at a different level of the administration.

We intend to reduce the number of independent administration and organizational offices. We want to subordinate the entire administrative branch, staffing included, that is now under the General Staff to one institution that would be, in turn, subordinated to the defense minister's director general. We are thus attempting to unify and rationalize the structures. This is our basic guideline. It will probably be possible to reduce a large number of offices in the process.

[Markowski] Will it be possible or necessary? It makes a huge difference.

[Karkoszka] I wish to state that we want to carry out reductions on the largest possible scale. At the same time, we must be aware that new tasks are appearing. We have signed the open skies treaty. A special unit has to be established for organizing inspections and flights, interpreting photos. This is a tremendous task. We have to do it. Moreover, we have signed a convention on chemical weapons. Again, we need a proper executive body. Somebody has to deal with this. We are developing cooperation with NATO. As you must well know, in the defense policy branch we are setting up a department for integration into NATO. We will have to establish a proper service within the finance branch that would adapt our defense financing system to conform with NATO standards and contemporary methods of administering defense resources. This is a huge task involving a change of our entire accounting system and developing an expenditure budget. After all, we do not know at the moment what the assets of MON are, only that they are enormous. All of this has to be calculated. Who is to do it? We need to establish a special unit for this purpose.

I want to form a unit that would be responsible for the standardization of administering the systems of command, training, education, and overall military technics. Just like the EU, we have dozens of thousands of instructions and norms that several ministries are including in our legislation and standardization systems. NATO also has several thousand regulations. This is a huge heap of papers containing an enormous amount of information and decisions that have to be made and implemented in the Army. Who is to do that? It has to be a bureaucratic unit established exclusively for this purpose. Being aware of the fact that we will have to carry out far-reaching staffing reductions at the General Staff and MON—hence the stress on integrating those institutions that shadow one another—we will cut several hundred positions, yet, at the same time, we must create new ones. Some savings will definitely be made. It is to early to say what they will be.

[Markowski] I was told about a 25-percent reduction, but what you have just told me does not confirm that.

[Karkoszka] This 25 percent was the exact expression the national defense minister used. This proved his determination to carry out this reduction, but it was a kind of general directive. However, the prime minister

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is not taking part in the work of our team, and he will not discuss details pertaining to specific posts. If the result we arrive at is worse than the one that has been indicated, but if, on the other hand, it is rational, then the minister will certainly agree with the results of the team's work.

[Markowski] The team has held three meetings. At what stage is the work now?

[Karkoszka] We are working extremely intensively. The schedule is as follows: By 15 February, we will complete the work on specifying the scope of activity, work on specifying the mandate of the minister himself, as it were. All of the tasks will be specified both in general and in detail. On 15 February, I must submit this to the minister. By 15 March, we want to specify the statute of the ministry. At this point we will most probably reach the issue that is the source of all concerns—that is, specification of which institutions will exist and in which branches. There will be several branches. Let me start with the command of the military—that is, with the purely military branch, which is now and will consist of the [General] Staff. Other branches will be the following: the defense policy branch, the social-parliamentary branch, the financial branch, and the logistics branch. Aside from them, there will also be units subordinated directly to the minister, such as the Military Information Services, the cadres branch, the administration and staffing branch, and, possibly, the legal department. On 31 March the team will complete its work on MON regulations.

Now, reverting to the core of the structure, it will consist of five branches, which will be further divided into departments. Indeed, the biggest changes will be made in the command branch because, in the future, we are going to begin work to establish a command headquarters of the ground forces. Thus, we are as if dividing the function of the [General] Staff into two parts. This will mean that this typical staff function, involving planning, the entire sphere of mobilization and providing a direction in which technology development should go, and checking the training level, will remain in the domain of the [General] Staff. However, exercising command over units must go down to the level of the command headquarters of the ground forces. We believe that this will help rationalize the activities of the military branch.

The most important task in the defense policy branch will be to complete the department's work on integration into NATO. If such a final form is approved by the minister, the department will consist of 36 persons. In the financial branch, we want to set up a team that would manage defense resources.

[Markowski] How about the liquidation of the 18th Directorate of the General Staff? Was it not suggested by the commission?

[Karkoszka] No, it was not. However, it is as if part of all of the restructuring efforts. Had this not been done, we would have proposed it. Liquidation of this directorate is a consequence of establishing the economic and financial branch, which must include all of the elements of the military's financial economy.

[Markowski] At the conference you spoke about the military "top brass" [*Czapa*]; you said that it would vanish. What exactly is to vanish?

[Karkoszka] I would not like to talk about any final solutions now. Really, this is being discussed in detail. I am not a person who imposes solutions but one who learns during the discussion and who lends a hand, taking into account the directives given by the minister, the provisions of the law, and the ideas that guide all of our work. Specific solutions must result from the knowledge, experience, and attitude of the team's members.

[Markowski] Is this going to be your only remark?

[Karkoszka] No, it is not. I have another one related to the work of the team. While we are specifying the tasks of the minister and of the cells that are under him, we can see clearly the vast sphere where the ministry's tasks overlap with the tasks of other centers. We should be aware of the fact that the minister's tasks are specified in the pertinent law, but in a hundred other laws [as published]. We must take this into consideration in our work; we must be aware of the fact that this sphere largely overlaps with the National Defense Committee, the National Security Office, and other ministries. Thus, this is another stage of the work on cleansing the legal system regarding defense.

[Markowski] Restructuring, reconstruction, and other similar actions cause concern among people. They are probably justified, are they not?

[Karkoszka] Let me answer the question this way: We people working in the civilian branch, and certainly I personally, know that military matters are extremely delicate, even though it may seem otherwise on the surface. It is a certain close-knit group of personalities subordinated to one general idea, discipline, and one cannot tamper with it and get away with it. Any action taken in this sphere undermines not only the discipline, but also the faith in the clarity of the goal that is to be achieved. All the more so because this is the third restructuring process in four years. This badly affects the morale of the officers and soldiers. I am aware of that. I also know that not all of the decisions made

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by the civilian authorities are now kindly recalled by the military; the same goes for some of the civilian ministers. There were situations in which they made vital decisions without having enough knowledge on defense issues, which undermined the morale of officers and soldiers. I understand all this. Nonetheless, this process must be quietly completed.

[Markowski] Thus, this is not a military "war at the top"?

[Karkoszka] It absolutely is not. Neither I nor the team members brought up the issue of solutions regarding personnel. They will result from structural changes, without any implied meaning. Whoever wants to take part in the creation of a new structure, who wants to take the floor and defend his stand, has the right to do so, and we even believe it is his duty. He has a chance to do it.

Now, whoever is against these changes must, unfortunately, leave. However, he must leave for entirely different reasons because these changes are related to the construction of democracy in this country, with a positive process that facilitates our integration into Western states. Thus, it is, objectively, the right process, even though it may be painful here and there. Unless we do this work, we will not be able to count on the support of our friends in the West.

I would like to appeal for peaceful support for the work of this commission, for participation in it in any form—writing letters, personal participation, or participation through commanders. No one intends to, as it were, tamper with the unity of the civilian and military parts of the ministry. We stress that, if we are talking about MON, it must be remembered that 80 percent of its civilian portion is made up of people in uniforms, and most of the civilians are reservists.

Let us be aware that there is one country, one army, and one ministry.

[Markowski] Thank you for the interview.

Poland: UW's Onyszkiewicz Denies Holding Talks on RBN

WS1402155296 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 14 Feb 96 p 2

[Article by "KRZEM" and "PW": "Kwasniewski Reveals; Onyszkiewicz and UW Rebut. Who Is Telling the Truth?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Contrary to the statement made by the president, opposition Freedom Union [UW] deputy Janusz Onyszkiewicz is not, on Kwasniewski's authority, holding any talks on the National Security Council [RBN].*

In line with the small constitution, the RBN is to replace the National Defense Committee, which still exists. In an interview for the latest issue of POLITYKA, Kwasniewski said that the RBN ought to be built "not as an institutional representation, consisting of people delegated by parties, but as a group of people with authority." The president stated: "(...) there is a person whom I asked to hold consultations on the composition of this body. It is Janusz Onyszkiewicz, who accepted the offer and who is now holding the first talks. Now he will hold more of them."

In a statement issued yesterday, the former national defense minister in the Suchocka cabinet and deputy chairman of the Sejm Defense Commission denied the president's revelations. He admitted that in early January he had talked with the president once and that he had also spoken with Kwasniewski's minister, Marek Siwiec, on several occasions: "The talks were about the plan to establish the RBN as an institution of agreement on the interests of the Polish state." "In these talks I expressed the view," Onyszkiewicz wrote, "that the establishment of such a council should be connected to making nonparty appointments in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense [MON], and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The decisions that were made in early January did not meet this criterion, as a result of which I did not start, and I am not holding any consultations."

We asked the President's Chancellery about the source of this misunderstanding. Presidential Spokesman Antoni Styrczula told us that Onyszkiewicz had met with the president twice. The second discussion was held after the new ministers of defense, foreign affairs, and internal affairs were appointed. Onyszkiewicz presented his "initial remarks regarding the conception of RBN's work" as well as a list of people who might be included in the council. The president entrusted him with the mission of establishing it.

"The president believes that the mission should be continued," Styrczula said. "The proposals submitted by Deputy Onyszkiewicz regarding the structure, location, and goals of the RBN are in line with the president's vision." The spokesman added that appointments of ministers depend on the prime minister, whereas the president merely issues his opinion on them.

Janusz Onyszkiewicz assessed the statement made by the president's spokesman as "an utter misunderstanding." "First I talked with Mr. Kwasniewski in December, and then I spoke with President Kwasniewski and Marek Siwiec. I remember that, at that time, Mr. Siwiec had

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not received his nomination yet. The ministerial posts were still vacant."

Onyszkiewicz added that he believes that the president does have some influence on the appointment of these ministers. "If this were not the case, Pastusiak, not Okonski, would have become defense minister a year ago." The former head of MON also claims that it is not true that he submitted a list of politicians who might become part of the RBN. He says that, when he was asked about this, he named only people whom he considered appropriate to fill posts in the council.

Poland: Comment: Rememberance in Martial Law Assessment

WS1502104696 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 14 Feb 96 p 1

[Commentary by Chief Editor Adam Michnik: "Remembrance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Regardless of the legal ramifications and the decision made by the Sejm, the assessment of martial law will be an act of remembrance for each of us. I was an enemy of martial law and its authors. I still remember the violence, the triumphant lies, the cold-blooded slander, and the victims. Only someone completely devoid of imagination and full of ill will could have shrugged off the threat of Soviet intervention at the time. We all remembered Budapest, Prague, Afghanistan.

I thus believed that General Jaruzelski and his comrades defended their government against a double threat: the Polish nation and imperial Soviet power. The dichotomy remains: Some will remember the martial law victims from the Wujek and Lubin coal mines, others will wonder how many potential victims of Soviet intervention were saved by martial law. For me, the miners from the Wujek coal mine will remain heroes forever. The Sejm decision will not end the debate. I hope its participants will be historians rather than politicians. This is not a topic I will abandon. In my deliberations, however, I will always remember that the same people who introduced martial law later became some of the architects of a democratic reconstruction of the state. This is one of the major Polish paradoxes.

Poland: Bankers Comment on New $100 Bills

WS1402143696 Szczecin GLOS SZCZECINSKI in Polish 2 Feb 96 p 1

[Article by Janusz Sudol: "The U.S. Embassy Informed Us: New $100 Bills Not in Circulation Yet and Already Counterfeited"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The information about introducing into circulation in the United States a new, better protected against counterfeiting $100 bill has made the headlines of the Polish press. The new $100 bill differs from the current one by having a graphic design, as well. GLOS SZCZECINSKI wrote about this two weeks ago. For the present, at the beginning of February, there is no new information on the matter—except signals that counterfeited bills have appeared in Warsaw.

We asked the question about the new $100 bill of bankers and owners of foreign exchange offices. The National Bank of Poland [NBP] (regional branch in Szczecin): "We have no official knowledge of the new $100 bill."

The Eldorado foreign exchange office: "They have not been circulated yet. We do not even have any specimens, so we would surely think twice before accepting such a bill."

The Darex foreign exchange office: "We have not had them thus far, but rumor has it that they are already in Warsaw. We have not had any information on this issue from the NBP, either, so we have no right to buy the new $100 bill. This is quite an awkward situation for us. If someone showed up with such a bill, we would most probably buy it, risking that the bank might refuse to exchange it."

We asked the source—that is, the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw—and received the following explanation from the press office: "The 1996 series $100 bills with the altered graphic design have not yet been put into circulation in the United States or anywhere in the world, and the date to introduce them into circulation is not known, either. All interested institutions, banks, and the media will be informed about this in time. The new $100 bills with the new graphic design will be circulated on the same basis as those printed thus far. The old bills will never lose their nominal value, meaning that they will always be valid legal tender and worth $100."

The Szczecin police, fortunately, have not received any reports on new, counterfeited hundreds.

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Romania: Prisacaru Denies Rumors on EU Adherence Delay

AU1402134496 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 14 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Regarding a news item—which was also covered by the Romanian media—on an alledged statement by EU Comissioner Hans van der Broek to the extent that Romania and Slovakia will not necessarily figure among the first group of countries with whom EU plans to start adherence negotiations, the head of the government's European Integration Department, Gheorghe Prisacaru, told our radio station that this information cannot be true and is probably part of some political games that the Romanian Government does not accept. On the contrary, Prisacaru emphasized, the UN commissioner said in Bucharest that Romania is on the right track, but it must continue with more perseverence along the road of reform in order to join the EU.

Romania: Battalion Head Confident of Success in Bosnia

AU1502140696 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 10 Feb 96 p 11

[Interview with Colonel Constantin Graur Vartopeanu, commander of the Romanian engineering battalion for the Bosnia mission, by Monica Szlavik; place and date not given: "I Believe We Will Fulfill Our Mission Very Well, Since We Have Done Even More Difficult Tasks"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Szlavik] Mr. Colonel Constantin Vartopeanu, the advance detachment was supposed to leave for Bosnia on 10 February. Will the battalion's departure, scheduled for 20 February, also be delayed, in view of the fact that NATO General Drevienkievicz asked you to supplement the unit with at least 27 to a maximum of 36 more troops?

[Vartopeanu] The advance detachment's departure was postponed for technical reasons from 10 February until 14 February or even 15 February. Nevertheless, this detachment will leave ahead of the battalion, in order to reconnoiter the route and the terrain at the place of our eventual deployment. It is true that the British general recommended that we boost our troops, but the battalion's departure on this mission does not depend on fulfilling his recommendations. Of course, it is good to listen to the advice of NATO officials about the dangers waiting for us over there, but I personally believe that the battalion is fit for the mission even in the present structure.

[Szlavik] What are the main difficulties that you know will confront you there?

[Vartopeanu] I would rather call them dangers, not difficulties. I particularly have in mind the large number of mines, which is estimated at 6 million, but I believe that we will cope with the situation thanks to our training, professionalism, and especially our order and discipline. To this main danger, one should add the traffic accidents and armed robberies carried out by local elements that are out of control.

[Szlavik] Where will you be deployed?

[Vartopeanu] The battalion will be deployed in Zenica, a town situated 80 km northeast of Sarajevo, in the Muslim zone of Bosnia. We are replacing an Indonesian sapper battalion, which belonged to the UN peacekeeping troops. [passage omitted] We will be in the British protection zone and will be subordinate, through the transfer of authority, to the Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), with its headquarters in Kiseljak. [passage omitted]

[Szlavik] The local population is Muslim and we are Christians. Do you anticipate any problems in this respect?

[Vartopeanu] No, I do not foresee such problems. We have subjected the troops to appropriate psychological and moral training to avoid just these kind of problems. [passage omitted]

[Szlavik] In practical terms, what kind of missions will you carry out there, Mr. Colonel?

[Vartopeanu] Mainly, we will locate and defuse mines. However, I must say that these operations will only be carried out for our own needs; that is, only in the areas where the battalion is operating. [passage omitted] A second mission is to repair roads and maintain the communication links in our zone. A third task is to rebuild the bridges. [passage omitted] From my talks with the inhabitants of Zenica, we learned that the Indonesians helped them with the painting of a school and the clearing of snow. If need be, we can also do that, since we have the necessary equipment.

[Szlavik] Who else did you get in touch with in Zenica?

[Vartopeau] At Zenica Town Hall, I talked to the deputy mayor and I also met with the chief of the sapper units of the 3d Corps of the Bosnian Army, who assured me of his cooperation. [passage omitted]

[Szlavik] How long will the mission last, what is the exact number of your troops at this time, and how long have they been in training?

[Vartopeanu] Our mission will last for one year. I do not know yet whether we will be relieved after six months and, if so, whether the change will be total or optional. Our sapper battalion has 200 troops at present;

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the possibility of supplementing them is minimal. We have been in training since 4 January. After the selection of personnel, whose average age is 25, we set up the various subunits and continued with our technical and specialized training program. I would like to mention that the battalion is made up only of volunteers.

[Szlavik] Is this your first mission abroad?

[Vartopeanu] Yes, this is a premiere both for me and the battalion I lead. This is the first excursion of a Romanian sappers battalion beyond the borders.

[Szlavik] What is now your main enemy?

[Vartopeanu] The only thing that bothers us now is the time pressure. On the other hand, the weather conditions will make our mission there more difficult. However, as I could see from my visit over there, I believe that we will fulfill our mission—not in an ordinary manner, but very well indeed. We have performed even more difficult tasks and the men's training and the technical equipment of the battalion assure me of our success.

Romania: FRY Accepts Transit of Equipment to Bosnia

AU1402211596 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 14 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] authorities have approved transit on its territory of equipment and technology by the Romanian battalion that will participate in the IFOR mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, reads a communique of the Romanian Defense Ministry.

The communique says that the Yugoslav sides sees this as an especially friendly gesture towards Romania, a state which, through its policy and diplomacy promoted in the international arena, has constantly supported the idea of finding peaceful solutions to the conflict in the ex-Yugoslav space.

Romania: Spokesman on Somogyi Visit, Zhirinovskiy

AU1402133296 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 14 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Regarding the statements made in Bucharest last night by Ferenc Somogyi, secretary of state at the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, about Romania's and Hungary's adherence to the North-Atlantic alliance, Sorin Ducaru, the spokesman of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said today that, in Romania's view, the Central European zone has its own geopolitical balance and NATO's expansion is certainly meant not to disturb this balance. In this respect, any attempt to draw a demarcation line in Central Europe cannot be looked upon with enthusiasm by the public at large in Romania. It is in the interest of our country and Hungary that NATO's expansion process should proceed on individual bases, but at a proximate pace—our correspondent Doina Saiciuc reports.

Beginning 26 February, Bucharest will host a new round of talks at the expert level on the basic political treaty between Romania and Ukraine—Sorin Ducaru announced at today's weekly news conference. He added that both sides will discuss holding the first session of the Consultative Intergovernmental Council on Trade and Economic Cooperation and preparations for a working meeting between the Romanian and Ukrainian prime ministers in March. The main topic on that meeting's agenda will be bilateral economic cooperation and expansion of the legal framework of trade and economic exchanges—our correspondent Doina Saiciuc reports.

Sorin Ducaru, spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also referred to certain recent statements made by the Russian ultranationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy about Romania. He pointed out that it is not the first time that the Russian deputy has made such statements. The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejects his insulting remarks, which prove a profound ignorance of the realities and the mutual Romanian and Russian interests; such remarks cannot possibly contribute to harmonious development of relations between Romania and the Russian Federation. The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs expresses its trust that the democratic forces in Russia will take a stand against such incorrect and extravagant statements. We would like to point out, the spokesman said, that such situations confirm the validity of the Romanian standpoint on the need to encourage the democratic forces in the Russian Federation, in the hope that they will ensure the continuity of the democratic process and economic reform in that country.

Romania: Iliescu, UDMR Leader View Minority Issues

LD1402155896 Timisoara Radio Timisoara in Hungarian 1200 GMT 14 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] President Ion Iliescu received Bela Marko, chairman of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR], yesterday.

During their talks, Marko raised several questions concerning the Hungarian community of Romania. The role of the press in preparation for the elections was also raised. In connection with this, it was raised that anti-Hungarian statements and comments were still very frequent in the press close to the government. Among

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the legislation issues, amendments to the Party Law, the Law on Local Authorities, and the private motion bill on Minority Education—still not debated by the Senate's Education Committee—were also raised.

Bela Marko indicated to the president that an urgent decision is required regarding the language of the university entrance exams due this autumn. Marko also raised the situation of Pal Cseresznyes and the residents of Zetelaka [Zetea] who were sentenced to imprisonment. President Iliescu said that he was just expecting a response from the justice authorities in charge.

Bela Marko repeatedly proposed to set up an institutional framework for dialogue among representatives of the Hungarian community of Romania, the Presidential Office, the government, and representatives of the Romanian political life, building on the conclusions drawn from consultations in Atlanta.

The president agreed that it would be useful to create a form of dialogue to clear up basic differences of views and to solve specific problems. Iliescu, however, repeatedly raised several objections to the UDMR's minority policy ideas.

Romania: Hungarian Report on Romanian Army Attacked

96P20270A Bucharest OBSERVATORUL MILITAR in Romanian 27 Dec 95 -2 Jan 96 p 7

[Article by Chief Editor Colonel Gheorghe Vaduva: "The Obsessive Strategy of Posing as a Victim"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Vaduva] In Issue No. 21/1995 of the publication ERDELY MAGYARSAG [Hungarian Transylvania], published in Hungary, there was an article entitled "In Memory of Refugees to a Voluntary Death," signed by Samu Vassas, former professor, pensioner from Huedin. We are presenting the full text of this article:

"One of the most frightening tools of the totalitarian Romanian regime prior to 1989 was the humiliation of ethnic Hungarian military inductees.

We do not have overall data but only some data from Calata. But we have enough to arouse our fear and repugnance. This is enough to make humanity aware of the pathological nature of the persons who conceive such things and of the sickness of those who carry them out, without thinking.

There are those soldiers from Calata, destroyed and made extinct, those who fled toward 'voluntary death.' This is why, when a man is inducted, armed, and blinded, either he abjures his right to think or he is robbed of his feeling of humanity.

Csaba Ambrus was killed somewhere near Constanta. The perpetrators were able to intimidate his parents so that they are not willing to make any statements. They were told only that their son had been put on furlough but he did not return, as if the earth had swallowed him!

The village was in mourning for a long time since, as we learned, he was not a drunkard, he did not lie, he was not a vagrant, and he liked to work. Villagers, at parties, kept bringing up this dilemma. How could this tragedy have befallen this lad? Probably, only the officers know the secret but they are as silent as clams. So they were allowed to live. But why this ending? Was it perhaps because the young man who grew up in a predominately Hungarian village did not have perfect mastery of the Romanian language?

Ferenc Valkai, from Huedin, was in the service in Lugoj. He was interested in sports more than anything else. He won ski competitions on many occasions. He received ski equipment as a prize but he had to give it to the officers. At this very moment, he was transferred to Curtea de Arges, to guard a munitions depot. Because of a 'mistake,' he was shot less than a week after his transfer. He was wrapped in a blanket and taken to the hospital. The young man, crying out in pain, asked for a doctor but to no avail. With a perforated lung, he did not resist too long and he died. When, in desperation, his parents arrived in the unit, their questions were in vain. The only response was—'we do not know.'

Some new recruits took him home. They did not know any details that they could tell his parents. He was living but now he is no longer alive. Ferenc Valkai is no more.

Janos Szakos, from Vista, performed his military service in Floresti. He was shot during guard service and was thrown from the watch tower, dead. They tried to convince his family that he died from a heart attack, but, if this was true, why was he transported by soldiers? According to his parents, the young man was well-liked by the officers and did everything well—he repaired engines. But the tragedy is a fact. He is dead, like the others, in the flower of his youth.

In May of last year [1994], another traumatic event shook Huedin and Calata. The hard-working soldier Istvan Bondi was killed in battle in or near the Floresti unit.

The events took place at an unprecedented speed. On 7 May, he was on leave at home, with permission, to take part in a wedding. The news of his death arrived on 9 May. His parents found out about it on 10 May, after the

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autopsy on their son. His face was covered with bruises as a result of beatings with a blunt object.

The prosecutor maintained, initially, that Bondi was drunk, despite the fact that the owner of the bar, where he frequently went to drink with his buddies, said categorically that he was the only one who consumed only soft drinks. Later they resorted to the old story: he had high blood pressure. His soldier buddies, who said one thing one time and another thing another time, expressed fear, certainly because he is dead. He cannot talk. Since he is silent, the accusation remains.

Shall we continue the presentation of the dead soldiers? Should we continue with Lajos Korpos, from Izvorul Crisului, or with Istvan Likacs Kiss, from Capus, who took the same route as the others? The newspapers (EVENIMENTUL ZILEI, MAGYAR SZO, ERDELYI HIRADO) have begun to treat this taboo subject.

Should we wonder why mothers kiss their sons goodbye, weeping as they leave for the 'school of life,' a last kiss for someone doomed to be lost?

At one time, young men took part in the real life of a soldier. All of them did their duty. But today, there is only the monotonous sound of tom-tom and the sad tolling of the bell for parents and loved ones."

Of course, in the Romanian Army, just as in all the armies of the world, there are accidents from time to time, some resulting in loss of life. This is sad, but this is the reality. No one wants it to be this way. The percentage is no greater or no smaller than in other armies. For example, in regard to the number of airplane crashes, the Romanian Army is somewhere in the middle, in fourth place, of the 10 modern armies analyzed. No one likes this and no one can like it. On the contrary. All serious incidents are recorded and analyzed and the rating of the units in which they took place are downgraded. The persons who are guilty of negligence and of not fulfilling their duty, not to mention those who have caused such situations, intentionally or unintentionally, are severely punished and subjected to the rigors of the law. When catastrophes occur, the units are deeply saddened. I have been in the Romanian armed forces for a long time. I was commander of a subunit for one-quarter of my military life. I have been in practically all of the structures but I have never, in my life, heard such an accusation, such singling out, such an insult addressed to the Romanian military as a whole, to the man in uniform.

I note, however, to my amazement, to our amazement, and to the amazement of all, that, in the second half of 1995, Hungarian-language publications in Romania expanded their attacks against the national sentiments of the Romanian people, supporting anti-Romanian theses, in a virulent and denigrating language, counting on a reaction which they would use to prove their point. Obviously, such an attitude, that of posing as a victim, aims at creating and maintaining an unstable climate in areas inhabited by ethnic Hungarians, creating possibilities for extending the hotbeds of tension and of subversive actions. We are not so naive that we are not aware of this traditional strategy in certain Hungarian circles.

The systematic disputing of the rules of law and of the Romanian state institutions set up for this purpose and the powerful campaign of the Hungarian-language mass media have increased in intensity and scope during this period, in which the Hungarian state, officially, has given an affirmative response to President Iliescu's initiative for an "historic reconciliation" between the two countries and the Romanian and Hungarian armed forces have had good relations. Indeed, we even believe that we have the best and the closest relations with the armed forces of Hungary. Of course, the press is free and no one can align it with objectives which it does not accept. But this freedom is too obvious. It plays the same tune too much, as if we were at war and not engaged in a dialogue, in a partnership for peace and quiet, for historic reconciliation.

Along with the announcement of close relations in the military domain and statements of good intentions from the Hungarian side, the media are reporting, in a tendentious manner, aspects with an emotional impact among the members of the Hungarian minority, most likely for the purpose of stirring up anti-Romanian reactions in the members of this ethnic group. The Romanian armed forces, regarded in all public opinion polls in our country as a basic element for the stability of Romanian society, is targeted, on a priority basis, in these publications, in the most direct and most aggressive ways, creating images which have nothing in common with reality.

The following are the results of the verification of the things mentioned in the article, in regard to the "humiliation of ethnic Hungarian inductees" who were "destroyed and killed":

Although the beginning of the article refers to the totalitarian Romanian regime prior to 1989, its conclusion clearly shows the author's intention to discredit and incriminate the Romanian military organism which currently exists.

No details are given about the ethnic Hungarian soldiers who died, some even 10 years ago, and it is suggested that their deaths occurred recently, under suspect and hostile conditions, in combat or by shooting.

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This is the real situation:

Csaba Ambrus, "killed somewhere near Constanta," is Gheorghe Caius Ambrus, assigned in October 1992 to a tank unit in Galati. He left his unit with permission 16-21 January 1993. He did not return to the unit. In the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he is listed as an uncaptured deserter. We are sorry for him and for any other young man from Romania or anywhere else, but this is the way things are, no different.

Ferenc Valkai, who, with serious gunshot wounds, "sought the aid of a doctor...in vain," was assigned to the mountain fighter brigade in Curtea de Arges. On 23 April 1985 (note, this was in 1985!), when he was engaged in a race to load a weapon with the soldier Mihai Antonescu, when both were acting as sentinels, he was mortally wounded by Antonescu and died in the Curtea de Arges city hospital. This is not the only case. I know of at least 10 such cases over the past two decades. From what I remember, the other 10 deaths were of Romanians, not Hungarians.

Imprudence does not select its victims from the ranks of the minority or the majority. The soldier Mihai Antonescu was tried by the military court and sentenced to nine years in prison.

Janos Szakos, "shot while performing guard service, thrown out of the watchtower, dead," is Janos Szallos, born on 2 July 1958, in the village of Vistea, Garbovi Commune, Cluj County, assigned to an antiaircraft artillery unit in Floresti. On 16 March 1979, when he was performing guard service, he was wounded by gunshot and died. The conclusion of the inquest was suicide by gunfire. This phenomenon disturbs us all. There have been many cases of suicide which we, naturally, regret. But no one ever thought about making a statistic for minorities—for the simple fact that we soldiers do not make any distinctions among ourselves.

Istvan Bondi, "killed in battle," is Andras Istvan Bondi, assigned to the same antiaircraft artillery unit in Floresti. On 8 August 1994, at 9:15 PM, he left his unit without approval, along with four buddies, went to a bar and drank too much. The respective soldier was transported, on an emergency basis, to the Cluj-Napoca Military Hospital, in an advanced state of drunkenness. He died on 9 May 1994, intoxicated with alcohol.

The result of the autopsy is mentioned in penal investigation file No. 138/0/1994 of the Cluj Military Court—nonviolent death (ethyl alcohol intoxication).

The data presented demonstrate the clear intention of the author of the article and of the publication mentioned to present the Romanian Army as a mechanism for the extermination of ethnic Hungarian youths and to create a terrible, frightful image of military service in the Romanian Army.

The publication ERDELY MAGYARSAG is the press organ of the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKGP], a party which is very active in the opposition in Hungary. The party is headed by Jozsef Torgyan (the chairman), whose wife, Maria Torgyan, is a deputy in the parliament of Hungary and a member of the Commission on National Security.

One of the clearly deliniated directions of action of the Smallholders' Party is the radicalization of anti-Romanian actions, in particular, those actions incriminating the Romanian Army as a segregationist political instrument, for the oppression of ethnic Hungarians. We do not have anything against this party. We do not have anything against anyone. But we cannot be indifferent to the articles which have been published, by chance, either by the press in Hungary, by the Hungarian press in Romania, or by some Spanish, Italian, or French review, which are disposed to publish untruths about us, without verifying them. The tactic of these publications—actually, of those who are behind them—is to throw stones, to accuse, to prompt reactions. explanations, justifications, etc. It is a tactic of harassment which exhausts, enervates, and causes anxiety. But it also serves as a warning, since, anyone might say, the old habits of some, adopted and taken further by others, cannot be so easily forgotten.

This is not the first time that bizarre associations have been made, when facts have been taken out of context, when they have been given the desired interpretation, and when people have posed as victims. The distortion of the Cofariu case of 19 March 1990, just as everything which happened in Targu Mures, should be a signal for lucid minds.... Persons nostalgic for the period before World War I still have their hopes. Tearing Transylvania away from the Romanian body is a dream of the enemies of Romania and nothing else. Even if, under the present conditions, this objective is not formulated so clearly, thousands of pages have been written which still serve this dream, despite the historic truth. Perhaps these people think that, when the miracle is produced, the ethnic Hungarians should have sufficient reasons for hate.... If they do not exist, they can be invented. They slander and slander but something still remains. Perhaps, one day.... We are optimistic. Perhaps, one day, everyone will learn the truth about these regions, these lands blessed by God and cursed by some people who no longer have a place under the sun of others. And they will respect the truth as the truth deserves to be respected.

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Romania: Gherman, Moldova's Lucinschi Discuss Relations

AU1402130696 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 14 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Oliviu Gherman, president of the Romanian Senate, received Petru Lucinschi, speaker of the Chisinau Parliament, in Bucharest today. On this occasion, the Senate president presented the priorities of the Romanian Parliament, including the passing of the budget, the law on local elections, and the law on legislative and presidential elections.

We support the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova, Oliviu Gherman said, and we believe that there will be a common point of evolution between us. However, any attempt to force the pace of this process is counterproductive, the Senate president said.

In his turn, the head of the Chisinau Parliament said that Moldova is currently faced with problems similar to those in Romania and that Chisinau is interested in very close relations with Bucharest—our correspondent Dan Preda reports.

Romania: Local Elections May Be Postponed Until May

AU1402125896 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 14 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Senate President Oliviu Gherman said that, due to the delay in the adoption of the electoral bills by Parliament, the local elections may take place on 5 and 19 May, with the third ballot held on 2 June.

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Slovenia: Defense Minister on Communications Purchase

AU1402113496 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A dispute surrounding the purchase of an [Israeli] communications system for the requirements of the Defense Ministry has finally got its epilogue. Namely, the government commission has completed its work and found no irregularities. It is not known yet when the results will be presented to the public.

All this time, we have listened constantly to the criticism that the system in question was not compatible with NATO standards. We tried to learn the truth about it from Defense Minister Jelko Kacin:

[Begin recording] The Slovene defense and the Slovene Army urgently need reliable communications because the equipment that we inherited from the former territorial defense and from the Yugoslav People's Army was not only outdated, but also worn out. We urgently need equipment that will be compatible with NATO so that we will be able to participate in joint activities. For that reason, we have worked hard over the past two years, on the basis of the Law on Fundamental Development Programs, to draw the best world manufacturers to cooperation. In the final stage, those that were the best were tested on Slovene territory and, afterward, on the basis of technological parameters and economic indicators, we decided in favor of the technology that is the most suitable for the requirements of the Slovene Army and that is also tolerable in terms of cost.

Pursuant to the Law on Fundamental Development Programs, the Republic of Slovenia can only purchase equipment that is compatible with NATO, that is, constructed in accordance with standards of this military organization. This equipment is widely used in the countries that are members of the Partnership for Peace and NATO. Unfortunately, I cannot reveal the names of these countries without their prior approval. [end recording]

Slovenia: Growing Popularity of Left Analyzed

AU1402100396

[FBIS Summary] Ljubljana DELO in Slovene in its editions from 18 to 29 January publishes an analysis in ten installments of the trends on the Slovene political scene over the past three years, the shifts that have occurred, and the parties' prospects for the 1996 parliamentary elections. The approximately 10,000-word series is entitled "Political Shifts in Slovenia." As its author Aleksander Bratina points out, the analysis of the party popularity is based on data acquired in monthly opinion polls on parties and politicians' popularity, conducted by DELO-Stik agency. "The monthly opinion polls involved roughly the same number of pollees (approximately 750), a pattern of identical characteristics, and the methodology applied was always the same." However, "the analysis of the voters' defection from one party to another is based on research that DELO-Stik carried out between 10 and 20 November 1995 on 786 pollees aged over 18."

"The analysis put forward does not deal with the specific traits of parties or their electorate. We are merely analyzing the degree to which an individual party is being accepted by various segments of voters, allowing the parties and the voters to judge by themselves what are the reasons for this or another change." As the author adds, the analysis concentrated in more detail only on the parties that "in our judgment have a realistic or at least theoretical chance" of getting into the parliament at the next elections.

The study begins with the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia [LDS], which won the biggest number of votes at the previous elections: "Following the last elections, LDS has lost a sizable portion of voters very rapidly, which is understandable for the most powerful party in the period after the elections—namely, it attracted a great number of undecided voters in the electoral campaign. LDS reached the bottom in the second half of 1994. The unification with smaller parties (the Democratic Party, the Greens, the Ecological-Social Party, and the Socialists) did not result in significant change in the party popularity, however, it marked the onset of growing support for LDS. In the second half of 1995 the trust in the party started growing more significantly and currently it enjoys support that is unparalleled in the entire post-election period." The author also notes that the party has always enjoyed the best results in the second half of calendar years which coincided with the publication of economic data for the past year. He assesses that the party's capability to identify successfully with the good economic results will be "crucial" for its success at the next elections. "However, the same also applies vice versa; negative indications would tarnish its reputation greatly."

Regionally, the party gained the most sympathizers in Krsko region, north Primorska , in Sava Basin, and in the last six months also in Maribor, however, its popularity is more varied in Upper Carniola, Lower Carniola, the Ljubljana and Celje regions, and in Prekmurje. The analysis notes that the party enjoys "the most stable support" among older voters. In terms of sex, the support of male and female voters is more or less evenly distributed, but women are "more loyal" LDS voters. The party enjoys a constant support among the urban

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voters and its recent surge in popularity is attributed to the voters in the countryside. In the first two years after the elections, the party enjoyed the greatest support from retirees. This trend reversed in 1995 into a slightly negative direction. Quite the opposite happened with farmers and the unemployed. In the first two years after the elections, support from these two groups faltered but lately this negative trend has been reversed.

LDS's central figure, Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek maintained stable support throughout and his popularity started to rise at the end of 1995. The popularity of another party official, Jozef Skoljc, also increased, but more among the United List of Social Democrats [ZLSD] supporters than the LDS. After the initial upsurge, the popularity of Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler started to decline, while support for Defense Minister Kacin and Rupel declined considerably.

"It is evident that LDS, with its most prominent politicians, easily attracts voters on the left, but it will find it very difficult to win votes on the right side of the Slovene political scene. Namely, apart from President Drnovsek it does not have a politician in its ranks who could steal voters from the right block; on the contrary, these politicians are losing rapidly on the right, which could be a consequence of greater political polarization in Slovenia. The exception is Janez Drnovsek, who has lost the least among the right-wing voters. For example, in the Slovene Christian Democratic Party [SKD] and the Slovene People's Party [SLS] he is still supported by almost half of the voters.

"The policy of Prime Minister Drnovsek, which displays a steady interest in the coalition partnership with the SKD in light of this fact acquires perfectly viable reasons. Because LDS can expect always to be a party of considerable political weight, its interest in an ideologically mixed coalition is probably long-term because it ensures stability and from a pragmatic standpoint an easier ruling, simultaneously procuring the image of a more center-oriented party than one would have judged from the images of the LDS's leading politicians.

"The party is evidently assisted greatly by favorable economic and social trends. If the trends of the past two years continue the party will certainly come out the strongest in the elections. We must, of course, add to this that LDS will not venture into a more radical resolution of economic problems in the last electorate year [for example the pensions system—the current negotiations with the pensioners will most likely end in an unchanged method of calculation of pensions) as anything of the kind would be guaranteed to diminish the electoral success. For that reason we can anticipate with minimal risk that the forthcoming electoral year will not be very successful from the viewpoint of the resolution of economic and social problems," analyst Bratina writes.

"The Social Democratic Party of Slovenia [SDSS] is a party that has boosted its number of sympathizers the most since the last elections. Its rapid ascent especially picked up after the Depala Vas incident [which resulted in the replacement of party president Janez Jansa in the post of defense minister]. However, in the last six months the dynamic trend of growth very quickly turned into dynamic decline for the party."

"The party's great talent for electoral campaigning could mean that its electoral result will exceed the usual potential of this party substantially. In November only 40 percent of the SDSS voters had voted for this party at the last parliamentary elections. The party stole the rest of them from others, mostly from the the Slovene National Party [SNS]—approximately 15 percent of this party voters at the last elections—more than 10 percent from the Greens, the same percentage from the Democrats, and a little less voters from SKD."

The author notes that the party increased its popularity in all regions of Slovenia, but the increase was the biggest in Upper Carniola, Maribor region, and in Slovene Carinthia, as well as in Celje and Ljubljana regions, and less proimnent in Koper region and in northern Primorska. The party sympathizers are mostly younger and middle-aged, although decline in support in this age group has also been the greatest in the last six months. He observes that "SDSS is a pronouncedly male party." Its greatest and most constant support comes from highly educated people, while its support has fluctuated among other segments. It reportedly maintained its position in the countryside, but its rating in urban centers has declined steadily over the past six months.

The "undisputed leader of the party" is Janez Jansa, a "typical politician of political polarization in Slovenia (increasingly popular with one side and less popular with the other)." He also enjoys considerable support among voters of the other two "Slovene spring" parties, SKD and SLS, but lately this support has declined. Another prominent SDSS politicians, Joze Pucnik is less popular than Jansa but his popularity is rather stable. As opposed to Jansa, he has been constantly acceptable to SKD and SLS voters too. Both politicians radically lost the support of left-wing voters, especially Jansa, who although considered one of the leaders on the right would almost definitely lose in a potential run for president if faced with a candidate of similar caliber, for instance Kucan and Drnovsek, the author writes.

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"At the moment the SDSS is still the strongest party of the Slovene spring. Its future success will depend primarily on two things—the success of the other two right-wing parties (SKD and SLS) and possible mistakes by LDS. Among all Slovene parties it is precisely SDSS that is the most dangerous to LDS, especially in the so-called Social Democratic categories—workers, retirees, and unemployed."

The article also states that "the party is well equipped for the electoral campaign for two main reasons. It has a highly media-profiled leader and relatively powerful backing among right-oriented intellectuals, which doubtlessly boosts it power of persuasion. That is where SDSS managed to gain considerable advantage over rival right-wing parties, SKD and SLS. Whoever wishes to defeat SDSS will have to do so before the beginning of the most intense electoral campaign," Bratina writes.

"The SKD maintained its leading role on the right for the first two years after the elections. In 1995 support for the party started declining rapidly. For that reason the claim of its leader Lojze Peterle that it is the second strongest parliamentary party in Slovenia is based on the number of seats in the present parliament and less on the voters who will shape the the future parliament.

"It is difficult to pinpoint the reasons for its decline. However, the fact is that the Aquileia episode and the resignation of the foreign minister [Peterle] have occurred in the meantime, while on the other hand support was growing for the other two right-wing parties, SDSS and SLS, which were increasingly vociferous in questioning SKD's attitude to the government coalition and the electoral coalition of the parties of the Slovene spring. All this combined definitely created uncertainty within a segment of this party's potential voters. The result could be less support for this party and a shift of its voters to more competitive parties with a better defined identity profile."

The analyst writes that the party lost voters in all Slovene regions. The greatest losses were in Ljubljana, Maribor, and Novo Mesto regions. In other areas the losses have been less significant and in Prekmurje it even increased its popularity lately. The losses were the greatest among older and middle-aged voters, while younger voters appear to be more stable. However, they do not represent a significant portion of their electorate. The decline is also noticeable among male voters and voters with high education. The initial losses occurred in urban centers. Recently, however, the party also started losing the support of country people. It maintained a stable position among farmers.

"Lack of media prominent party leaders could be one of the biggest problems at the next State Chamber elections," Bratina continues, assessing the SDK's chances. "Party President Lojze Peterle in the first year after the elections even gained in popularity, followed by two years of decline. During this time he lost in general as well as within his own party, which started losing especially rapidly after local elections. The decline in support for this politician in other right-of-center parties is even more noticeable."

The author notes that it is difficult to judge the popularity of other SKD politicians because they rarely are featured in popularity polls. "Precisely for that reason Peterle will be a highly exposed party personality and will have to weigh his decisions carefully. His resignation from the post of Slovene diplomacy's chief did not bring him any additional points, quite the contrary, among voters of his party and in general.

"Typical of the SKD is that it always gets somewhat fewer votes in the polls than in elections. This is probably a consequence of the way in which its voters decide and also the nature of its electoral base, for which the telephone polling method is not the most suitable. Despite all this, very explicit trends of the party's popularity clearly indicate that this party, about which we often say it is has the biggest natural base of all, has sailed into very dangerous electoral waters indeed. The decline in support for the party is very great, and information that the structure of the party's electorate is also changing should not be ignored either."

"Symptomatic of this party is that its activity in the current coalition, therefore its public image, does not coincide with the identity of its electorate. The party leadership is probably aware of this and for that reason often plays the opposition to the current political ruling parties. All this, thus, boils down to a hiatus between 'the ideal and the reality' which is pushing the voters into a sort of political vacuum. For the time being it appears that the benefits of participation in the government are less than the losses due to discrepancy between the activities of the party caucus and the identity of its electorate. We can speculate that this will increase further in the electoral year, culminating in the party's departure from the coalition."

The SLS, the author concludes, is also "a sure member of the State Chamber after the next elections. Since the last State Chamber elections it has persistently gained support among voters and currently it is the second strongest party of the Slovene right. It has caught up with, if not overtaken, the SKD. Just as with SDSS, the trend of support for SLS changed from positive to negative in the last half of 1995."

The analyst observes that the party has strengthened considerably at the expense of Jelincic's SNS and also

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SKD voters. All the time the party has been gaining steadily in north Primorska. It also enjoys stable support in the Maribor region, in Prekmurje, and in Notranjska. In Celje, Novo Mesto, Slovene Carinthia, and Ljubljana region the party's popularity started waning in the second half of 1995. "The party is gaining constantly among middle-aged voters. It enjoys stable support of younger voters, while support among older voters has declined, especially after 1994."

The author notes that the party is slightly more "male" even though it has been gaining female supporters lately. Its supporters are people with primary or secondary education. The core comes from the countryside, although a slight increase in popularity in towns has been observed. "Over the last few months the negative trend of support has been noticeable primarily among farmers and pensioners."

The most striking party personalities are brothers Marjan and Janez Podobnik, who apart from boosting popularity in the party are also "more acceptable than other right-wing politicians to the voters on the left wing of the political spectrum." The analysis also observes that Marjan Podobnik was gaining in popularity even when the party was loosing supporters and that he particularly excels in one-to-one confrontations with politicians from the left. "With Janez Podobnik's somewhat greater media exposure SLS could even win over some additional voters on the right."

The image of the party is more clear-cut than SKD's since the party has been in opposition since last elections. "It also has the most stable support of all right-wing political parties. Lately SLS has been the center of various speculations concerning the post-election coalition. These speculations will become even more topical if SKD scores a poorer election result. Among the three parties of the Slovene spring, the SLS is more of a competitor for the SKD than the SDSS. Its image is clearly 'the party of Podobniks' and this will probably be its strategy employed in the election campaign. Poor economic results, increased unemployment, and irregularities in the property transformation could, in addition, increase the prospects for a favorable electoral result. Insistence on national sentiments and criticism of irregularities will probably be the two constants in the election campaign of a party that through the skillful appearances of its leader attracts voters from the social margin of our society."

As Aleksander Bratina concludes in the sixth installment of his analysis, the United List of Social Democrats [ZLSD] occupies "a relatively comfortable if not exactly large niche on the extreme left of the Slovene political scene." It has the most stable electoral support of the five main parties and has more or less maintained its supporters from the last elections. The author believes that the party also gained some 5 percent of former SNS voters. In most regions party support has been stable. Positive trends have been noted in industrial Sava Basin, in north Primorska, and Slovene Carinthia, and also in Ljubljana region, and slightly negative trends in Prekmurje, Upper Carniola, and Celje region. Older voters form the important electoral basis of this party, but it seems that a small core of its younger supporters is most loayl. It has slightly more male than female supporters, and the popularity among men increased even further recently. The majority of its supporters have higher education; however, lately the party has been gaining among less well-educated voters. It is mostly present in towns and recently its support has especially started to increase in smaller towns.

"For relative stability of its popularity it must primarily thank its most important segment—pensioners," the author writes. "Decline in support is most noticeable in the Social Democratic categories and among the unemployed. Increased interest for this party can be observed among youths attending school."

"The party compensates for the lack of charismatic personalities by its more or less recognizable existence in the shadow of [President] Kucan's political umbrella. The voters of this party support Kucan wholeheartedly. Dr. Cyril Ribicic also enjoys relatively large support within the party while there is not sufficient information for others. The President's discreet favoring of this party is of great importance for it. The possible formation of the so-called Kucan party would parallel a major restructuring on the left and signal the end of this party."

The analyst anticipates that the party will enter parliament in the next elections. "Because the majority of its voters are pensioners, it will in the time leading up to the next State Chamber elections thwart any measures that would encroach on pensioners' rights. In the next electoral cycle (after the elections this year), however, it will probably find it more advantageous to be in opposition than in the government coalition since the reform of the pensions system is one of the future government's fundamental projects and its voters could resent very much participation in the government that will implement this."

As for the other parliamentary parties, the SNS, the Democratic Party, and the Greens, the analyst doubts that they have secured their entry into the next parliament. "Even if their electoral campaign is fairly aggressive, their chances of getting into parliament are rather slim," he writes. The closest to achieving this is the Democratic Party and the furthest away from it SNS,

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which has been the biggest loser since the last elections and has suffered "a great loss of younger voters under 35, who used to be its strongest electoral segment." They lost support in the countryside among the pupils, students, and the unemployed.

The Democratic Party has recently managed to halt the decline in it s popularity it had suffered ever since the split in the party. Bratina predict that its fate will be decided among the urban voters where it had enjoyed the biggest support even before. To reanimate its former supporters, he advises the party to concentrate on students and people with higher education.

The Greens can seek their "relatively meager" chances among younger voters, mainly the population attending school, the analyst believes.

In the conclusion, Bratina writes that "the Slovene right evidently started the present electoral cycle as an underdog. Until mid-1995 the right has been gaining constantly but since then its gains have slowed down, while the parties of the left started gaining in prominence again. The antagonism between the voters of the right and left-wing parties is currently palpable, and we can assume that the right's latest call for early parliamentary elections was calculated to increase its presence in the public. In any case, now is not the right time for anything of the kind. A year before the elections is nevertheless a sufficiently long period to allow for changes in support for right-wing parties among the voters."

He further observes that Kucan and Drnovsek are the most popular politicians and had achieved the same popularity by the end of 1995. Defense Minister Kacin and Foreign Minister Thaler are in third and fourth place, although Kacin's popularity has been nose-diving ever since his appointment as defense minister. "Among voters of the left-oriented political parties the popularity of Jozef Skoljc is growing," the author adds.

"Until the second half of 1995 the undisputed leader on the right was Janez Jansa. However, his popularity among voters of right-wing parties declined in the second half of 1995, while it increased strongly for Marjan Podobnik, who now enjoys greater support among right-wing oriented voters. The third politician of the right, judging by the support of voters of these parties, appears to be Janez Podobnik, followed by Lojze Peterle."

Before venturing into forecasts for the next elections, the analyst also examines undecided voters. "The percentage of those who do not know which party they will vote for in the next elections is between 25 and 30 percent in Slovenia. It is interesting to note that this percentage was declining steadily until mid-1995 and since then their numbers have been growing again. As the structure of voters in Slovenia is such that the final outcome depends primarily on their decision, analysts often try to understand the structure of undecided voters."

He admits that this is a difficult and a treacherous task because of the limited nature of data obtained in the polls. The poll organizers tried to learn more about undecided voters by asking them eight highly controversial questions (such as attitude to the Catholic Church, national reconciliation, attitude to privatization, relations with Italy) and on the basis of their replies classified them into groups of potential voters. The results showed that 50.7 percent appeared as potential voters of the left and 49.3 percent as potential votes of right-wing parties. The author is also inclined to believe that the number of undecided but potentially right-wing voters has been increasing since November. He bases this observation on the fact that "support for the right wing parties has declined lately, while simultaneously support for the left did not increase significantly. However, the share of undecided voters has."

Although the author admits that it would be impossible to give a reliable forecast for the next elections, he nevertheless believes that "if elections were held tomorrow the block of left-wing political parties would probably win. Given the present threshold, only five parties would qualify for parliament."

"The differences between right- and left-oriented political parties have shrunk the most after the last local elections. In the first half of 1995 the two political blocks in Slovenia were the most balanced. As for regional preference for the political blocks, we can conclude that the situation remained rather similar to the one immediately after the elections, with a couple of exceptions—North Primorska region is more right-wing than ever before. The same applies to Slovene Carinthia and even more to Upper Carniola. The same situation temporarily prevailed in Celje and Maribor regions. Lately, we have noticed a decline in the popularity of right-wing parties in all regions that have a relatively powerful segment of the social democratic voters (workers, unemployed, pensioners). It is evident that pensioner-voters are the biggest guarantee of stability for left-wing political parties. Their support for the most extreme left parties can increase even further in the face of recent events.

"Objectively speaking, the status of pensioners improved under the present government. The elections in the near future definitely would not suit the right-wing parties although one must also be a little careful here. It is true that right wing parties have lost very much over

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the past few months. However, the left-wing political parties did not benefit as a result, which supports the theory that there was no substantial transfer of voters from one electoral block to another. It is possible that the share of the right-wing oriented within the segment of undecided voters has increased. Precisely because of the current situation, the right-wing parties will definitely channel a lot of their energy in the election campaign. Some of them will have to invest a little more effort in the professional nature of their campaign than they did at the last elections. Some right-wing parties were—with the exception of work on the field which is, of course, also very important—in a rather subordinated position at the last elections, especially in relation to the triumphant LDS. In light of the trends among the left-wing parties (if allowed to speculate) we anticipate:

"— They will not change conditions, primarily in the form of cutting funds in the social policy.

"— New legal provisions that somewhat more strictly control the unemployed probably will not be enacted before the elections.

"— A more radical reform of the pensions system will be delayed for another year

"— In the year leading to elections the government will not seriously concern itself with curbing the growth of salaries.

"— Arguments in support of the success story will acquire new variants.

"On the right, however, we can expect:

"— An outbreak of another scandal.

"— Escalating demands from agriculture in the process of adjustment to the EU standards and a general polemic surrounding 'the harmonization' of Slovene property legislation with the European Union.

"— Escalation of the problem of denationalization.

"— A significant increase in industrial strikes.

"— Before the departure of the ZLSD from the government coalition the Christian Democrats had been expected to leave the coalition. Now it is this party's vital need so to speak to get SLS in the coalition.

"— There will be more talk about the right wing in general as conflicts may arise regarding the privileged position in the right.

"The turnout will also play a great role in the next elections. If it will be around 60 percent, as in the last local elections, or less, then the chances of the right-wing parties for the victory will be greater. In case of a higher turnout where the number of voters from urban areas increases, the chances of the left wing will increase. Namely, it is a well-known fact that voters in which the right-wing political parties usually have grater support are more disciplined in participating in elections. ZLSD would gain primarily from a lower turnout. Also important are the movements of the economic trends and the degree of their transparency. If prosperity dominates, the chances of the right-wing parties will be smaller," Bratina concludes his analysis of the Slovene political scene in election year.

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Federal

FRY: Lilic Says Dayton Implementation Priority

LD1402163596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1621 GMT 14 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pristina, Feb. 14 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav President Zoran Lilic said here Wednesday [14 February] that the implementation of the Dayton accords was one of the priority goals and that Yugoslavia, for its part, had from the start urged an equal treatment of all sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Lilic said in a talk with representatives of the Power Industry of Serbia (EPS) in the centre of Serbia's southern province of Kosovo and Metohija that economic recovery and development were also among Yugoslavia's priority tasks.

He said that following the suspension of international sanctions against Yugoslavia, there was no reason why Yugoslavia should not draw closer to the developed Western countries.

Lilic said one had the impression that some provisions of the Dayton peace accords were not being adhered to of late, which he said could not be conducive to creating a climate of confidence in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

'We, nevertheless, believe that the Dayton accords will be implemented consistently and in an unbiased fashion, and that the sanctions against Yugoslavia will be lifted in line with the implementation of the accords,' Lilic said.

The Yugoslav president said the lifting of the sanctions would enable Yugoslavia's quick reintegration into international financial trends and secure financial aid for it.

Lilic said Yugoslavia had lost a great deal during the three and a half years of the international sanctions but had to make up for the lost and to rid itself of some negative habits from the period behind it.

The Yugoslav president singled out the importance of the projects for building a highway between the town of Nis in Serbia and the Adriatic coast, via Pristina, Pec and Cakor, and for building gas-supply and heating systems in Pristina itself.

He said, however, that projects of this kind presupposed unity and concord in Kosovo and Metohija.

Lilic paid recognition to the EPS for fulfilling its national duty in the past three and a half years of the international sanctions.

He lent support to the plans for greater investments into the EPS for its stepped-up development.

Lilic said in a talk with local Pristina officials that stepped-up development, a better standard of living and overall prosperity in Kosovo and Metohija depended the most on inter-ethnic relations.

'We should be happy over the stabilization of the situation in Kosovo and Metohija and everything that has been achieved here and by the wish and orientation of all citizens, regardless of nationality, to live in peace,' Lilic said.

'That is why everybody, ethnic Albanians, Serbs, Montenegrins and others, must combat nationalism and extremism by all existing mechanisms,' the Yugoslav president said.

'There can be no prosperity in Kosovo and Metohija without a policy of national equality and without respect for the state,' Lilic said.

Yugoslavia's strategic goals are a further stabilization of relations in Kosovo and Metohija, economic and overal development of Serbia and Yugoslavia, and the stabilization of the situation and the establishing of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which are still fragile, Lilic said.

The Yugoslav president told the local Pristina officials that a lasting solution would be sought for refugees from war-affected parts of the former Yugoslavia who are in Kosovo and Metohija, which he said would be in the interest of both the refugees and the local population.

FRY: Lilic on Dayton Accord, Kosovo

AU1402174596 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 14 Feb 96

[Report by Josip Fazekas, Vukomir Petric, and Milos Lepovic—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Unspecified correspondent] After being informed in the Kosmet sector of the Serbian Electricity Board about the encouraging results achieved under extremely difficult conditions, which were even crowned at the beginning of this year with a record production of 134 million kWh of electricity, President Lilic said that Yugoslavia was involved in some lively diplomatic activity whose main objective was the successful implementation of the Dayton agreement.

[Lilic] Following the signing of the Dayton agreement and the recognition given us for the policy that we have been conducting [changes thought] it is certain that without the presence of the FRY delegation and

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the efforts of our delegation head, President Milosevic, there would be no Dayton agreement and we need constantly to reiterate this. This means that there would be no peace, there would no stability in the region of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the earlier Yugoslavia and I am personally convinced that there would be no peace or stability in the broader region.

What is our goal in the coming period? The implementation of the Dayton agreement; I believe that we all have to agree on this for the simple reason that any other option would again lead us in an undesirable direction. When I say the implementation of the Dayton agreement, it means that it should not be detrimental to any of the sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but exactly as the agreement specifies. In the recent period we have had very intense diplomatic activities precisely because there was the impression that (?the agreement) implemented was not the agreement that was signed. This will certainly be cleared up, we have received such promises, and the implementation of the agreement will proceed precisely as planned. This means that we will soon be entering a period that promises full lifting of the sanctions and, the most important thing, our chance to join financial institutions, the IMF, the World Bank, and the creation of conditions for a truly rapid and exceptional development.

Our second objective and task, in addition to the implementation of the agreement, is precisely the economic reconstruction and development of the FRY. We have no reason not to believe that our place is among the more developed European countries. It is our goal—and I particularly wish to stress this here in Kosmet—to have good relations with all our neighbors and we are intensely working on this.

[Unspecified correspondent] There can be no prosperity in Kosmet without a policy of national equality on the one hand, and respect for the state in which one lives on the other hand, President Lilic stressed in talks with the heads of five of the province's counties. He expressed satisfaction with indications that the situation in Kosmet is normalizing.

[Lilic] I believe I can say that we should be satisfied with the stabilization of the situation in Kosovo, particularly if this is a lasting orientation of all its peoples. If this is so, then it is a fact which should satisfy us, although it is certain—I wish to stress this here and I believe that you share my opinion—that there are those who think differently. All progressive Albanians, Serbs, and Montenegrins, irrespective of whether they are natives or refugees who have settled in the area, must fight such extreme nationalisms and extremists, regardless of their nationality. I believe that in the struggle against extremists and extremism all mechanisms of a well organized state must be applied and that is why it is [word indistinct] to do what I mentioned at the beginning and that is to appoint adequate personnel to all state bodies [words indistinct]. [passage omitted]

FRY: Lilic: FRY Aims To Turn Balkans Into Peace Zone

LD1402152096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1341 GMT 14 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 14 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav President Zoran Lilic said on Wednesday [14 February] in Belgrade that Yugoslavia's basic aim is to turn the Balkans into a zone of peace and thus significantly contribute to the stability of Europe as a whole.

Lilic made the statement in talks with French Constitutional Court President Roland Dumas who is on a two-day visit to the Yugoslav Constitutional Court.

In order to fulfill its obligations from the Dayton peace agreement, the international community should create conditions to enable Yugoslavia to realize this aim.

The Yugoslav president's information service said that Lilic stated that hasty decisions should not be repeated, such as the most recent one regarding The Hague tribunal and its prosecutor Richard Goldstone.

On Feb. 7 Goldstone issued the warrent for the arrest of two officers of the Army of Serb Republic (Bosnian Serb state): General Djordje Djukic and Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic, on suspicion of committing war crimes in Bosnia and on the basis of information received from the Sarajevo Muslim authorities.

Gen. Djukic and Col. Krsmanovic were abducted by the Muslim authorities in the vicinity of Sarajevo on one of the so-called blue routes controlled by the international Implementation Force (IFOR) six days before The Hague tribunal issued the warrents for their arrest (Jan. 30).

The Serb officers were on their way to a previously scheduled meeting with IFOR representatives.

On Monday evening, Djukic and Krsmanovic were handed over to The Hague tribunal in charge of war crimes committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and on Tuesday investigation proceedings were instigated.

Dumas said that the interested parties should insist that The Hague tribunal establishes the legal criteria—who is entitled to make arrests, on what conditions, and how

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indictments are rised in order to build up its international authority and do its work objectively.

Lilic reiterrated that the initialling of the peace agreement for Bosnia in Dayton (Nov. 21, 1995) and its signing in Paris (Dec. 14, 1995) had brought a peace, but added that peace cannot become stable nor lasting if legal criteria of The Hague tribunal are not determined and if all guarrantors of the implementation of the peace agreement fail to have the same criteria towards all sides in Bosnia.

Yugoslavia highly appreciates France's efforts to conclude the peace process, Lilic said and added that this is a good starting point for future cooperation which opens up wide prospects.

Lilic praised France which will be first E.U. country to send a special and accredited ambassador to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. He said that Yugoslavia would also dispatch its ambassador to Paris.

FRY: Serbian President Receives UN Administrator

LD1402173596 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1532 GMT 14 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 14 Feb (TANJUG)—Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Republic [of Serbia], today received U.S. diplomat Jacques Klein, UN administrator for the Srem-Baranja district, who has arrived with his associates in Belgrade.

President Milosevic wished ambassador Klein and his colleagues success in their mission. The expectation was voiced that the process of normalization of conditions in this region should be accelerated with the full involvement of international factors. This means, above all, the solid protection of the security, rights, freedoms, and equality of citizens and more rapid economic recovery.

The importance of setting up cooperation between local bodies and institutions and the UN administrator and his offices in the Srem-Baranja region was also noted.

Also taking part in the talks was Milan Milutinovic, federal minister for foreign affairs.

FRY: Lilic, Bulgarian PM Discuss Balkan Future

LD1302164096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1624 GMT 13 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan 13 (TANJUG) [dateline as received]—President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Zoran Lilic and visiting Bulgarian Premier Jan Videnov agreed in Belgrade Tuesday [13 February] that their countries' common goal was to make the Balkans a zone of peace and friendship.

Videnov, who is accompanied by several cabinet members and associates, has arrived in Belgrade on a two-day official visit to Yugoslavia.

A statement on the Lilic-Videnov talks said that they agreed a strengthening of the process of cooperation among Balkan countries would pave the way for European integrations.

Our efforts to attain the goal are based on good neighbourly relations, such as the Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations, Lilic said.

Videnov proposed that in keeping with a policy of good neighbourly relations Belgrade and Sofia sign an overall agreement on friendship and cooperation as soon as possible. Videnov also said that Bulgaria had already signed such an agreement with other neighbours.

Videnov reiterated that his country advocated a policy of equality, cooperation, respect for sovereignty and integrity of states, the statement said.

There are tendencies of pushing the Balkans backwards and attempts at stirring up past disputes, and even border issues, but we believe that history should be left to historians and that Balkan countries should settle their problems by upgrading economic and cultural development and cooperation, the Bulgarian premier said.

Lilic and Videnov agreed that isolated problems or incidents should be prevented from derailing the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the statement said.

The signing of the peace accord was made possible only with a policy of equality and equal treatment of the parties to the conflict and it is necessary to respect the same principles to obtain its full implementation, Lilic said.

The latest developments show that exceptions are being made, the statement said. Lilic particularly stressed the arrest of two top-ranking officers of the Serb Republic, the Bosnian Serb state.

Gen. Djordje Djukic and Col. Aleksa Krsmanovic were abducted by the Muslim police, on January 30 in territory controlled by the Implementation Force (IFOR), while they were heading for talks with the IFOR command on the implementation of the peace accords. They were clandestinely transferred to The Hague on Monday evening.

The statement said that Yugoslavia condemned war crimes and that it had cleary showed its willingness

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to cooperate with The Hague tribunal but that the tribunal and chief prosecutor Richard Goldstone could only politicize and discredit the entire idea of justice, international law and legislation by making unilateral and biased moves.

On the other hand, such developments can only provoke insecurity among the citizens of the Serb Republic and their mistrust not only towards the U.N. war crimes tribunal but the international community factors who guarantee the implementation of the Dayton accords as well, and can even instill fears among them that peace cannot be restored.

Fears can easily grow into dangerous reactions or incidents in the already uneasy atmosphere in Bosnia, Lilic said.

We can meet our obligations as a guarantor only if the agreement's basic principles, primarily an equal treatment of both entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, are fully respected, Lilic said.

FRY: Officer Suspected of War Crimes Promoted

AU1402175296 Paris AFP in English 1649 GMT 14 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Podgorica, Yugoslavia, Feb 14 (AFP)—A Yugoslav Army officer, Veselin Sljivancanin, wanted by an international war-crimes tribunal in connection with the massacre of 261 civilians in a Croatian hospital has been promoted, an informed military source said.

Sljivancanin was promoted from lieutenant-colonel to full colonel, the source said, and is to be transfered from the Montenegrin capital here to Belgrade.

He is thought to have been in charge of federal Yugoslav army troops held responsible for the killing in November 1991 of the 261 patients taken from Vukovar hospital in eastern Croatia, as the former Yugoslavia disintegrated into war.

FRY: Serb Unity Leader on Kosovo Separatism

LD1302143096 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1319 GMT 13 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 13 Feb (TANJUG)—Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan, president of the Party of Serb Unity [Stranka Srpskog Jedinstva-SSJ], today said that the extradition of two officers of the Serb Republic to the Hague Tribunal represents an attack against the Serb people.

Expressing his indignation, Raznjatovic told reporters at the International Press Center in Belgrade that the two arrested Serb officers "did not fire a shot during the war" and that they carried out logistical tasks.

He mentioned Kosmet, and said that Albanian separatism is emerging again through attempts to expel [from Kosovo] the refugees from the Republic of Serb Krajina [in Croatia].

Raznjatovic, who has revived his role as chairman of the SSJ, appealed to the Serb refugees to stay [in Kosovo], and said that the Kosovo problem could be solved by adopting American constitutional provisions regarding emigration. He said that according to those provisions, the citizens who were against the state they lived in and who refused to serve in its military had to leave that state.

Serbia

Serbia: SPS Spokesman on Attacks on Kosovo Camps

LD1402231796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2154 GMT 14 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 14 (TANJUG)—Ivica Dacic, spokesman of Serbia's ruling Socialist Party, said Wednesday he considered it immoral that some Yugoslav media arbitrarily and without proof accused ethnic Albanians of throwing bombs on refugee camps in the Serbian southern province of Kosovo-Metohija (Kosmet).

Such reports are a typical example of inciting and spreading inter-ethnic hatred at the time when what consolidation of peace is so badly needed, said Dacic.

A series of explosions took place in five refugee camps in Kosmet on Sunday evening, but there were no casualties.

Serbia: JUL Rejects PFP Membership

AU1402150796 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 14 Feb 96 p 4

["N.T." report: "JUL Is Not Even Thinking About 'Partnership for Peace'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—JUL [Yugoslav Left] is against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia joining "Partnership for Peace." This was stated by JUL's spokesman Aleksandar Vulin at a news conference yesterday in response to the journalists' insistence to answer the question clearly.

"JUL is not even thinking about 'Partnership for Peace,'" Vulin repeated several times, and added: "If one does not even think about something, then this is simply not being accepted, and I have nothing to tell

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you about it. JUL is opposed to 'Partnership for Peace' just as it is opposed to any bloc alignment."

Vulin said that the extradition of two high-ranking Serb officers to The Hague represents the violation of the Dayton Agreement, and demanded that the international community clearly state the conditions under which people can be detained by The Hague, stressing that the same standards should apply to all three sides in Bosnia.

The reaction from The Hague Tribunal is benefiting those who favor war, Vulin said, condemning "mild reaction" of the international community to the Croat authorities' violation of the Dayton Agreement in Mostar.

Serbia: Seselj To Testify Against Milosevic in Hague

AU1302160796 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 13 Feb 96 p 5

[Report by V.D.: "To The Hague Without a Summons"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—Vojislav Seselj, president of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS], is earnestly preparing to go to The Hague. He recently submitted a request for a visa to the Dutch Embassy and, if granted the document, he will be on his way even though he has not received an official summons from the International Court.

I will be visiting the Serbian community in Holland, and, irrespective of whether I am served a summons, I will offer my testimony to the Tribunal, the Radicals leader said, adding that he was expecting "concrete gains" from his voluntary cooperation.

Let me remind you that in December last year, Seselj offered to testify in the possible trial of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. His intention, claims Seselj, is to "show that the military operations were not conducted by Karadzic or Mladic, but by Slobodan Milosevic personally."

In a telephone conversation with the Tribunal's official representative, Seselj was told—so he claims—that no charges have been issued against him. "They cannot place me among war criminals," the SRS president is convinced.

Serbia: Financing of Ethnic Minority Media Increased

LD1402192096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1724 GMT 14 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Nis, Feb. 14 (TANJUG)—Serbian Minister of Information Ratomir Vico said Wednesday that the republican budget would this year earmark much greater funds for financing media of ethnic minorities.

Vico said this at a meeting with editors of Bulgarian-language radio and television programmes in the region of Nis in southeastern Serbia.

'Almost every ethnic monority in Serbia has a television channel or frequency for its own information programmes, while international and European conventions prescribe only one channel or frequency for all minorities in a country,' Vico said.

He said that such attitude of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its Republic of Serbia was based on the belief that minority members feel free when they freely cultivate their cultural values and tradition, and when they can read and write and be informed in their mother tongues.

'Only when a minority member fully exercises such rights, he can also feel a member of a wider community, i.e. the state he lives in,' Vico said.

He pointed at the good experiences with minority media in Serbia's northern province of Vojvodina, which has more than 20 ethnic minority groups.

Montenegro

Montenegro: Djukanovic Demands Strict Price Controls

AU1402092096 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 11 Feb 96 p 4

[Unattributed report on news conference by Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic in Podgorica on 9 February: "Hindering in Serbia and Yugoslavia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic warned in Podgorica last Friday that price increases could endanger the main goals of the Second Program of Economic Stabilization,and said that the Montenegrin Government has demanded that the "Federal Government take action" to stop the inflationary trends.

Owing to the unsynchronized implementation of economic policies, especially in the price sector, the stability of price parities and the domestic currency could be endangered, Djukanovic told reporters.

According to him, this is indicated by the January price increase of 9.5 percent at the federal, 9.6 percent at the Serbian, and 8.6 percent at the Montenegrin level. The standard of living is seriously endangered, and the increase in prices has not been caused by the attempt to correct parities, since, for instance, the price of gasoline is considerably lower, Djukanovic said.

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If the present trend of rising prices continues, prices will be doubled in comparison with last year, Djukanovic said, adding that the increase in prices is already exerting pressure on the currency, which is confirmed by the so-called black market.

Considering that the monetary and macroeconomic policies are in the hands of the federal organs and that the inappropriate conduct of these policies was identified as the most important cause of the inflationary trends last year, Montenegro has called for consultations and an agreement on activating the Federal Government in the conduct of the economic policy that would bring the current inflationary trends under full control, Djukanovic said.

He said that, regarding Montenegro, the most significant criticism of the Second Program is the lack of "clear commitment to intensifying the process of privatization."

Moreover, the lack of resolve to solve this capital economic and political issue at the federal level and in the Republic of Serbia is putting a question mark over not only the fast and efficient inclusion in international currents and the restoration of relations with international financial institutions, but also the adopted strategy and the concept of economic development of Montenegro, Djukanovic said.

Montenegro will insist that the Federal Government again assumes the control of prices and trade of cereals, agricultural products, and food, which affect the standard of living and the price of other goods.

Answering correpondents' questions, Djukanovic said that Montenegro and Serbia do not have opposing interests and concepts. All the documents adopted are aimed at the market and privatization. The problem lies in the implementation of these ideas.

Serbia is lagging behind with privatization and must not waste time. If we waste 1996, we will make more difficult cooperation with international monetary institutions. We need money, Djukanovic said.

"Blind" National Bank

The Montenegrin prime minister also said that the National Bank of Yugoslavia is not prepared to discuss essential issues regarding the functioning of the banking system, and the money, capital, and stock markets; that is, the essence of a modern financial system.

The central bank is beginning to look like an academic supervisor that has solved only one problem and does not see that the effects of that have already disappeared, Djukanovic said.

For Lower Custom Duties

Djukanovic says that Montenegro will demand a revision of the system of economic relations with other countries, that is, a looser policy of imports and protection of domestic production. According to him, this implies a more significant reduction of custom duties and levies, and not only corrections to the other taxes, which has been the practice of the federal government so for.

Previaka Is Still a Problem

Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic said that the government and the republican state leadership are striving the quickest possible normalization of relations with the former Yugoslav republics, its immediate neighbors, such as Italy and Albania, and with the international community as a whole.

As far as we are concerned, there are no longer any formal obstacles to mutual recognition of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia-FYROM] and Slovenia. Regarding Croatia, however, recognition will take place when the agreements from Dayton are implemented, that is, when the contentious issue of Previaka is resolved, and regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina, when relations in that region are finally normalized, Djukanovic said.

Kosovo

Kosovo: Serb Refugee Centers Come Under Bomb Attack

AU1402114496 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 13 Feb 96 p 15

[Report by S. Kostic: "A Real Tragedy Avoided in Vucitrn"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The night before last, after 2100 [2000 GMT], bombs were thrown simultaneously at the buildings of the refugee camps in several towns of Kosovo and Metohija in which refugees from the Republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] are situated.

Bombs were thrown at the Medical School in Pristina, where refugees have found a temporarily shelter; in Podujevo; in the refugee settlements in Vucitrn and Suva Reka, which were constructed by the Serbian commissariat for refugees; and in Kosovska Mitrovica. In four out of five localities, the bombs exploded, the POLITIKA correspondent from Pristina, Z. Zejneli, reports.

As our correspondent from Vucitrn reports, a tragedy was narrowly avoided in a refugee settlement in this town the night before last. For the time being, an

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unidentified person, or several of them, threw two hand grenades of Chinese manufacture into room number 4, in which the RSK refugees were sleeping blissfully. Luckily, the bombs thrown through the window glass did not explode.

A panic ensued after bombs were thrown into a Vucitrn school center, in which more than 300 refugees from Krajina have been situated since August last year, and the unfortunate people stayed awake until dawn, the POLITIKA correspondent from Vucitrn, Lj. Knezevic, reports.

Our correspondent P. Pasic reports on the event near the Park Motel in Pec. A hand grenade was thrown at the motel, which houses Serb refugees from the RSK, and, according to Veselin Cadjenovic, the investigation judge of the Pec District Court, it exploded 1 meter away from the building. Luckily, nobody was injured. Minor material damage was incurred in the explosion. The glass in two windows of the motel was broken, and the facade of the building was slightly damaged.

According to Cadjenovic, the bomb exploded in the southwest side of the motel where the restaurant is situated, which was luckily empty at the time.

Otherwise, the Park Motel houses some 100 Serbian refugees from the RSK.

Within the area of the Kristal hotel in the center of Suva Reka, where 36 refugees from RSK are situated, a bomb exploded at about 2100 last night in which nobody died or was hurt, luckily.

Security services are working intensely to shed some light on these incidents, which have caused great anxiety among the residents of the Serbian ethnicity in the Prizren district, correspondent S. Kostic reports.

Kosovo: SPS Rules Out Return to Province's 1974 Status

AU1402212696 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 14 Feb 96

[Report by Milos Lepovic on SPS rally in Kosovo on 14 Feb—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Lepovic] In these trying times, the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] has maintained a solid core, which has rallied around it the most progressive forces in society. This party, even when surrounded by war and in the midst of a grave economic crisis, offers a way out and leads to a better tomorrow. This core has been established by President Slobodan Milosevic, said Vojislav Zivkovic, president of the SPS Municipal Committee in Kosmet.

[Zivkovic] In the past period, the Kosmet SPS was working under conditions created by a political and economic crisis. Severely tested national relations, an economy on the brink of collapse, and the constant threat that the biggest war in the Balkans would start precisely here, where the disintegration of Yugoslavia started. These are the circumstances under which our party was operating. Now, when we can state with certainty that the time of the greatest trials is behind us, we can conclude that the SPS persevered with its political commitments and managed to maintain the state, national, and social interests of Serbia and Yugoslavia in the region.

The continuity of Serbia's policy is of utmost importance for the SPS, and the Socialists' implementation of this policy in Kosmet has yielded very concrete results. Important proof of this is the change in the political atmosphere and the decision of a great number of Albanians who are gradually beginning to see the Kosmet issue realistically. We are striving for a dialogue that will define the Kosmet issue as an issue of reason, interest, will, and purpose. We are convinced that Serbia, as a state of citizens, must be of interest to members of the Albanian minority. Only a modern, democratic, and strong Serbia can enable development and guarantee the rights of ethnic minorities. The Socialists of Kosmet believe in Slobodan Milosevic, socialist democracy, social equality, equality, freedom, and themselves. At the same time, the Kosmet Socialists do not believe in right-wing political options, they do not believe in anonymous masses, noninstitutional solutions, [words indistinct] individuals and groups, false authorities, secret and criminal centers of powers, nor in those who insist on class and economic discrimination among peoples.

[Lepovic] Speaking about the SPS's future tasks in Kosmet, Vojislav Zivkovic said:

[Zivkovic] The SPS does not intend to change its policy in Kosmet. We rule out the possibility of creating a Kosovo republic, or an independent Albanian state in the region. Moreover, we assess that it is in an illusion to believe that the 1974 status [of Kosovo as an autonomous province of Serbia] can be re-established. The reinstatement of state attributes to Kosmet would only encourage the Albanian separatists and would instill insecurity among the Serbian and Montenegrin people in the region. Moreover, our party believes that the reinstatement of the province's status under the 1974 Constitution would return the Kosmet problem to the beginning and would initiate an escalation of the national separatist movement. In present circumstances, such a move can only lead to conflict, and endanger peace in the region. [passage omitted]

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